SF.net SVN: gar:[23771] csw/mgar/pkg/openssl/trunk/files

chninkel at users.sourceforge.net chninkel at users.sourceforge.net
Fri Jun 6 01:36:52 CEST 2014


Revision: 23771
          http://sourceforge.net/p/gar/code/23771
Author:   chninkel
Date:     2014-06-05 23:36:51 +0000 (Thu, 05 Jun 2014)
Log Message:
-----------
openssl/trunk: remove obsolete patches

Removed Paths:
-------------
    csw/mgar/pkg/openssl/trunk/files/pkcs11_engine-0.9.8h.patch.2008-07-29
    csw/mgar/pkg/openssl/trunk/files/pkcs11_engine-0.9.8l.patch.2009-11-19

Deleted: csw/mgar/pkg/openssl/trunk/files/pkcs11_engine-0.9.8h.patch.2008-07-29
===================================================================
--- csw/mgar/pkg/openssl/trunk/files/pkcs11_engine-0.9.8h.patch.2008-07-29	2014-06-05 23:35:58 UTC (rev 23770)
+++ csw/mgar/pkg/openssl/trunk/files/pkcs11_engine-0.9.8h.patch.2008-07-29	2014-06-05 23:36:51 UTC (rev 23771)
@@ -1,10168 +0,0 @@
-diff -urN openssl-0.9.8j/Configure openssl-0.9.8j.new/Configure
---- openssl-0.9.8j/Configure	2008-12-29 01:18:23.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-0.9.8j.new/Configure	2009-02-15 22:26:02.669766669 +0100
-@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
- # --prefix      prefix for the OpenSSL include, lib and bin directories
- #               (Default: the OPENSSLDIR directory)
- #
-+# --pk11-libname  PKCS#11 library name.
-+#               (Default: none)
-+#
- # --install_prefix  Additional prefix for package builders (empty by
- #               default).  This needn't be set in advance, you can
- #               just as well use "make INSTALL_PREFIX=/whatever install".
-@@ -575,6 +578,8 @@
- my $idx_ranlib = $idx++;
- my $idx_arflags = $idx++;
- 
-+my $pk11_libname="";
-+
- my $prefix="";
- my $openssldir="";
- my $exe_ext="";
-@@ -807,6 +812,10 @@
- 				{
- 				$flags.=$_." ";
- 				}
-+                        elsif (/^--pk11-libname=(.*)$/)
-+                                {
-+                                $pk11_libname=$1;
-+                                }
- 			elsif (/^--prefix=(.*)$/)
- 				{
- 				$prefix=$1;
-@@ -938,6 +947,13 @@
- 	exit 0;
- }
- 
-+if (! $pk11_libname)
-+        {
-+        print STDERR "You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.\n";
-+        print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n";
-+        exit 1;
-+        }
-+
- if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) {
- 	$target = "Cygwin".$1;
- }
-@@ -1095,6 +1111,8 @@
- if ($flags ne "")	{ $cflags="$flags$cflags"; }
- else			{ $no_user_cflags=1;       }
- 
-+$cflags="-DPK11_LIB_LOCATION=\"$pk11_libname\" $cflags";
-+
- # Kerberos settings.  The flavor must be provided from outside, either through
- # the script "config" or manually.
- if (!$no_krb5)
-@@ -1446,6 +1464,7 @@
- 	s/^VERSION=.*/VERSION=$version/;
- 	s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/;
- 	s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/;
-+	s/^PK11_LIB_LOCATION=.*/PK11_LIB_LOCATION=$pk11_libname/;
- 	s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/;
- 	s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/;
- 	s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/;
-diff -urN openssl-0.9.8j/Makefile.org openssl-0.9.8j.new/Makefile.org
---- openssl-0.9.8j/Makefile.org	2008-12-30 14:26:26.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-0.9.8j.new/Makefile.org	2009-02-15 22:26:02.673236044 +0100
-@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@
- INSTALL_PREFIX=
- INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl
- 
-+# You must set this through --pk11-libname configure option.
-+PK11_LIB_LOCATION=
-+
- # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this!
- OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl
- 
-diff -urN openssl-0.9.8j/README.pkcs11 openssl-0.9.8j.new/README.pkcs11
---- openssl-0.9.8j/README.pkcs11	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-0.9.8j.new/README.pkcs11	2009-02-15 22:26:02.675891756 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
-+PKCS#11 engine support for OpenSSL 0.9.8h
-+=========================================
-+
-+[July 29, 2008]
-+
-+This patch containing code available in OpenSolaris adds support for PKCS#11
-+engine into OpenSSL and implements PKCS#11 v2.20. It is to be applied against
-+OpenSSL 0.9.8h source code distribution as shipped by OpenSSL.Org. Your system
-+must provide PKCS#11 backend otherwise the patch is useless. You provide the
-+PKCS#11 library name during the build configuration phase, see below.
-+
-+Patch can be applied like this:
-+
-+	# NOTE: use gtar if on Solaris
-+	tar xfzv openssl-0.9.8h.tar.gz
-+	# now download the patch to the current directory
-+	# ...
