[csw-devel] SF.net SVN: gar:[9139] csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files

chninkel at users.sourceforge.net chninkel at users.sourceforge.net
Sat Mar 13 18:23:00 CET 2010


Revision: 9139
          http://gar.svn.sourceforge.net/gar/?rev=9139&view=rev
Author:   chninkel
Date:     2010-03-13 17:22:59 +0000 (Sat, 13 Mar 2010)

Log Message:
-----------
openssh: added gsskex patch

Added Paths:
-----------
    csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/openssh-5.4p1-gsskex-all-20100313.patch

Removed Paths:
-------------
    csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/openssh-5.3p1-gsskex-all-20090726.patch

Deleted: csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/openssh-5.3p1-gsskex-all-20090726.patch
===================================================================
--- csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/openssh-5.3p1-gsskex-all-20090726.patch	2010-03-13 16:47:28 UTC (rev 9138)
+++ csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/openssh-5.3p1-gsskex-all-20090726.patch	2010-03-13 17:22:59 UTC (rev 9139)
@@ -1,3060 +0,0 @@
-? .kex.h.swp
-? .pc
-? openssh-5.0p1-gsskex-20080404.patch
-? openssh-5.0p1-gssrenew-20080707.patch
-? openssh-5.2p1-gsskex-20090726.patch
-? openssh-5.2p1-gsskex-all-20090726.patch
-? patches
-Index: ChangeLog.gssapi
-===================================================================
-RCS file: ChangeLog.gssapi
-diff -N ChangeLog.gssapi
---- /dev/null	1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 -0000
-+++ ./ChangeLog.gssapi	26 Jul 2009 12:21:52 -0000
-@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
-+20090615
-+  - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
-+      sshd.c ]
-+    Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
-+	Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
-+	Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
-+	Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
-+	Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
-+	Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
-+	Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
-+	Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
-+	Cast data.length before printing
-+	If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
-+
-+20090201
-+  - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
-+      ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
-+    Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
-+    to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
-+
-+20080404
-+  - [ gss-serv.c ]
-+    Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
-+    been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
-+    Stoichkov
-+
-+20070317
-+  - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
-+    Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a 
-+    function
-+
-+20061220
-+  - [ servconf.c ]
-+    Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and 
-+    documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
-+
-+20060910
-+  - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
-+      ssh-gss.h ]
-+    add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
-+  - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
-+    Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
-+    acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
-+    <Bugzilla #928>
-+  - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
-+    Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
-+    configuration files
-+  - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
-+    Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
-+    Limit length of error messages displayed by client
-+
-+20060909
-+  - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
-+    move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
-+    only, where they belong 
-+    <Bugzilla #1225>
-+
-+20060829
-+  - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
-+    Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment 
-+    variable
-+
-+20060828
-+  - [ gss-genr.c ]
-+    Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
-+    <Fixed upstream 20060829>
-+
-+20060818
-+  - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
-+    Make sure that SPENGO is disabled 
-+    <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
-+
-+20060421
-+  - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
-+    a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
-+    fix compiler errors/warnings 
-+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+  - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
-+    fix uninitialized variable warnings
-+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+  - [ gssgenr.c ]
-+    pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
-+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+    <Bugzilla #1220 >
-+  - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
-+    #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
-+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+    <Fixed upstream 20060304>
-+  - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c 
-+    add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
-+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+  - [ sshconnect2.c ]
-+    add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
-+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+    <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
-Index: Makefile.in
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/Makefile.in,v
-retrieving revision 1.298
-diff -u -r1.298 Makefile.in
---- ./Makefile.in	5 Nov 2008 05:20:46 -0000	1.298
-+++ ./Makefile.in	26 Jul 2009 12:21:53 -0000
-@@ -71,7 +71,8 @@
- 	atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
- 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o kexdh.o \
- 	kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o scard.o msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o \
--	entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o schnorr.o
-+	entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o schnorr.o \
-+	kexgssc.o
- 
- SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
- 	sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o
-@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@
- 	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-jpake.o \
- 	monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o \
- 	auth-krb5.o \
--	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
-+	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\
- 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
- 	audit.o audit-bsm.o platform.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o
- 
-Index: auth-krb5.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/auth-krb5.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.35
-diff -u -r1.35 auth-krb5.c
---- ./auth-krb5.c	5 Aug 2006 02:39:39 -0000	1.35
-+++ ./auth-krb5.c	26 Jul 2009 12:21:53 -0000
-@@ -166,8 +166,13 @@
- 
- 	len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
- 	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
-+	    authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
-+#else
- 	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
- 	    authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
-+#endif
- 
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 	if (options.use_pam)
-@@ -219,15 +224,22 @@
- #ifndef HEIMDAL
- krb5_error_code
- ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
--	int tmpfd, ret;
-+	int ret;
- 	char ccname[40];
- 	mode_t old_umask;
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+	char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
-+#else
-+	char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
-+	int tmpfd;
-+#endif
- 
- 	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
--	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
-+	    cctemplate, geteuid());
- 	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
- 		return ENOMEM;
- 
-+#ifndef USE_CCAPI
- 	old_umask = umask(0177);
- 	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
- 	umask(old_umask);
-@@ -242,6 +254,7 @@
- 		return errno;
- 	}
- 	close(tmpfd);
-+#endif
- 
- 	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
- }
-Index: auth.h
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/auth.h,v
-retrieving revision 1.80
-diff -u -r1.80 auth.h
---- ./auth.h	5 Nov 2008 05:20:46 -0000	1.80
-+++ ./auth.h	26 Jul 2009 12:21:53 -0000
-@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
- 	int		 valid;		/* user exists and is allowed to login */
- 	int		 attempt;
- 	int		 failures;
-+	int		 server_caused_failure; 
- 	int		 force_pwchange;
- 	char		*user;		/* username sent by the client */
- 	char		*service;
-Index: auth2-gss.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/auth2-gss.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.19
-diff -u -r1.19 auth2-gss.c
---- ./auth2-gss.c	2 Dec 2007 11:59:45 -0000	1.19
-+++ ./auth2-gss.c	26 Jul 2009 12:21:54 -0000
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.16 2007/10/29 00:52:45 dtucker Exp $ */
- 
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-  *
-  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -52,6 +52,40 @@
- static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
- static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
- 
-+/* 
-+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
-+ */
-+static int
-+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
-+{
-+	int authenticated = 0;
-+	Buffer b;
-+	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
-+	u_int len;
-+
-+	mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
-+	mic.length = len;
-+
-+	packet_check_eom();
-+
-+	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
-+	    "gssapi-keyex");
-+
-+	gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
-+	gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-+
-+	/* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
-+	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, 
-+	    &gssbuf, &mic))))
-+		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+		    authctxt->pw));
-+	
-+	buffer_free(&b);
-+	xfree(mic.value);
-+
-+	return (authenticated);
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
-  * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
-@@ -102,6 +136,7 @@
- 
- 	if (!present) {
- 		xfree(doid);
-+		authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
- 		return (0);
- 	}
- 
-@@ -109,6 +144,7 @@
- 		if (ctxt != NULL)
- 			ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
- 		xfree(doid);
-+		authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
- 		return (0);
- 	}
- 
-@@ -242,7 +278,8 @@
- 
- 	packet_check_eom();
- 
--	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-+	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+	    authctxt->pw));
- 
- 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
- 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
-@@ -277,7 +314,8 @@
- 	gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
- 
- 	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
--		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-+		authenticated = 
-+		    PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
- 	else
- 		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
- 
-@@ -291,6 +329,12 @@
- 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
- 	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic");
- }
-+
-+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
-+	"gssapi-keyex",
-+	userauth_gsskeyex,
-+	&options.gss_authentication
-+};
- 
- Authmethod method_gssapi = {
- 	"gssapi-with-mic",
-Index: auth2.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/auth2.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.149
-diff -u -r1.149 auth2.c
---- ./auth2.c	5 Nov 2008 05:20:46 -0000	1.149
-+++ ./auth2.c	26 Jul 2009 12:21:54 -0000
-@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
- extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
- extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
- extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
- #endif
- #ifdef JPAKE
-@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@
- 	&method_none,
- 	&method_pubkey,
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-+	&method_gsskeyex,
- 	&method_gssapi,
- #endif
- #ifdef JPAKE
-@@ -274,6 +276,7 @@
- #endif
- 
- 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
-+	authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0;
- 
- 	/* try to authenticate user */
- 	m = authmethod_lookup(method);
-@@ -346,7 +349,8 @@
- 	} else {
- 
- 		/* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */
--		if (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0)
-+		if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure &&
-+		    (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0))
- 			authctxt->failures++;
- 		if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-Index: clientloop.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/clientloop.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.197
-diff -u -r1.197 clientloop.c
---- ./clientloop.c	14 Feb 2009 05:28:21 -0000	1.197
-+++ ./clientloop.c	26 Jul 2009 12:21:56 -0000
-@@ -110,6 +110,10 @@
- #include "match.h"
- #include "msg.h"
- 
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#endif
-+
- /* import options */
- extern Options options;
- 
-@@ -1429,6 +1433,13 @@
- 		/* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
- 		if (!rekeying) {
- 			channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
-+
-+			if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
-+			    ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) {
-+				debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
-+				need_rekeying = 1;
-+			}
-+
- 			if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) {
- 				debug("need rekeying");
- 				xxx_kex->done = 0;
-Index: configure.ac
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/configure.ac,v
-retrieving revision 1.415
-diff -u -r1.415 configure.ac
---- ./configure.ac	16 Feb 2009 04:37:03 -0000	1.415
-+++ ./configure.ac	26 Jul 2009 12:22:00 -0000
-@@ -473,6 +473,30 @@
- 	    [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
- 	AC_DEFINE(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF, 1,
- 	    [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
-+	AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API)
-+	AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
-+		[SessionCreate(0, 0);],
-+		[ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
-+		 AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1, 
-+			[platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
-+		 LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
-+		 AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
-+		[ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
-+		 AC_MSG_RESULT(no)])
-+	AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache)
-+	AC_TRY_COMPILE(
-+		[#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
-+		[cc_context_t c;
-+		 (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
-+		[AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1, 
-+			[platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
-+		 LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
-+		 AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
-+		 if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
-+			AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***)
-+		fi],
-+		[AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]
-+	)
- 	m4_pattern_allow(AU_IPv)
- 	AC_CHECK_DECL(AU_IPv4, [], 
- 	    AC_DEFINE(AU_IPv4, 0, [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
-Index: gss-genr.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/gss-genr.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.21
-diff -u -r1.21 gss-genr.c
---- ./gss-genr.c	12 Jun 2007 13:44:36 -0000	1.21
-+++ ./gss-genr.c	26 Jul 2009 12:22:01 -0000
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.19 2007/06/12 11:56:15 dtucker Exp $ */
- 
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-  *
-  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -39,12 +39,167 @@
- #include "buffer.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
- 
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
- 
- extern u_char *session_id2;
- extern u_int session_id2_len;
- 
-+typedef struct {
-+	char *encoded;
-+	gss_OID oid;
-+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
-+
-+/*
-+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
-+ * XXX   passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
-+ */
-+
-+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
-+
-+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
-+
-+int 
-+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() {
-+	return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
-+ *
-+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
-+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
-+ */
-+
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
-+	gss_OID_set gss_supported;
-+	OM_uint32 min_status;
-+
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
-+		return NULL;
-+
-+	return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
-+	    host, client));
-+}
-+
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
-+    const char *host, const char *client) {
-+	Buffer buf;
-+	size_t i;
-+	int oidpos, enclen;
-+	char *mechs, *encoded;
-+	u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-+	char deroid[2];
-+	const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
-+	EVP_MD_CTX md;
-+
-+	if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
-+		for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
-+			xfree(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
-+		xfree(gss_enc2oid);
-+	}
-+
-+	gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
-+	    (gss_supported->count + 1));
-+
-+	buffer_init(&buf);
-+
-+	oidpos = 0;
-+	for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
-+		if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
-+		    (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
-+
-+			deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
-+			deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
-+
-+			EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
-+			EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
-+			EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
-+			    gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
-+			    gss_supported->elements[i].length);
-+			EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
-+
-+			encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
-+			enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
-+			    encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
-+
-+			if (oidpos != 0)
-+				buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+
-+			buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
-+			    sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-+			buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+			buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+			buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, 
-+			    sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-+			buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+			buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+			buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
-+			    sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-+			buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+
-+			gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
-+			gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
-+			oidpos++;
-+		}
-+	}
-+	gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
-+	gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
-+
-+	buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
-+
-+	mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
-+	buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
-+	buffer_free(&buf);
-+
-+	if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
-+		xfree(mechs);
-+		mechs = NULL;
-+	}
-+	
-+	return (mechs);
-+}
-+
-+gss_OID
-+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
-+	int i = 0;
-+	
-+	switch (kex_type) {
-+	case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+		if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
-+			return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+		name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
-+		break;
-+	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+		if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
-+			return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+		name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
-+		break;
-+	case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+		if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
-+			return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+		name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
-+		break;
-+	default:
-+		return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+	}
-+
-+	while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
-+	    strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
-+		i++;
-+
-+	if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
-+		ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
-+
-+	return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
-+}
-+
- /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
- int
- ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
-@@ -197,7 +352,7 @@
- 	}
- 
- 	ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
--	    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
-+	    ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
- 	    GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
- 	    0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
- 
-@@ -227,8 +382,42 @@
- }
- 
- OM_uint32
-+ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
-+{
-+	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
-+	gss_name_t gssname;
-+	OM_uint32 status;
-+	gss_OID_set oidset;
-+
-+	gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
-+	gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
-+
-+	gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+	gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
-+
-+	ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
-+	    GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
-+
-+	if (!ctx->major)
-+		ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, 
-+		    gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE, 
-+		    &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+	gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
-+	gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+
-+	if (ctx->major)
-+		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+
-+	return(ctx->major);
-+}
-+
-+OM_uint32
- ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
- {
-+	if (ctx == NULL) 
-+		return -1;
-+
- 	if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
- 	    GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
- 		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-@@ -236,6 +425,19 @@
- 	return (ctx->major);
- }
- 
-+/* Priviledged when used by server */
-+OM_uint32
-+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
-+{
-+	if (ctx == NULL)
-+		return -1;
-+
-+	ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
-+	    gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
-+
-+	return (ctx->major);
-+}
-+
- void
- ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
-     const char *context)
-@@ -249,11 +451,16 @@
- }
- 
- int
--ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
-+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host, 
-+    const char *client)
- {
- 	gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- 	OM_uint32 major, minor;
- 	gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
-+	Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
-+
-+	if (ctx == NULL)
-+		ctx = &intctx;
- 
- 	/* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
- 	if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && 
-@@ -263,6 +470,10 @@
- 	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
- 	ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
- 	major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
-+
-+	if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
-+		major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
-+
- 	if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
- 		major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, 
- 		    NULL);
-@@ -272,10 +483,67 @@
- 			    GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
- 	}
- 
--	if (GSS_ERROR(major)) 
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL) 
- 		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
- 
- 	return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
-+}
-+
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
-+	static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+	static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
-+	static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+	static gss_name_t name;
-+	static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