-+	cd openssl-0.9.8h
-+	# NOTE: use gpatch if on Solaris	
-+	patch -p1 < ../pkcs11_engine-0.9.8h.patch.2008-07-29
-+
-+It is designed to support pure acceleration for RSA, DSA, DH and all the
-+symetric ciphers and message digest algorithms that PKCS#11 and OpenSSL share
-+except for missing support for patented algorithms MDC2, RC3, RC5 and IDEA.
-+
-+According to the PKCS#11 providers installed on your machine, it can support
-+following mechanisms:
-+
-+	RSA, DSA, DH, RAND, DES-CBC, DES-EDE3-CBC, DES-ECB, DES-EDE3, RC4,
-+	AES-128-CBC, AES-192-CBC, AES-256-CBC, AES-128-ECB, AES-192-ECB,
-+	AES-256-ECB, AES-128-CTR, AES-192-CTR, AES-256-CTR, MD5, SHA1, SHA224,
-+	SHA256, SHA384, SHA512
-+
-+Note that for AES counter mode the application must provide their own EVP
-+functions since OpenSSL doesn't support counter mode through EVP yet. You may
-+see OpenSSH source code (cipher.c) to get the idea how to do that.
-+
-++------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-+| NOTE: this patch version does NOT contain experimental code for accessing    |
-+| RSA keys stored in pkcs#11 key stores by reference. Some problems were found |
-+| (thanks to all who wrote me!) and due to my ENOTIME problem I'll address     |
-+| those issues in the next version of the patch that will have that code back, |
-+| hopefully fixed.                                                             |
-++------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-+
-+You must provide the location of PKCS#11 library in your system to the
-+configure script. You will be instructed to do that when you try to run the
-+config script:
-+
-+	$ ./config 
-+	Operating system: i86pc-whatever-solaris2
-+	Configuring for solaris-x86-cc
-+	You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.
-+	See README.pkcs11 for more information.
-+
-+Taking openCryptoki project on Linux AMD64 box as an example, you would run
-+configure like this:
-+
-+	./config --pk11-libname=/usr/lib64/pkcs11/PKCS11_API.so
-+
-+To check whether newly built openssl really supports PKCS#11 it's enough to
-+run "apps/openssl engine" and look for "(pkcs11) PKCS #11 engine support" in
-+the output.
-+
-+This patch was tested on Solaris against PKCS#11 engine available from Solaris
-+Cryptographic Framework (Solaris 10 and OpenSolaris) and also on Linux using
-+PKCS#11 libraries from openCryptoki project (see openCryptoki website
-+http://sourceforge.net/projects/opencryptoki for more information). Some Linux
-+distributions even ship those libraries with the system. The patch should work
-+on any system that is supported by OpenSSL itself and has functional PKCS#11
-+library.
-+
-+The patch contains "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
-+(Cryptoki)" - files cryptoki.h, pkcs11.h, pkcs11f.h and pkcs11t.h which are
-+copyrighted by RSA Security Inc., see pkcs11.h for more information.
-+
-+Other added/modified code in this patch is copyrighted by Sun Microsystems,
-+Inc. and is released under the OpenSSL license (see LICENSE file for more
-+information).
-+
-+Revisions of patch for 0.9.8 branch
-+===================================
-+
-+2008-07-29
-+- update the patch to OpenSSL 0.9.8h version
-+- pkcs11t.h updated to the latest version:
-+
-+	6545665 make CKM_AES_CTR available to non-kernel users
-+
-+- fixed bugs in the engine code:
-+
-+	6602801 PK11_SESSION cache has to employ reference counting scheme for
-+		asymmetric key operations
-+	6605538 pkcs11 functions C_FindObjects[{Init,Final}]() not called
-+		atomically
-+	6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys
-+	6652362 pk11_RSA_finish() is cutting corners
-+	6662112 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() use locking in
-+		suboptimal way
-+	6666625 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() should be more
-+		resilient to destroy failures
-+	6667273 OpenSSL engine should not use free() but OPENSSL_free()
-+	6670363 PKCS#11 engine fails to reuse existing symmetric keys
-+	6678135 memory corruption in pk11_DH_generate_key() in pkcs#11 engine
-+	6678503 DSA signature conversion in pk11_dsa_do_verify() ignores size
-+		of big numbers leading to failures
-+	6706562 pk11_DH_compute_key() returns 0 in case of failure instead of
-+		-1
-+	6706622 pk11_load_{pub,priv}key create corrupted RSA key references
-+	6707129 return values from BN_new() in pk11_DH_generate_key() are not
-+		checked
-+	6707274 DSA/RSA/DH PKCS#11 engine operations need to be resistant to
-+		structure reuse
-+	6707782 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine pretends to be aware of
-+		OPENSSL_NO_{RSA,DSA,DH}
-+	defines but fails miserably
-+	6709966 make check_new_*() to return values to indicate cache hit/miss
-+	6705200 pk11_dh struct initialization in PKCS#11 engine is missing
-+		generate_params parameter
-+	6709513 PKCS#11 engine sets IV length even for ECB modes
-+	6728296 buffer length not initialized for C_(En|De)crypt_Final() in the
-+		PKCS#11 engine
-+	6728871 PKCS#11 engine must reset global_session in pk11_finish()
-+
-+- new features and enhancements:
-+
-+	6562155 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for SHA224/256/384/512
-+	6685012 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for new cipher modes
-+	6725903 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine shouldn't use soft token for symmetric
-+		ciphers and digests
-+
-+2007-10-15
-+- update for 0.9.8f version
-+- update for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference"
-+
-+2007-10-02
-+- draft for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference"
-+- draft for "6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys"
-+
-+2007-09-26
-+- 6375348 Using pkcs11 as the SSLCryptoDevice with Apache/OpenSSL causes
-+	  significant performance drop
-+- 6573196 memory is leaked when OpenSSL is used with PKCS#11 engine
-+
-+2007-05-25
-+- 6558630 race in OpenSSL pkcs11 engine when using symetric block ciphers
-+
-+2007-05-19
-+- initial patch for 0.9.8e using latest OpenSolaris code
-+
-+
-+Feedback
-+========
-+
-+Please send feedback to security-discuss at opensolaris.org. The patch was
-+created by Jan.Pechanec at Sun.COM from code available in OpenSolaris.