-+	OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
-+	int equal;
-+	gss_cred_usage_t usage = GSS_C_INITIATE;
-+	
-+	now = time(NULL);
-+
-+	if (ctxt) {
-+		debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
-+
-+		if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
-+			gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
-+
-+		major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
-+		    &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+		if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
-+			saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
-+		        saved_lifetime+= now;
-+		} else {
-+			/* Handle the error */
-+		}
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (now - last_call < 10)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	last_call = now;
-+
-+	if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+		return 0;
-+	
-+	major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, 
-+	    &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
-+	if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
-+		return 0;
-+	else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
-+	gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
-+		return 1;
-+
-+	return 0;
- }
- 
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-Index: gss-serv-krb5.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/gss-serv-krb5.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.17
-diff -u -r1.17 gss-serv-krb5.c
---- ./gss-serv-krb5.c	1 Sep 2006 05:38:36 -0000	1.17
-+++ ./gss-serv-krb5.c	26 Jul 2009 12:22:01 -0000
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
- 
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-  *
-  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@
- 	krb5_principal princ;
- 	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
- 	int len;
-+	const char *new_ccname;
- 
- 	if (client->creds == NULL) {
- 		debug("No credentials stored");
-@@ -168,11 +169,16 @@
- 		return;
- 	}
- 
--	client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
-+	new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
-+
- 	client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
--	len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
--	client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
--	snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+	xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
-+	client->store.filename = NULL;
-+#else
-+	xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname);
-+	client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
-+#endif
- 
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 	if (options.use_pam)
-@@ -184,6 +190,71 @@
- 	return;
- }
- 
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store, 
-+    ssh_gssapi_client *client)
-+{
-+	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
-+	krb5_principal principal = NULL;
-+	char *name = NULL;
-+	krb5_error_code problem;
-+	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
-+
-+   	if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
-+                logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
-+                    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+                return 0;
-+       	}
-+	
-+	/* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
-+	if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache, 
-+	    &principal))) {
-+		logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
-+		    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+		krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
-+		logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
-+		    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+		krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+		krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
-+
-+	if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
-+		debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
-+		krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+		krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+		krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+	krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
-+
-+	/* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
-+
-+	if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
-+		logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
-+		    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+		krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+		krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
-+	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+
-+	if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
-+	    ccache))) {
-+		logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
-+		krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
- ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
- 	"toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
- 	"Kerberos",
-@@ -191,7 +262,8 @@
- 	NULL,
- 	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
- 	NULL,
--	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
-+	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
-+	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
- };
- 
- #endif /* KRB5 */
-Index: gss-serv.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/gss-serv.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.24
-diff -u -r1.24 gss-serv.c
---- ./gss-serv.c	19 May 2008 05:05:07 -0000	1.24
-+++ ./gss-serv.c	26 Jul 2009 12:22:01 -0000
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.22 2008/05/08 12:02:23 djm Exp $ */
- 
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-  *
-  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -45,15 +45,20 @@
- #include "channels.h"
- #include "session.h"
- #include "misc.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
-+#include "uidswap.h"
- 
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-+
-+extern ServerOptions options;
- 
- static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
-     { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
--    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}};
-+    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME,  NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
- 
- ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
--    { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
-+    { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
- 
- #ifdef KRB5
- extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
-@@ -81,25 +86,32 @@
- 	char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
- 	gss_OID_set oidset;
- 
--	gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
--	gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
-+	if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) {
-+		gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+		gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
-+
-+		if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
-+			gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+			return (-1);
-+		}
- 
--	if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
--		gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
--		return (-1);
--	}
-+		if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
-+			gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+			return (ctx->major);
-+		}
-+
-+		if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
-+		    ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, 
-+		    NULL, NULL)))
-+			ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
- 
--	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
- 		gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
- 		return (ctx->major);
-+	} else {
-+		ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+		ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
- 	}
--
--	if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
--	    ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL)))
--		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
--
--	gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
--	return (ctx->major);
-+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
- }
- 
- /* Privileged */
-@@ -114,6 +126,29 @@
- }
- 
- /* Unprivileged */
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
-+	gss_OID_set	supported;
-+
-+	ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
-+	return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
-+	    NULL, NULL));
-+}
-+
-+/* Unprivileged */
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
-+    const char *dummy) {
-+	Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
-+	int res;
-+ 
-+	res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
-+	ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
-+
-+	return (res);
-+}
-+
-+/* Unprivileged */
- void
- ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
- {
-@@ -123,7 +158,9 @@
- 	gss_OID_set supported;
- 
- 	gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
--	gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
-+
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
-+		return;
- 
- 	while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
- 		if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
-@@ -247,8 +284,48 @@
- ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- {
- 	int i = 0;
-+	int equal = 0;
-+	gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+	gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+
-+	if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
-+		if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
-+		    (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
-+		     ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
-+			debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
-+			return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+		}
-+
-+		if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, 
-+		    ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name, 
-+		    NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
-+			ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+			return (ctx->major);
-+		}
-+
-+		ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name, 
-+		    new_name, &equal);
- 
--	gss_buffer_desc ename;
-+		if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
-+			ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+			return (ctx->major);
-+		}
-+ 
-+		if (!equal) {
-+			debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
-+			return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+		}
-+
-+		debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
-+
-+		gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
-+		gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
-+		client->name = new_name;
-+		client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
-+        	ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-+		client->updated = 1;
-+		return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+	}
- 
- 	client->mech = NULL;
- 
-@@ -263,6 +340,13 @@
- 	if (client->mech == NULL)
- 		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- 
-+	if (ctx->client_creds &&
-+	    (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
-+	     ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
-+		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+		return (ctx->major);
-+	}
-+
- 	if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
- 	    &client->displayname, NULL))) {
- 		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-@@ -280,6 +364,8 @@
- 		return (ctx->major);
- 	}
- 
-+	gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
-+
- 	/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
- 	client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
- 	ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-@@ -327,7 +413,7 @@
- 
- /* Privileged */
- int
--ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
-+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
- {
- 	OM_uint32 lmin;
- 
-@@ -337,9 +423,11 @@
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
--		if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
-+		if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
-+			gssapi_client.used = 1;
-+			gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
- 			return 1;
--		else {
-+		} else {
- 			/* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
- 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
- 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
-@@ -352,14 +440,90 @@
- 	return (0);
- }
- 
--/* Privileged */
--OM_uint32
--ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
-+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running 
-+ * as the user, the monitor is root.