-+
-+Latest version should be always available on http://blogs.sun.com/janp.
-+
-diff -urN openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/engine/Makefile openssl-0.9.8j.new/crypto/engine/Makefile
---- openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/engine/Makefile	2008-09-17 19:10:59.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-0.9.8j.new/crypto/engine/Makefile	2009-02-15 22:29:36.590747863 +0100
-@@ -21,12 +21,14 @@
- 	eng_table.c eng_pkey.c eng_fat.c eng_all.c \
- 	tb_rsa.c tb_dsa.c tb_ecdsa.c tb_dh.c tb_ecdh.c tb_rand.c tb_store.c \
- 	tb_cipher.c tb_digest.c \
--	eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c eng_padlock.c
-+	eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c eng_padlock.c \
-+	hw_pk11.c hw_pk11_pub.c
- LIBOBJ= eng_err.o eng_lib.o eng_list.o eng_init.o eng_ctrl.o \
- 	eng_table.o eng_pkey.o eng_fat.o eng_all.o \
- 	tb_rsa.o tb_dsa.o tb_ecdsa.o tb_dh.o tb_ecdh.o tb_rand.o tb_store.o \
- 	tb_cipher.o tb_digest.o \
--	eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o eng_padlock.o
-+	eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o eng_padlock.o \
-+	hw_pk11.o hw_pk11_pub.o
- 
- SRC= $(LIBSRC)
- 
-@@ -286,6 +288,54 @@
- eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
- eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h eng_int.h
- eng_table.o: eng_table.c
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/ui.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/md2.h ../../include/openssl/md4.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/ripemd.h ../../include/openssl/des.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/des_old.h ../../include/openssl/ui_compat.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/rc4.h ../../include/openssl/rc2.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../crypto/rc5/rc5.h ../../include/openssl/blowfish.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/cast.h ../../include/openssl/idea.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../crypto/mdc2/mdc2.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../cryptlib.h
-+hw_pk11.o: ../../e_os.h hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11.c
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ui.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/md2.h ../../include/openssl/md4.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ripemd.h ../../include/openssl/des.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/des_old.h ../../include/openssl/ui_compat.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rc4.h ../../include/openssl/rc2.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../crypto/rc5/rc5.h ../../include/openssl/blowfish.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/cast.h ../../include/openssl/idea.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../crypto/mdc2/mdc2.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../cryptlib.h
-+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../e_os.h hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11_pub.c
- tb_cipher.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
- tb_cipher.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
- tb_cipher.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-diff -urN openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h openssl-0.9.8j.new/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h
---- openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-0.9.8j.new/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h	2009-02-15 22:26:02.684405873 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
-+/*
-+ * CDDL HEADER START
-+ *
-+ * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
-+ * Common Development and Distribution License, Version 1.0 only
-+ * (the "License").  You may not use this file except in compliance
-+ * with the License.
-+ *
-+ * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
-+ * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
-+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions
-+ * and limitations under the License.
-+ *
-+ * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
-+ * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
-+ * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
-+ * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
-+ * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
-+ *
-+ * CDDL HEADER END
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc.   All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef	_CRYPTOKI_H
-+#define	_CRYPTOKI_H
-+
-+#pragma ident	"@(#)cryptoki.h	1.2	05/06/08 SMI"
-+
-+#ifdef	__cplusplus
-+extern "C" {
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef	CK_PTR
-+#define	CK_PTR *
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION
-+#define	CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION
-+#define	CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER
-+#define	CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) returnType (* name)
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION
-+#define	CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType (* name)
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef NULL_PTR
-+#include <unistd.h>	/* For NULL */
-+#define	NULL_PTR NULL
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * pkcs11t.h defines TRUE and FALSE in a way that upsets lint
-+ */
-+#ifndef	CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
-+#define	CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
-+#ifndef	TRUE
-+#define	TRUE	1
-+#endif /* TRUE */
-+#ifndef	FALSE
-+#define	FALSE	0
-+#endif /* FALSE */
-+#endif /* CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE */
-+
-+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
-+
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+
-+/* Solaris specific functions */
-+
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+
-+/*
-+ * SUNW_C_GetMechSession will initialize the framework and do all
-+ * the necessary PKCS#11 calls to create a session capable of
-+ * providing operations on the requested mechanism
-+ */
-+CK_RV SUNW_C_GetMechSession(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech,
-+    CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR hSession);
-+
-+/*
-+ * SUNW_C_KeyToObject will create a secret key object for the given
-+ * mechanism from the rawkey data.