-+ *
-+ * In the child, we want to :
-+ *    *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
-+ *    *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
-+ */
-+
-+/* Stuff for PAM */
-+
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg, 
-+    struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
- {
--	ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
--	    gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
-+	return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-+}
-+#endif
- 
--	return (ctx->major);
-+void
-+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
-+	int ok;
-+	int ret;
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+	pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
-+	struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
-+	char *envstr;
-+#endif
-+
-+	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL && 
-+	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
-+	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
-+		return;
-+ 
-+	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
-+
-+	if (!ok)
-+		return;
-+
-+	debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
-+
-+	/* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
-+	 * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
-+	 * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
-+	 */
-+#ifdef USE_PAM	
-+	if (!use_privsep) {
-+		debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
-+	ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
-+ 	    &pamconv, &pamh);
-+	if (ret)
-+		return;
-+
-+	xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, 
-+	    gssapi_client.store.envval);
-+
-+	ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
-+	if (!ret)
-+		pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
-+	pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
-+#endif
-+}
-+
-+int 
-+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
-+	int ok = 0;
-+
-+	/* Check we've got credentials to store */
-+	if (!gssapi_client.updated)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	gssapi_client.updated = 0;
-+
-+	temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
-+	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
-+		ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
-+	else
-+		debug("No update function for this mechanism");
-+
-+	restore_uid();
-+
-+	return ok;
- }
- 
- #endif
-Index: kex.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/kex.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.87
-diff -u -r1.87 kex.c
---- ./kex.c	3 Nov 2008 08:19:12 -0000	1.87
-+++ ./kex.c	26 Jul 2009 12:22:02 -0000
-@@ -49,4 +49,8 @@
- #include "dispatch.h"
- #include "monitor.h"
- 
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#endif
-+
- #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
-@@ -326,6 +330,20 @@
- 	} else if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_DHGEX_SHA256) == 0) {
- 		k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256;
- 		k->evp_md = evp_ssh_sha256();
-+#endif
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+	} else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
-+	    sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
-+		k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1;
-+		k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
-+	} else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
-+	    sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
-+		k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1;
-+		k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
-+	} else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
-+	    sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
-+		k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1;
-+		k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
- #endif
- 	} else
- 		fatal("bad kex alg %s", k->name);
-Index: kex.h
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/kex.h,v
-retrieving revision 1.49
-diff -u -r1.49 kex.h
---- ./kex.h	11 Jun 2007 04:01:42 -0000	1.49
-+++ ./kex.h	26 Jul 2009 12:22:02 -0000
-@@ -64,6 +64,9 @@
- 	KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1,
- 	KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1,
- 	KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
-+	KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
-+	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
-+	KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
- 	KEX_MAX
- };
- 
-@@ -119,6 +122,12 @@
- 	sig_atomic_t done;
- 	int	flags;
- 	const EVP_MD *evp_md;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+	int	gss_deleg_creds;
-+	int	gss_trust_dns;
-+	char    *gss_host;
-+	char	*gss_client;
-+#endif
- 	char	*client_version_string;
- 	char	*server_version_string;
- 	int	(*verify_host_key)(Key *);
-@@ -140,6 +149,11 @@
- void	 kexdh_server(Kex *);
- void	 kexgex_client(Kex *);
- void	 kexgex_server(Kex *);
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+void	kexgss_client(Kex *);
-+void	kexgss_server(Kex *);
-+#endif
- 
- void
- kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
-Index: kexgssc.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: kexgssc.c
-diff -N kexgssc.c
---- /dev/null	1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 -0000
-+++ ./kexgssc.c	26 Jul 2009 12:22:02 -0000
-@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "dh.h"
-+
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+
-+void
-+kexgss_client(Kex *kex) {
-+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
-+	Gssctxt *ctxt;
-+	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
-+	u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen;
-+	DH *dh; 
-+	BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
-+	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
-+	BIGNUM *p = NULL;
-+	BIGNUM *g = NULL;	
-+	u_char *kbuf, *hash;
-+	u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
-+	u_char *empty = "";
-+	char *msg;
-+	char *lang;
-+	int type = 0;
-+	int first = 1;
-+	int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
-+
-+	/* Initialise our GSSAPI world */	
-+	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
-+	if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type) 
-+	    == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+		fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
-+
-+	if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
-+		fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
-+
-+	if (kex->gss_client && 
-+	    ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
-+		fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
-+
-+	switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+	case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+		dh = dh_new_group1();
-+		break;
-+	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+		dh = dh_new_group14();
-+		break;
-+	case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+		debug("Doing group exchange\n");
-+		nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8);
-+		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
-+		packet_put_int(min);
-+		packet_put_int(nbits);
-+		packet_put_int(max);
-+
-+		packet_send();
-+
-+		packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
-+
-+		if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+			fatal("BN_new() failed");
-+		packet_get_bignum2(p);
-+		if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+			fatal("BN_new() failed");
-+		packet_get_bignum2(g);
-+		packet_check_eom();
-+
-+		if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
-+			fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
-+			    min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
-+
-+		dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
-+		break;
-+	default:
-+		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+	}
-+	
-+	/* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
-+	dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
-+
-+	/* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
-+	dh_server_pub = BN_new();
-+	if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
-+		fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
-+
-+	token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
-+			 
-+	do {
-+		debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
-+		
-+		maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
-+		    kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
-+		    &ret_flags);
-+
-+		if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+			if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+				packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+				packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
-+				    send_tok.length);
-+			}
-+			fatal("gss_init_context failed");
-+		}
-+
-+		/* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
-+		if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
-+			xfree(recv_tok.value);
-+
-+		if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-+			/* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
-+			if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+				fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
-+
-+			/* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
-+			if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+				fatal("Integrity check failed");
-+		}
-+
-+		/* 
-+		 * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
-+		 * received cannot have been a 'complete'. 
-+		 */
-+		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+			if (first) {
-+				packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
-+				packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
-+				    send_tok.length);
-+				packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
-+				first = 0;
-+			} else {
-+				packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+				packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
-+				    send_tok.length);
-+			}
-+			packet_send();
-+			gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+
-+			/* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
-+			do {	
-+				type = packet_read();
-+				if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
-+					debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
-+					if (serverhostkey)
-+						fatal("Server host key received more than once");
-+					serverhostkey = 
-+					    packet_get_string(&slen);
-+				}
-+			} while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
-+
-+			switch (type) {
-+			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+				debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+				if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) 
-+					fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
-+				recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
-+				recv_tok.length = strlen; 
-+				break;
-+			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
-+				debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
-+				packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
-+				msg_tok.value =  packet_get_string(&strlen);
-+				msg_tok.length = strlen; 
-+
-+				/* Is there a token included? */
-+				if (packet_get_char()) {
-+					recv_tok.value=
-+					    packet_get_string(&strlen);
-+					recv_tok.length = strlen;
-+					/* If we're already complete - protocol error */
-+					if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+						packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
-+					} else {
-+						/* No token included */
-+						if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+							packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
-+				}
-+				break;
-+			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
-+				debug("Received Error");
-+				maj_status = packet_get_int();
-+				min_status = packet_get_int();
-+				msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
-+				lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
-+				fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
-+			default:
-+				packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+		    		type);
-+			}
-+			token_ptr = &recv_tok;
-+		} else {
-+			/* No data, and not complete */
-+			if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+				fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
-+		}
-+	} while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+	/* 
-+	 * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the 
-+	 * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok 
-+	 */
-+
-+	if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
-+		fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
-+
-+	/* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
-+	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
-+		packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
-+
-+	/* compute K=f^x mod p */
-+	klen = DH_size(dh);
-+	kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
-+	kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
-+	if (kout < 0)
-+		fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
-+
-+	shared_secret = BN_new();
-+	if (shared_secret == NULL)
-+		fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
-+
-+	if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
-+		fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
-+
-+	memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
-+	xfree(kbuf);
-+
-+	switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+	case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+		kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string, 
-+		    kex->server_version_string,
-+		    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+		    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+		    (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
-+		    dh->pub_key,	/* e */
-+		    dh_server_pub,	/* f */
-+		    shared_secret,	/* K */
-+		    &hash, &hashlen
-+		);
-+		break;
-+	case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+		kexgex_hash(
-+		    kex->evp_md,
-+		    kex->client_version_string,
-+		    kex->server_version_string,
-+		    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+		    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+		    (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
-+ 		    min, nbits, max,
-+		    dh->p, dh->g,
-+		    dh->pub_key,
-+		    dh_server_pub,
-+		    shared_secret,
-+		    &hash, &hashlen
-+		);
-+		break;
-+	default:
-+		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+	}
-+
-+	gssbuf.value = hash;
-+	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+	/* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
-+		packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
-+
-+	xfree(msg_tok.value);
-+
-+	DH_free(dh);
-+	if (serverhostkey)
-+		xfree(serverhostkey);
-+	BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
-+
-+	/* save session id */
-+	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
-+		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-+		kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
-+		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
-+	}
-+
-+	if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
-+		ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
-+
-+	if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+		gss_kex_context = ctxt;
-+	else
-+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
-+
-+	kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
-+	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-+	kex_finish(kex);
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* GSSAPI */
-Index: kexgsss.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: kexgsss.c
-diff -N kexgsss.c
---- /dev/null	1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 -0000
-+++ ./kexgsss.c	26 Jul 2009 12:22:03 -0000
-@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "dh.h"
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
-+
-+extern ServerOptions options;
-+
-+void
-+kexgss_server(Kex *kex)
-+{
-+	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
-+	
-+	/* 
-+	 * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
-+ 	 * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific 
-+ 	 * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently 
-+ 	 * activating this non-standard behaviour.
-+	 */
-+
-+	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
-+	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
-+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+	Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
-+	u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen;
-+	u_char *kbuf, *hash;
-+	DH *dh;
-+	int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
-+	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
-+	BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
-+	int type = 0;
-+	gss_OID oid;
-+	char *mechs;
-+
-+	/* Initialise GSSAPI */
-+
-+	/* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
-+	 * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
-+	 * into life
-+	 */
-+	if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) 
-+		if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms()))
-+			xfree(mechs);
-+
-+	debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
-+	oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
-+	if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+	   fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
-+
-+	debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
-+
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
-+		fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
-+
-+	switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+	case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+		dh = dh_new_group1();
-+		break;
-+	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+		dh = dh_new_group14();
-+		break;
-+	case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+		debug("Doing group exchange");
-+		packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
-+		min = packet_get_int();
-+		nbits = packet_get_int();
-+		max = packet_get_int();
-+		min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
-+		max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
-+		packet_check_eom();
-+		if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
-+			fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
-+			    min, nbits, max);
-+		dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
-+		if (dh == NULL)
-+			packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
-+
-+		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
-+		packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
-+		packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
-+		packet_send();
-+
-+		packet_write_wait();
-+		break;
-+	default:
-+		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+	}
-+
-+	dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
-+
-+	do {
-+		debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
-+		type = packet_read();
-+		switch(type) {
-+		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
-+			if (dh_client_pub != NULL) 
-+				fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
-+			recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
-+			recv_tok.length = slen; 
-+
-+			if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+				fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
-+
-+			packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
-+
-+			/* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
-+			break;
-+		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+			recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
-+			recv_tok.length = slen; 
-+			break;
-+		default:
-+			packet_disconnect(
-+			    "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+			    type);
-+		}
-+
-+		maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, 
-+		    &send_tok, &ret_flags));
-+
-+		xfree(recv_tok.value);
-+
-+		if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
-+			fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
-+
-+		if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
-+			fatal("No client public key");
-+		
-+		if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
-+			debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+			packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-+			packet_send();
-+			gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+		}
-+	} while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+		if (send_tok.length > 0) {
-+			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+			packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-+			packet_send();
-+		}
-+		fatal("accept_ctx died");
-+	}
-+
-+	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+		fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
-+
-+	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+		fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
-+	
-+	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
-+		packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
-+
-+	klen = DH_size(dh);
-+	kbuf = xmalloc(klen); 
-+	kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
-+	if (kout < 0)
-+		fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
-+
-+	shared_secret = BN_new();
-+	if (shared_secret == NULL)
-+		fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
-+
-+	if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
-+		fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
-+
-+	memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
-+	xfree(kbuf);
-+
-+	switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+	case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+		kex_dh_hash(
-+		    kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
-+		    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+		    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+		    NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
-+		    dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
-+		    &hash, &hashlen
-+		);
-+		break;
-+	case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+		kexgex_hash(
-+		    kex->evp_md,
-+		    kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
-+		    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+		    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+		    NULL, 0,
-+		    min, nbits, max,
-+		    dh->p, dh->g,
-+		    dh_client_pub,
-+		    dh->pub_key,
-+		    shared_secret,
-+		    &hash, &hashlen
-+		);
-+		break;
-+	default:
-+		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+	}
-+
-+	BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
-+
-+	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
-+		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-+		kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
-+		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
-+	}
-+
-+	gssbuf.value = hash;
-+	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
-+		fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
-+
-+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
-+	packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
-+	packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
-+
-+	if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+		packet_put_char(1); /* true */
-+		packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-+	} else {
-+		packet_put_char(0); /* false */
-+	}
-+	packet_send();
-+
-+	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
-+
-+	if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+		gss_kex_context = ctxt;
-+	else 
-+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
-+
-+	DH_free(dh);
-+
-+	kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
-+	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-+	kex_finish(kex);
-+
-+	/* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
-+	 * just exchanged.  */
-+	if (options.gss_store_rekey)
-+		ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
-+}
-+#endif /* GSSAPI */
-Index: key.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/key.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.83
-diff -u -r1.83 key.c
---- ./key.c	3 Nov 2008 08:24:17 -0000	1.83
-+++ ./key.c	26 Jul 2009 12:22:03 -0000
-@@ -764,6 +764,8 @@
- 		return KEY_RSA;
- 	} else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-dss") == 0) {
- 		return KEY_DSA;
-+	} else if (strcmp(name, "null") == 0) {
-+		return KEY_NULL;
- 	}
- 	debug2("key_type_from_name: unknown key type '%s'", name);
- 	return KEY_UNSPEC;
-Index: key.h
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/key.h,v
-retrieving revision 1.29
-diff -u -r1.29 key.h
---- ./key.h	12 Jun 2008 18:40:35 -0000	1.29
-+++ ./key.h	26 Jul 2009 12:22:03 -0000
-@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
- 	KEY_RSA1,
- 	KEY_RSA,
- 	KEY_DSA,
-+	KEY_NULL,
- 	KEY_UNSPEC
- };
- enum fp_type {
-Index: monitor.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/monitor.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.134
-diff -u -r1.134 monitor.c
---- ./monitor.c	14 Feb 2009 05:33:31 -0000	1.134
-+++ ./monitor.c	26 Jul 2009 12:22:06 -0000
-@@ -170,6 +170,8 @@
- int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-@@ -239,6 +241,7 @@
-     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
- #endif
- #ifdef JPAKE
-     {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata},
-@@ -251,6 +254,12 @@
- };
- 
- struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
-+#endif
-     {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
-@@ -355,6 +364,10 @@
- 		/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
- 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
- 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+		/* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
-+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
-+#endif
- 	} else {
- 		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
- 
-@@ -441,6 +454,10 @@
- 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
- 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
- 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+		/* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
-+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
-+#endif		
- 	} else {
- 		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
- 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
-@@ -1699,6 +1716,13 @@
- 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
- 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
- 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+	if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+	}
-+#endif
- 	kex->server = 1;
- 	kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
- 	kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
-@@ -1898,6 +1922,9 @@
- 	OM_uint32 major;
- 	u_int len;
- 
-+	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
- 	goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- 	goid.length = len;
- 
-@@ -1925,6 +1952,9 @@
- 	OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
- 	u_int len;
- 
-+	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
- 	in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- 	in.length = len;
- 	major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
-@@ -1942,6 +1972,7 @@
- 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
- 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
- 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
-+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
- 	}
- 	return (0);
- }
-@@ -1953,6 +1984,9 @@
- 	OM_uint32 ret;
- 	u_int len;
- 
-+	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
- 	gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- 	gssbuf.length = len;
- 	mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-@@ -1979,7 +2013,11 @@
- {
- 	int authenticated;
- 
--	authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
-+	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
-+	authenticated = authctxt->valid && 
-+	    ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
- 
- 	buffer_clear(m);
- 	buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
-@@ -1992,6 +2030,74 @@
- 	/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
- 	return (authenticated);
- }
-+
-+int 
-+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+	gss_buffer_desc data;
-+	gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+	OM_uint32 major, minor;
-+	u_int len;
-+
-+	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
-+	data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+	data.length = len;
-+	if (data.length != 20) 
-+		fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, 
-+		    (int) data.length);
-+
-+	/* Save the session ID on the first time around */
-+	if (session_id2_len == 0) {
-+		session_id2_len = data.length;
-+		session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
-+		memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
-+	}
-+	major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
-+
-+	xfree(data.value);
-+
-+	buffer_clear(m);
-+	buffer_put_int(m, major);
-+	buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
-+
-+	gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
-+
-+	/* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
-+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
-+	
-+	/* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
-+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
-+
-+	return (0);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
-+	ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
-+	int ok;
-+
-+	store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-+	store.envvar   = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-+	store.envval   = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-+
-+	ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
-+
-+	xfree(store.filename);
-+	xfree(store.envvar);
-+	xfree(store.envval);
-+
-+	buffer_clear(m);
-+	buffer_put_int(m, ok);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
-+
-+	return(0);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
- 
- #ifdef JPAKE
-Index: monitor.h
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/monitor.h,v
-retrieving revision 1.22
-diff -u -r1.22 monitor.h
---- ./monitor.h	5 Nov 2008 05:20:46 -0000	1.22
-+++ ./monitor.h	26 Jul 2009 12:22:06 -0000
-@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@
- 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC,
-+	MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN,
-+	MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX,
-Index: monitor_wrap.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/monitor_wrap.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.80
-diff -u -r1.80 monitor_wrap.c
---- ./monitor_wrap.c	5 Nov 2008 05:20:47 -0000	1.80
-+++ ./monitor_wrap.c	26 Jul 2009 12:22:07 -0000
-@@ -1239,7 +1239,7 @@
- }
- 
- int
--mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
-+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
- {
- 	Buffer m;
- 	int authenticated = 0;
-@@ -1256,6 +1256,51 @@
- 	debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
- 	return (authenticated);