-+ */
-+CK_RV SUNW_C_KeyToObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
-+    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, const void *rawkey, size_t rawkey_len,
-+    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR obj);
-+
-+
-+#ifdef	__cplusplus
-+}
-+#endif
-+
-+#endif	/* _CRYPTOKI_H */
-diff -urN openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/engine/eng_all.c openssl-0.9.8j.new/crypto/engine/eng_all.c
---- openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/engine/eng_all.c	2008-06-04 20:01:39.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-0.9.8j.new/crypto/engine/eng_all.c	2009-02-15 22:26:02.687356494 +0100
-@@ -110,6 +110,9 @@
- #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG)
- 	ENGINE_load_capi();
- #endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11
-+	ENGINE_load_pk11();
-+#endif
- #endif
- 	}
- 
-diff -urN openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/engine/engine.h openssl-0.9.8j.new/crypto/engine/engine.h
---- openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/engine/engine.h	2008-06-04 20:01:40.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-0.9.8j.new/crypto/engine/engine.h	2009-02-15 22:26:02.691825491 +0100
-@@ -337,6 +337,7 @@
- void ENGINE_load_ubsec(void);
- #endif
- void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void);
-+void ENGINE_load_pk11(void);
- void ENGINE_load_padlock(void);
- void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void);
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG
-diff -urN openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c openssl-0.9.8j.new/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c
---- openssl-0.9.8j/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-0.9.8j.new/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c	2009-02-15 22:26:02.715171244 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,3382 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ */
-+
-+#pragma ident	"@(#)hw_pk11.c	1.14	08/07/28 SMI"
-+
-+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */
-+/* This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for 
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by 
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/* ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ *    distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ *    licensing at OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ *    acknowledgment:
-+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
-+#include <openssl/dso.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+#include <openssl/md5.h>
-+#include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+#include <openssl/dh.h>
-+#endif
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/objects.h>
-+#include <openssl/x509.h>
-+#include <openssl/aes.h>
-+#include <cryptlib.h>
-+#include <dlfcn.h>
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
-+
-+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */
-+#define	PK11_DBG	"PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG"
-+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */
-+#undef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+/*
-+ * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more
-+ * information.
-+ */
-+#undef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+
-+/*
-+ * AES counter mode is not supported in the OpenSSL EVP API yet and neither
-+ * there are official OIDs for mechanisms based on this mode. With our changes,
-+ * an application can define its own EVP calls for AES counter mode and then
-+ * it can make use of hardware acceleration through this engine. However, it's
-+ * better if we keep AES CTR support code under ifdef's.
-+ */
-+#define	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+
-+#include "cryptoki.h"
-+#include "pkcs11.h"
-+#include "hw_pk11_err.c"
-+
-+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+/*
-+ * NIDs for AES counter mode that will be defined during the engine
-+ * initialization.
-+ */
-+int NID_aes_128_ctr = NID_undef;
-+int NID_aes_192_ctr = NID_undef;
-+int NID_aes_256_ctr = NID_undef;
-+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+
-+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+/*
-+ * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel
-+ * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information.
-+ */
-+int *hw_cnids;
-+int *hw_dnids;
-+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Heads of the free PK11 session lists. We have three groups of algorithms in
-+ * the engine. Public key mechanisms, random operations, and symetric ciphers
-+ * and digests. We can use a different slot for each group so we must keep a
-+ * separate cache of sessions for them.