- }
-+
-+OM_uint32
-+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
-+{
-+	Buffer m;
-+	OM_uint32 major;
-+	u_int len;
-+
-+	buffer_init(&m);
-+	buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
-+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
-+
-+	major = buffer_get_int(&m);
-+	hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
-+	hash->length = len;
-+
-+	buffer_free(&m);
-+
-+	return(major);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
-+{
-+	Buffer m;
-+	int ok;
-+
-+	buffer_init(&m);
-+
-+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
-+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
-+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
-+	
-+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
-+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
-+
-+	ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
-+
-+	buffer_free(&m);
-+	
-+	return (ok);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
- 
- #ifdef JPAKE
-Index: monitor_wrap.h
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/monitor_wrap.h,v
-retrieving revision 1.28
-diff -u -r1.28 monitor_wrap.h
---- ./monitor_wrap.h	5 Nov 2008 05:20:47 -0000	1.28
-+++ ./monitor_wrap.h	26 Jul 2009 12:22:07 -0000
-@@ -57,8 +57,10 @@
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
-    gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
--int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
-+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
-+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
-+int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-Index: readconf.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/readconf.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.153
-diff -u -r1.153 readconf.c
---- ./readconf.c	14 Feb 2009 05:28:21 -0000	1.153
-+++ ./readconf.c	26 Jul 2009 12:22:10 -0000
-@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@
- 	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
- 	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
- 	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
-+	oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
- 	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
- 	oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oHashKnownHosts,
- 	oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
-@@ -164,10 +165,18 @@
- 	{ "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
- #if defined(GSSAPI)
- 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
-+	{ "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
- 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
-+	{ "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
-+	{ "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
-+	{ "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
- #else
- 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
-+	{ "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
- 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
-+	{ "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
-+	{ "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
-+	{ "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
- #endif
- 	{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
- 	{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
-@@ -453,10 +462,26 @@
- 		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
-+	case oGssKeyEx:
-+		intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case oGssDelegateCreds:
- 		intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
-+	case oGssTrustDns:
-+		intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
-+	case oGssClientIdentity:
-+		charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
-+		goto parse_string;
-+
-+	case oGssRenewalRekey:
-+		intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case oBatchMode:
- 		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
- 		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1008,7 +1033,11 @@
- 	options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
- 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
- 	options->gss_authentication = -1;
-+	options->gss_keyex = -1;
- 	options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
-+	options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
-+	options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
-+	options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
- 	options->password_authentication = -1;
- 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- 	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
-@@ -1099,8 +1128,14 @@
- 		options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
- 	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
- 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
-+	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-+		options->gss_keyex = 0;
- 	if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
- 		options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
-+	if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
-+		options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
-+	if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
-+		options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
- 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- 		options->password_authentication = 1;
- 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-Index: readconf.h
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/readconf.h,v
-retrieving revision 1.70
-diff -u -r1.70 readconf.h
---- ./readconf.h	14 Feb 2009 05:28:21 -0000	1.70
-+++ ./readconf.h	26 Jul 2009 12:22:10 -0000
-@@ -44,7 +44,11 @@
- 	int     challenge_response_authentication;
- 					/* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
- 	int     gss_authentication;	/* Try GSS authentication */
-+	int     gss_keyex;		/* Try GSS key exchange */
- 	int     gss_deleg_creds;	/* Delegate GSS credentials */
-+	int	gss_trust_dns;		/* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
-+	int	gss_renewal_rekey;	/* Credential renewal forces rekey */
-+	char    *gss_client_identity;   /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
- 	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
- 						 * authentication. */
- 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
-Index: servconf.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/servconf.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.186
-diff -u -r1.186 servconf.c
---- ./servconf.c	28 Jan 2009 05:31:23 -0000	1.186
-+++ ./servconf.c	26 Jul 2009 12:22:11 -0000
-@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@
- 	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
- 	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
- 	options->gss_authentication=-1;
-+	options->gss_keyex = -1;
- 	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
-+	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
-+	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
- 	options->password_authentication = -1;
- 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
-@@ -210,8 +213,14 @@
- 		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
- 	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
- 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
-+	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-+		options->gss_keyex = 0;
- 	if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
- 		options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
-+	if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
-+		options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
-+	if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
-+		options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
- 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- 		options->password_authentication = 1;
- 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -302,7 +311,9 @@
- 	sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
- 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
- 	sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sAuthorizedKeysFile2,
--	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
-+	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
-+	sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
-+	sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
- 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
- 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
- 	sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
-@@ -364,9 +375,15 @@
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #else
- 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #endif
- 	{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
-@@ -891,8 +908,20 @@
- 		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
-+	case sGssKeyEx:
-+		intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case sGssCleanupCreds:
- 		intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
-+	case sGssStrictAcceptor:
-+		intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
-+	case sGssStoreRekey:
-+		intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
- 	case sPasswordAuthentication:
-Index: servconf.h
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/servconf.h,v
-retrieving revision 1.79
-diff -u -r1.79 servconf.h
---- ./servconf.h	28 Jan 2009 05:31:23 -0000	1.79
-+++ ./servconf.h	26 Jul 2009 12:22:12 -0000
-@@ -91,7 +91,10 @@
- 	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
- 						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
- 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
-+	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
- 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-+	int 	gss_strict_acceptor;	/* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
-+	int 	gss_store_rekey;
- 	int     password_authentication;	/* If true, permit password
- 						 * authentication. */
- 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication;	/* If true, permit */
-Index: ssh-gss.h
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/ssh-gss.h,v
-retrieving revision 1.12
-diff -u -r1.12 ssh-gss.h
---- ./ssh-gss.h	12 Jun 2007 13:40:39 -0000	1.12
-+++ ./ssh-gss.h	26 Jul 2009 12:22:12 -0000
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.10 2007/06/12 08:20:00 djm Exp $ */
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-  *
-  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -60,10 +60,22 @@
- 
- #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
- 
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT                            30
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE                        31
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE                        32
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY                         33
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR                           34
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ			40
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP				41
-+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID				"gss-group1-sha1-"
-+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID				"gss-group14-sha1-"
-+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID				"gss-gex-sha1-"
-+
- typedef struct {
- 	char *filename;
- 	char *envvar;
- 	char *envval;
-+	struct passwd *owner;
- 	void *data;
- } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
- 
-@@ -71,8 +83,11 @@
- 	gss_buffer_desc displayname;
- 	gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
- 	gss_cred_id_t creds;
-+	gss_name_t name;
- 	struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
- 	ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
-+	int used;
-+	int updated;
- } ssh_gssapi_client;
- 
- typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
-@@ -83,6 +98,7 @@
- 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
- 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
- 	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
-+	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
- } ssh_gssapi_mech;
- 
- typedef struct {
-@@ -93,10 +109,11 @@
- 	gss_OID		oid; /* client */
- 	gss_cred_id_t	creds; /* server */
- 	gss_name_t	client; /* server */
--	gss_cred_id_t	client_creds; /* server */
-+	gss_cred_id_t	client_creds; /* both */
- } Gssctxt;
- 
- extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
-+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
- 
- int  ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
-@@ -116,16 +133,30 @@
- void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
--int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
-+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
-+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
-+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
- 
- /* In the server */
-+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, 
-+    const char *);
-+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
-+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
-+    const char *);
-+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
-+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, 
-+    const char *);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
--int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
-+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
- void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
- void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
- 
-+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
-+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok();
-+
-+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
- 
- #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
-Index: ssh_config
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/ssh_config,v
-retrieving revision 1.27
-diff -u -r1.27 ssh_config
---- ./ssh_config	21 Feb 2009 01:45:02 -0000	1.27
-+++ ./ssh_config	26 Jul 2009 12:22:12 -0000
-@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
- #   HostbasedAuthentication no
- #   GSSAPIAuthentication no
- #   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
-+#   GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-+#   GSSAPITrustDNS no
- #   BatchMode no
- #   CheckHostIP yes
- #   AddressFamily any
-Index: ssh_config.5
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/ssh_config.5,v
-retrieving revision 1.119
-diff -u -r1.119 ssh_config.5
---- ./ssh_config.5	22 Feb 2009 23:53:58 -0000	1.119
-+++ ./ssh_config.5	26 Jul 2009 12:22:13 -0000
-@@ -478,11 +478,38 @@
- The default is
- .Dq no .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
-+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
-+GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
-+If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when 
-+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default 
-+identity will be used.