-+ */
-+static struct PK11_SESSION_st *pubkey_free_session = NULL;
-+static struct PK11_SESSION_st *rand_free_session = NULL;
-+static struct PK11_SESSION_st *free_session = NULL;
-+
-+/* Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available
-+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed
-+ * without losing the secret key objects */
-+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE	global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+/* ENGINE level stuff */
-+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)());
-+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e);
-+
-+/* RAND stuff */
-+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
-+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
-+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void);
-+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
-+static int pk11_rand_status(void);
-+
-+/* These functions are also used in other files */
-+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+
-+/* active list manipulation functions used here */
-+int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h);
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Local helper functions */
-+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void);
-+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_SESSION **sp);
-+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
-+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh);
-+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
-+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
-+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name);
-+
-+/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */
-+static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
-+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln);
-+static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void);
-+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids);
-+static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids);
-+static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
-+	const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
-+static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp);
-+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
-+	const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl);
-+static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
-+static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
-+	const int **nids, int nid);
-+static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
-+	const int **nids, int nid);
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, 
-+	const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp);
-+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
-+	int key_len);
-+static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
-+static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-+static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,const void *data,
-+	size_t count);
-+static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,unsigned char *md);
-+static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to,const EVP_MD_CTX *from);
-+static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-+
-+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found);
-+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
-+    int *local_cipher_nids);
-+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest,
-+    int *local_digest_nids);
-+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id,
-+    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids,
-+    int id);
-+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
-+    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
-+    int id);
-+
-+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void);
-+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table);
-+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+/* Index for the supported ciphers */
-+enum pk11_cipher_id {
-+	PK11_DES_CBC,
-+	PK11_DES3_CBC,
-+	PK11_DES_ECB,
-+	PK11_DES3_ECB,
-+	PK11_RC4,
-+	PK11_AES_128_CBC,
-+	PK11_AES_192_CBC,
-+	PK11_AES_256_CBC,
-+	PK11_AES_128_ECB,
-+	PK11_AES_192_ECB,
-+	PK11_AES_256_ECB,
-+	PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC,
-+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+	PK11_AES_128_CTR,
-+	PK11_AES_192_CTR,
-+	PK11_AES_256_CTR,
-+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+	PK11_CIPHER_MAX
-+};
-+
-+/* Index for the supported digests */
-+enum pk11_digest_id {
-+	PK11_MD5,
-+	PK11_SHA1,
-+	PK11_SHA224,
-+	PK11_SHA256,
-+	PK11_SHA384,
-+	PK11_SHA512,
-+	PK11_DIGEST_MAX
-+};
-+
-+#define	TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sess_hdl, obj_hdl, retval, uselock)		\
-+	{								\
-+	if (uselock)							\
-+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);			\
-+	if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl) == 1)				\
-+		{							\
-+		retval = pk11_destroy_object(sess_hdl, obj_hdl);	\
-+		}							\
-+	if (uselock)							\
-+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);		\
-+	}
-+
-+static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
-+static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
-+static int cipher_count		= 0;
-+static int digest_count		= 0;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa	= CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa	= CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh	= CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st 
-+	{
-+	enum pk11_cipher_id	id;
-+	int			nid;
-+	int			iv_len;
-+	int			key_len;
-+	CK_KEY_TYPE		key_type;
-+	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE	mech_type;
-+	} PK11_CIPHER;
-+
-+static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] = 
-+	{
-+	{PK11_DES_CBC,	   NID_des_cbc,      8,  8, CKK_DES,      CKM_DES_CBC, },
-+	{PK11_DES3_CBC,	   NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, CKK_DES3,     CKM_DES3_CBC, },
-+	{PK11_DES_ECB,	   NID_des_ecb,      0,  8, CKK_DES,      CKM_DES_ECB, },
-+	{PK11_DES3_ECB,	   NID_des_ede3_ecb, 0, 24, CKK_DES3,     CKM_DES3_ECB, },
-+	{PK11_RC4,	   NID_rc4,          0, 16, CKK_RC4,      CKM_RC4, },
-+	{PK11_AES_128_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, CKK_AES,      CKM_AES_CBC, },
-+	{PK11_AES_192_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, CKK_AES,      CKM_AES_CBC, },
-+	{PK11_AES_256_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, CKK_AES,      CKM_AES_CBC, },
-+	{PK11_AES_128_ECB, NID_aes_128_ecb,  0, 16, CKK_AES,      CKM_AES_ECB, },
-+	{PK11_AES_192_ECB, NID_aes_192_ecb,  0, 24, CKK_AES,      CKM_AES_ECB, },
-+	{PK11_AES_256_ECB, NID_aes_256_ecb,  0, 32, CKK_AES,      CKM_AES_ECB, },
-+	{PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC,NID_bf_cbc,       8, 16, CKK_BLOWFISH, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC,},
-+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+	/* we don't know the correct NIDs until the engine is initialized */
-+	{PK11_AES_128_CTR, NID_undef,	    16, 16, CKK_AES,      CKM_AES_CTR, },
-+	{PK11_AES_192_CTR, NID_undef,	    16, 24, CKK_AES,      CKM_AES_CTR, },
-+	{PK11_AES_256_CTR, NID_undef,	    16, 32, CKK_AES,      CKM_AES_CTR, },
-+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+	};
-+
-+typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st
-+	{
-+	enum pk11_digest_id	id;
-+	int			nid;
-+	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE	mech_type;
-+	} PK11_DIGEST;
-+
-+static PK11_DIGEST digests[] = 
-+	{
-+	{PK11_MD5,	NID_md5,	CKM_MD5, },
-+	{PK11_SHA1,	NID_sha1,	CKM_SHA_1, },
-+	{PK11_SHA224,	NID_sha224,	CKM_SHA224, },
-+	{PK11_SHA256,	NID_sha256,	CKM_SHA256, },
-+	{PK11_SHA384,	NID_sha384,	CKM_SHA384, },
-+	{PK11_SHA512,	NID_sha512,	CKM_SHA512, },
-+	{0,		NID_undef,	0xFFFF, },
-+	};
-+
-+/* Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in 
-+ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same 
-+ * pk11 session in multiple cipher_update calls
-+ */
-+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st
-+	{
-+	PK11_SESSION	*sp;
-+	} PK11_CIPHER_STATE;
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets
-+ * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID.
-+ *
-+ * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here.
-+ */
-+
-+/* DES CBC EVP */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc = 
-+	{
-+	NID_des_cbc,
-+	8, 8, 8,
-+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+	pk11_cipher_init,
-+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+	sizeof(PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+	NULL
-+	};
-+
-+/* 3DES CBC EVP */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc = 
-+	{
-+	NID_des_ede3_cbc,
-+	8, 24, 8,
-+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+	pk11_cipher_init,
-+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+	sizeof(PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+	NULL
-+	};
-+
-+/*
-+ * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
-+ * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL.