- .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
- Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
- The default is
- .Dq no .
--Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
-+If set to 
-+.Dq yes
-+then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
-+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed 
-+credentials to a session on the server.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
-+Set to 
-+.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
-+the name of the host being connected to. If 
-+.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
-+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
- .It Cm HashKnownHosts
- Indicates that
- .Xr ssh 1
-Index: sshconnect2.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/sshconnect2.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.162
-diff -u -r1.162 sshconnect2.c
---- ./sshconnect2.c	5 Nov 2008 05:20:47 -0000	1.162
-+++ ./sshconnect2.c	26 Jul 2009 12:22:16 -0000
-@@ -104,9 +104,34 @@
- {
- 	Kex *kex;
- 
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+	char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
-+	char *gss_host = NULL;
-+#endif
-+
- 	xxx_host = host;
- 	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
- 
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+	if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this 
-+		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
-+		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+
-+		if (options.gss_trust_dns)
-+			gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
-+		else
-+			gss_host = host;
-+
-+		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
-+		if (gss) {
-+			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
-+			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
-+			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+		}
-+	}
-+#endif
-+
- 	if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) {
- 		logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
- 		options.ciphers = NULL;
-@@ -134,6 +159,17 @@
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
- 		    options.hostkeyalgorithms;
- 
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+	/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
-+	 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
-+	if (options.gss_keyex && gss) {
-+		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
-+		xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], 
-+		    "%s,null", orig);
-+		xfree(gss);
-+	}
-+#endif
-+
- 	if (options.rekey_limit)
- 		packet_set_rekey_limit((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit);
- 
-@@ -143,10 +179,26 @@
- 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
- 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
- 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+	if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
-+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
-+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
-+	}
-+#endif
- 	kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
- 	kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
- 	kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
- 
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+	if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+		kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
-+		kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
-+		kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
-+		kex->gss_host = gss_host;
-+	}
-+#endif
-+
- 	xxx_kex = kex;
- 
- 	dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
-@@ -235,6 +287,7 @@
- void	input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
- void	input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
- void	input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-+int	userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
- #endif
- 
- void	userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
-@@ -250,6 +303,10 @@
- 
- Authmethod authmethods[] = {
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-+	{"gssapi-keyex",
-+		userauth_gsskeyex,
-+		&options.gss_authentication,
-+		NULL},
- 	{"gssapi-with-mic",
- 		userauth_gssapi,
- 		NULL,
-@@ -541,19 +598,29 @@
- 	static u_int mech = 0;
- 	OM_uint32 min;
- 	int ok = 0;
-+	const char *gss_host;
-+
-+	if (options.gss_trust_dns)
-+		gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
-+	else
-+		gss_host = authctxt->host;
- 
- 	/* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
- 	 * once. */
- 
- 	if (gss_supported == NULL)
--		gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
-+		if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
-+			gss_supported = NULL;
-+			return 0;
-+		}
- 
- 	/* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
- 	while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
- 		/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
- 		if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
- 		    ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, 
--		    &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
-+		    &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host, 
-+                    options.gss_client_identity)) {
- 			ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
- 		} else {
- 			mech++;
-@@ -650,8 +717,8 @@
- {
- 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- 	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
--	int oidlen;
--	char *oidv;
-+	u_int oidlen;
-+	u_char *oidv;
- 
- 	if (authctxt == NULL)
- 		fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
-@@ -761,6 +828,48 @@
- 	xfree(msg);
- 	xfree(lang);
- }
-+
-+int
-+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
-+{
-+	Buffer b;
-+	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
-+	gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+	OM_uint32 ms;
-+
-+	static int attempt = 0;
-+	if (attempt++ >= 1)
-+		return (0);
-+
-+	if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
-+		debug("No valid Key exchange context"); 
-+		return (0);
-+	}
-+
-+	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
-+	    "gssapi-keyex");
-+
-+	gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
-+	gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-+
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
-+		buffer_free(&b);
-+		return (0);
-+	}
-+
-+	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
-+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
-+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
-+	packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
-+	packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
-+	packet_send();
-+
-+	buffer_free(&b);
-+	gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
-+
-+	return (1);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
- 
- int
-Index: sshd.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/sshd.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.384
-diff -u -r1.384 sshd.c
---- ./sshd.c	28 Jan 2009 05:31:23 -0000	1.384
-+++ ./sshd.c	26 Jul 2009 12:22:17 -0000
-@@ -119,6 +119,10 @@
- #include "monitor_wrap.h"
- #include "version.h"
- 
-+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
-+#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
-+#endif
-+
- #ifdef LIBWRAP
- #include <tcpd.h>
- #include <syslog.h>
-@@ -1530,10 +1534,13 @@
- 		logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
- 		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
- 	}
-+#ifndef GSSAPI
-+	/* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
- 	if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
- 		logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
- 		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
- 	}
-+#endif
- 	if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
- 		logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
- 		exit(1);
-@@ -1817,6 +1824,60 @@
- 	/* Log the connection. */
- 	verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
- 
-+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
-+	/*
-+	 * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
-+	 * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
-+	 * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode).  We do not
-+	 * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
-+	 * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
-+	 *
-+	 * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
-+	 * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
-+	 * new sessions for us.  Then all the users will end up in the
-+	 * same session (bad).
-+	 *
-+	 * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
-+	 * automatically.