-+ */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb = 
-+	{
-+	NID_des_ecb,
-+	8, 8, 8,
-+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+	pk11_cipher_init,
-+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+	sizeof(PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+	NULL,
-+	NULL,
-+	NULL
-+	};
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb = 
-+	{
-+	NID_des_ede3_ecb,
-+	8, 24, 8,
-+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+	pk11_cipher_init,
-+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+	sizeof(PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+	NULL,
-+	NULL,
-+	NULL
-+	};
-+
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc = 
-+	{
-+	NID_aes_128_cbc,
-+	16, 16, 16,
-+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+	pk11_cipher_init,
-+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+	sizeof(PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+	NULL
-+	};
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc = 
-+	{
-+	NID_aes_192_cbc,
-+	16, 24, 16,
-+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+	pk11_cipher_init,
-+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+	sizeof(PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+	NULL
-+	};
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc = 
-+	{
-+	NID_aes_256_cbc,
-+	16, 32, 16,
-+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+	pk11_cipher_init,
-+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+	sizeof(PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+	NULL
-+	};
-+
-+/*
-+ * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
-+ * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL.
-+ */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb = 
-+	{
-+	NID_aes_128_ecb,
-+	16, 16, 0,
-+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+	pk11_cipher_init,
-+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+	sizeof(PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+	NULL,
-+	NULL,
-+	NULL
-+	};
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb = 
-+	{
-+	NID_aes_192_ecb,
-+	16, 24, 0,
-+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+	pk11_cipher_init,
-+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+	sizeof(PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+	NULL,
-+	NULL,
-+	NULL
-+	};
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb = 
-+	{
-+	NID_aes_256_ecb,
-+	16, 32, 0,
-+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+	pk11_cipher_init,
-+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+	sizeof(PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+	NULL,
-+	NULL,
-+	NULL
-+	};
-+
-+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+/*
-+ * NID_undef's will be changed to the AES counter mode NIDs as soon they are
-+ * created in pk11_library_init(). Note that the need to change these structures
-+ * is the reason why we don't define them with the const keyword.
-+ */
-+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr = 
-+	{
-+	NID_undef,
-+	16, 16, 16,
-+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+	pk11_cipher_init,
-+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+	sizeof(PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+	NULL
-+	};
-+
-+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr = 
-+	{
-+	NID_undef,
-+	16, 24, 16,
-+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+	pk11_cipher_init,
-+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+	sizeof(PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+	NULL
-+	};
-+
-+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr = 
-+	{
-+	NID_undef,
-+	16, 32, 16,
-+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+	pk11_cipher_init,
-+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+	sizeof(PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+	NULL
-+	};
-+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc = 
-+	{
-+	NID_bf_cbc,
-+	8, 16, 8,
-+	EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
-+	pk11_cipher_init,
-+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+	sizeof(PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+	NULL
-+	};
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 =
-+	{
-+	NID_rc4,
-+	1, 16, 0,
-+	EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
-+	pk11_cipher_init,
-+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+	sizeof(PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+	NULL,
-+	NULL,
-+	NULL
-+	};
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 =
-+	{
-+	NID_md5,
-+	NID_md5WithRSAEncryption,
-+	MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+	0,
-+	pk11_digest_init,
-+	pk11_digest_update,
-+	pk11_digest_final,
-+	pk11_digest_copy,
-+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+	MD5_CBLOCK,
-+	sizeof(PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+	};
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 =
-+	{
-+	NID_sha1,
-+	NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption,
-+	SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+	0,
-+	pk11_digest_init,
-+	pk11_digest_update,
-+	pk11_digest_final,
-+	pk11_digest_copy,
-+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+	SHA_CBLOCK,
-+	sizeof(PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+	};
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 =
-+	{
-+	NID_sha224,
-+	NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption,
-+	SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+	0,
-+	pk11_digest_init,
-+	pk11_digest_update,
-+	pk11_digest_final,
-+	pk11_digest_copy,
-+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+	/* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */
-+	SHA256_CBLOCK,
-+	sizeof(PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+	};
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 =
-+	{
-+	NID_sha256,
-+	NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption,
-+	SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+	0,
-+	pk11_digest_init,
-+	pk11_digest_update,
-+	pk11_digest_final,
-+	pk11_digest_copy,
-+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+	SHA256_CBLOCK,
-+	sizeof(PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+	};
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 =
-+	{
-+	NID_sha384,
-+	NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption,
-+	SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+	0,
-+	pk11_digest_init,
-+	pk11_digest_update,
-+	pk11_digest_final,
-+	pk11_digest_copy,
-+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+	/* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */
-+	SHA512_CBLOCK,
-+	sizeof(PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+	};
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 =
-+	{
-+	NID_sha512,
-+	NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption,
-+	SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+	0,
-+	pk11_digest_init,
-+	pk11_digest_update,
-+	pk11_digest_final,
-+	pk11_digest_copy,
-+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+	SHA512_CBLOCK,
-+	sizeof(PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+	};
-+
-+/* Initialization function. Sets up various pk11 library components.
-+ */
-+/* The definitions for control commands specific to this engine
-+ */
-+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH		ENGINE_CMD_BASE
-+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] =
-+	{
-+		{
-+		PK11_CMD_SO_PATH,
-+		"SO_PATH",
-+		"Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library",
-+		ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
-+		},
-+		{0, NULL, NULL, 0}
-+	};
-+
-+
-+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random =
-+	{
-+	pk11_rand_seed,
-+	pk11_rand_bytes,
-+	pk11_rand_cleanup,
-+	pk11_rand_add,
-+	pk11_rand_bytes,
-+	pk11_rand_status
-+	};
-+
-+
-+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE
-+ */
-+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11";
-+static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support";
-+
-+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL;
-+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList";
-+
-+/* Cryptoki library
-+ */
-+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION;
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL true = TRUE;
-+static CK_BBOOL false = FALSE;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0;
-+static int pk11_library_initialized = 0;
-+static int pk11_pid = 0;
-+
-+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL;
-+
-+/*
-+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support.
-+ */
-+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e)
-+	{
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+	const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL;
-+	RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA();
-+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+		pk11_library_init(e);
-+
-+	if(!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) ||
-+	   !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) ||
-+	   !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) ||
-+	   !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests))
-+	   	return 0;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+	if(pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE)
-+		{
-+		if(!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) ||
-+	           !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) ||
-+	           !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey))
-+			return 0;
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+		}
-+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+	if(pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE)
-+		{	
-+	  	if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA()))
-+			return 0;
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+	    	}
-+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+	if(pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE)
-+		{
-+	  	if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH()))
-+			return 0;
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+	    	}
-+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+	if(pk11_have_random)
-+		{
-+		if(!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random))
-+			return 0;
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+		}
-+	if(!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) ||
-+	   !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) ||
-+	   !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) ||
-+	   !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) ||
-+	   !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns))
-+		return 0;
-+
-+/* Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup
-+ * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp
-+ * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation. 
-+ * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern. */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+        rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
-+        pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp;
-+        pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp;
-+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+
-+	/* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */
-+	ERR_load_pk11_strings();
-+	
-+	return 1;
-+	}
-+
-+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris
-+ */
-+#ifdef	ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
-+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
-+	{
-+	if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0))
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	if (!bind_pk11(e))
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	return 1;
-+	}	   
-+
-+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
-+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
-+
-+#else
-+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void)
-+	{
-+	ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
-+
-+	if (!ret)
-+		return NULL;
-+
-+	if (!bind_pk11(ret))
-+		{
-+		ENGINE_free(ret);
-+		return NULL;
-+		}
-+
-+	return ret;
-+	}
-+
-+void ENGINE_load_pk11(void)
-+	{
-+	ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL;
-+
-+	/* Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to 
-+	 * security reasons. We will link it in statically
-+	 */
-+	/* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library 
-+	 */
-+	if (!pk11_dso)
-+		pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
-+
-+	if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+		{
-+		PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+		return;
-+		}
-+
-+	e_pk11 = engine_pk11();
-+	if (!e_pk11) 
-+		{
-+		DSO_free(pk11_dso);
-+		pk11_dso = NULL;
-+		return;
-+		}
-+
-+	/* At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically
-+	 * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11 
-+	 * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter 
-+	 * needs cipher and digest algorithm information
-+	 */
-+	if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11))
-+		{
-+		DSO_free(pk11_dso);
-+		pk11_dso = NULL;
-+		ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
-+		return;
-+		}
-+
-+	ENGINE_add(e_pk11);
-+
-+	ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
-+	ERR_clear_error();
-+	}
-+#endif	/* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */
-+
-+/* These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and 
-+ * the function symbol names to bind to. 
-+ */
-+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
-+
-+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
-+	{
-+	if (PK11_LIBNAME)
-+		return PK11_LIBNAME;
-+
-+	return def_PK11_LIBNAME;
-+	}
-+
-+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
-+	{
-+	if (PK11_LIBNAME)
-+		OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME);
-+
-+	PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
-+	}
-+
-+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name)
-+	{
-+	free_PK11_LIBNAME();
-+
-+	return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0);
-+	}
-+
-+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */
-+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e)
-+{
-+	return pk11_library_init(e);
-+}
-+
-+/* Initialization function. Sets up various pk11 library components.
-+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also
-+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and
-+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function
-+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e)
-+	{
-+	CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
-+	CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
-+	CK_INFO info;
-+	CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
-+	int any_slot_found;
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which is called
-+	 * from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still at least one
-+	 * existing functional reference to the engine (see engine(3) for more
-+	 * information), pk11_finish() is skipped. For example, this can happen
-+	 * if an application forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a
-+	 * fork() when the application is finishing the engine so that it can be
-+	 * reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional reference causes
-+	 * pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In that case we need the PID
-+	 * check so that we properly initialize the engine again.
-+	 */
-+	if (pk11_library_initialized)
-+		{
-+		if (pk11_pid == getpid())
-+			return 1;
-+		else
-+			global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+		}
-+	
-+	if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+		{
-+		PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+		goto err;
-+		}
-+
-+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+	/*
-+	 * We must do this before we start working with slots since we need all
-+	 * NIDs there.