-+	 *
-+	 * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
-+	 * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
-+	 */
-+	{
-+		OSStatus err = 0;
-+		SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
-+		SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
-+
-+		err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
-+		if (err)
-+			error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
-+			    (unsigned) err);
-+		else
-+			debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
-+			    (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
-+
-+		if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
-+			debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
-+			    "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
-+		else {
-+			debug("Creating new security session...");
-+			err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
-+			if (err)
-+				error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
-+				    (unsigned) err);
-+
-+			err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, 
-+			    &sattrs);
-+			if (err)
-+				error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
-+				    (unsigned) err);
-+			else
-+				debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
-+				    (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
-+		}
-+	}
-+#endif
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
- 	 * successfully authenticates itself.  So we set up an alarm which is
-@@ -2194,12 +2255,61 @@
- 
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
- 
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+	{
-+	char *orig;
-+	char *gss = NULL;
-+	char *newstr = NULL;
-+	orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+
-+	/* 
-+	 * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
-+	 * the other key exchange algorithms
-+	 */
-+
-+	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
-+		orig = NULL;
-+
-+	if (options.gss_keyex)
-+		gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
-+	else
-+		gss = NULL;
-+
-+	if (gss && orig)
-+		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+	else if (gss)
-+		newstr = gss;
-+	else if (orig)
-+		newstr = orig;
-+
-+	/* 
-+	 * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
-+	 * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
-+  	 * host key algorithm we support
-+	 */
-+	if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
-+
-+	if (newstr)
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
-+	else
-+		fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
-+	}
-+#endif
-+
- 	/* start key exchange */
- 	kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
- 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
- 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
- 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
- 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+	if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+	}
-+#endif
- 	kex->server = 1;
- 	kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
- 	kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
-Index: sshd_config
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/sshd_config,v
-retrieving revision 1.82
-diff -u -r1.82 sshd_config
---- ./sshd_config	2 Jul 2008 12:35:43 -0000	1.82
-+++ ./sshd_config	26 Jul 2009 12:22:19 -0000
-@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@
- # GSSAPI options
- #GSSAPIAuthentication no
- #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
-+#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
-+#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
- 
- # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, 
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will 
-Index: sshd_config.5
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvs/openssh/sshd_config.5,v
-retrieving revision 1.108
-diff -u -r1.108 sshd_config.5
---- ./sshd_config.5	23 Feb 2009 00:00:24 -0000	1.108
-+++ ./sshd_config.5	26 Jul 2009 12:22:20 -0000
-@@ -374,12 +374,40 @@
- The default is
- .Dq no .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
-+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
-+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
- .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
- Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
- on logout.
- The default is
- .Dq yes .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
-+Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor 
-+a client authenticates against. If
-+.Dq yes
-+then the client must authenticate against the
-+.Pa host
-+service on the current hostname. If 
-+.Dq no
-+then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the 
-+machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation 
-+on multi homed machines. 
-+The default is
-+.Dq yes .
-+Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections,
-+and setting it to 
-+.Dq no
-+may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
-+Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a 
-+successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed 
-+or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
-+.Dq no .
- .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
- Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
- with successful public key client host authentication is allowed

Added: csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/openssh-5.4p1-gsskex-all-20100313.patch
===================================================================
--- csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/openssh-5.4p1-gsskex-all-20100313.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/openssh-5.4p1-gsskex-all-20100313.patch	2010-03-13 17:22:59 UTC (rev 9139)
@@ -0,0 +1,2933 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/ChangeLog.gssapi openssh-5.4p1/ChangeLog.gssapi
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/ChangeLog.gssapi	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/ChangeLog.gssapi	2010-03-13 00:39:22.276624764 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
++20090615
++  - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
++      sshd.c ]
++    Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
++	Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
++	Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
++	Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
++	Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
++	Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
++	Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
++	Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
++	Cast data.length before printing
++	If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
++
++20090201
++  - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
++      ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
++    Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
++    to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
++
++20080404
++  - [ gss-serv.c ]
++    Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
++    been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
++    Stoichkov
++
++20070317
++  - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++    Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a 
++    function
++
++20061220
++  - [ servconf.c ]
++    Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and 
++    documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
++
++20060910
++  - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
++      ssh-gss.h ]
++    add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
++  - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
++    Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
++    acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
++    <Bugzilla #928>
++  - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
++    Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
++    configuration files
++  - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
++    Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
++    Limit length of error messages displayed by client
++
++20060909
++  - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
++    move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
++    only, where they belong 
++    <Bugzilla #1225>
++
++20060829
++  - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++    Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment 
++    variable
++
++20060828
++  - [ gss-genr.c ]
++    Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
++    <Fixed upstream 20060829>
++
++20060818
++  - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
++    Make sure that SPENGO is disabled 
++    <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
++
++20060421
++  - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
++    a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
++    fix compiler errors/warnings 
++    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++  - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
++    fix uninitialized variable warnings
++    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++  - [ gssgenr.c ]
++    pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
++    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++    <Bugzilla #1220 >
++  - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++    #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
++    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++    <Fixed upstream 20060304>
++  - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c 
++    add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
++    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++  - [ sshconnect2.c ]
++    add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
++    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++    <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/Makefile.in openssh-5.4p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/Makefile.in	2010-02-24 08:18:51.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/Makefile.in	2010-03-13 00:39:54.547584984 +0100
+@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@
+ 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o kexdh.o \
+ 	kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o \
+ 	entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o schnorr.o \
+-	ssh-pkcs11.o
++	ssh-pkcs11.o kexgssc.o
+ 
+ SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
+ 	sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \
+@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@
+ 	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-jpake.o \
+ 	monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o \
+ 	auth-krb5.o \
+-	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
++	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\
+ 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
+ 	audit.o audit-bsm.o platform.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+ 	roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/auth-krb5.c openssh-5.4p1/auth-krb5.c
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/auth-krb5.c	2009-12-21 00:49:22.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/auth-krb5.c	2010-03-13 00:39:22.287877739 +0100
+@@ -170,8 +170,13 @@
+ 
+ 	len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
+ 	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
++	    authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
++#else
+ 	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
+ 	    authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
++#endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -226,15 +231,22 @@
+ #ifndef HEIMDAL
+ krb5_error_code
+ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+-	int tmpfd, ret;
++	int ret;
+ 	char ccname[40];
+ 	mode_t old_umask;
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++	char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
++#else
++	char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
++	int tmpfd;
++#endif
+ 
+ 	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+-	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
++	    cctemplate, geteuid());
+ 	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+ 		return ENOMEM;
+ 
++#ifndef USE_CCAPI
+ 	old_umask = umask(0177);
+ 	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+ 	umask(old_umask);
+@@ -249,6 +261,7 @@
+ 		return errno;
+ 	}
+ 	close(tmpfd);
++#endif
+ 
+ 	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+ }
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/auth.h openssh-5.4p1/auth.h
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/auth.h	2010-03-04 11:53:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/auth.h	2010-03-13 00:39:22.290248539 +0100
+@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
+ 	int		 valid;		/* user exists and is allowed to login */
+ 	int		 attempt;
+ 	int		 failures;
++	int		 server_caused_failure; 
+ 	int		 force_pwchange;
+ 	char		*user;		/* username sent by the client */
+ 	char		*service;
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-5.4p1/auth2-gss.c
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/auth2-gss.c	2007-12-02 12:59:45.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/auth2-gss.c	2010-03-13 00:39:22.294875029 +0100
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.16 2007/10/29 00:52:45 dtucker Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -52,6 +52,40 @@
+ static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
+ static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+ 
++/* 
++ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
++ */
++static int
++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
++{
++	int authenticated = 0;
++	Buffer b;
++	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
++	u_int len;
++
++	mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
++	mic.length = len;
++
++	packet_check_eom();
++
++	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
++	    "gssapi-keyex");
++
++	gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
++	gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
++
++	/* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
++	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, 
++	    &gssbuf, &mic))))
++		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++		    authctxt->pw));
++	
++	buffer_free(&b);
++	xfree(mic.value);
++
++	return (authenticated);
++}
++
+ /*
+  * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
+  * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
+@@ -102,6 +136,7 @@
+ 
+ 	if (!present) {
+ 		xfree(doid);

@@ Diff output truncated at 100000 characters. @@

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