-+	 */
-+	if (pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs() == 0)
-+		goto err;
-+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+
-+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+	if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
-+		goto err;
-+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+	/* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library
-+	 */
-+	p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso, 
-+		PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST);
-+	if ( !p )
-+		{
-+		PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+		goto err;
-+		}
-+ 
-+	/* get the full function list from the loaded library 
-+	 */
-+	rv = p(&pFuncList);
-+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+		{
-+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv);
-+		goto err;
-+		}
-+ 
-+	rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
-+	if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+		{
-+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
-+		goto err;
-+		}
-+
-+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info);
-+	if (rv != CKR_OK) 
-+		{
-+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv);
-+		goto err;
-+		}
-+
-+	if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0)
-+		goto err;
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any
-+	 * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an
-+	 * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11
-+	 * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just
-+	 * because no slot was present.
-+	 */
-+	if (any_slot_found == 0)
-+		return 1;
-+
-+	if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+		{
-+		/* Open the global_session for the new process */
-+		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
-+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+			{
-+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT,
-+			    PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+			goto err;
-+			}
-+		}
-+
-+	/* Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since
-+	 * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function */
-+	if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len)
-+			== CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, "
-+		    "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+		digest_count = 0;
-+	}
-+
-+	pk11_library_initialized = 1;
-+	pk11_pid = getpid();
-+	return 1;
-+
-+err:
-+	return 0;
-+	}
-+
-+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor)
-+ */
-+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e)
-+	{
-+	free_PK11_LIBNAME();
-+	ERR_unload_pk11_strings();
-+	return 1;
-+	}
-+
-+/* Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and 
-+ * the pk11 library.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e)
-+	{
-+	if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+		{
-+		PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED);
-+		goto err;
-+		}
-+
-+	OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL);
-+
-+	if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0)
-+		goto err;
-+
-+	pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session);
-+	global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
-+	 * may have side-effects.
-+	 */
-+#if 0
-+	pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL);
-+#endif
-+
-+	if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso))
-+		{
-+		PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+		goto err;
-+		}
-+	pk11_dso = NULL;
-+	pFuncList = NULL;
-+	pk11_library_initialized = 0;
-+	pk11_pid = 0;
-+
-+	return 1;
-+
-+err:
-+	return 0;
-+	}
-+
-+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */
-+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)())
-+	{
-+	int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
-+
-+	switch(cmd)
-+		{
-+	case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH:
-+		if (p == NULL)
-+			{
-+			PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-+			return 0;
-+			}
-+
-+		if (initialized)
-+			{
-+			PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
-+			return 0;
-+			}
-+
-+		return set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char*)p);
-+	default:
-+		break;
-+		}
-+
-+	PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL,PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
-+
-+	return 0;
-+	}
-+
-+
-+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here
-+ */
-+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void)
-+	{
-+	return;
-+	}
-+
-+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
-+	{
-+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
-+		return;
-+
-+	/* Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since 
-+	 * the calling functions do not care anyway
-+	 */
-+	pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num);
-+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+
-+	return;
-+	}
-+
-+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
-+	{
-+	pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0);
-+	}
-+
-+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
-+	{
-+	CK_RV rv;
-+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+	
-+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
-+		return 0;
-+	
-+	rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num);
-+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+		{
-+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv);
-+		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+		return 0;
-+		}
-+
-+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+	return 1;
-+	}
-+
-+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here
-+ */
-+static int pk11_rand_status(void)
-+	{
-+	return 1;
-+	}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION.
-+ */
-+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp)
-+	{
-+#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+		if (sp->rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+			BN_free(sp->rsa_n_num);
-+		if (sp->rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+			BN_free(sp->rsa_e_num);
-+		if (sp->rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+			BN_free(sp->rsa_d_num);
-+#endif
-+#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+		if (sp->dsa_pub_num != NULL)
-+			BN_free(sp->dsa_pub_num);
-+		if (sp->dsa_priv_num != NULL)
-+			BN_free(sp->dsa_priv_num);
-+#endif
-+#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+		if (sp->dh_priv_num != NULL)
-+			BN_free(sp->dh_priv_num);
-+#endif
-+	}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have
-+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here
-+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist.
-+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist.
-+ */
-+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+	{
-+	PK11_SESSION *sp, *sp1, *freelist;
-+	CK_RV rv;
-+
-+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+	switch (optype)
-+		{
-+		case OP_PUBKEY:
-+			freelist = pubkey_free_session;
-+			break;
-+		case OP_RAND:
-+			freelist = rand_free_session;
-+			break;
-+		case OP_DIGEST:
-+		case OP_CIPHER:
-+			freelist = free_session;
-+			break;
-+		default:
-+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 
-+				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+			goto err;
-+		}
-+	sp = freelist;
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled
-+	 * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first
-+	 * structure from the freelist.
-+	 */
-+	if (sp == NULL)
-+		{
-+		if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(PK11_SESSION))) == NULL)
-+			{
-+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 
-+				PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+			goto err;
-+			}
-+		memset(sp, 0, sizeof(PK11_SESSION));
-+		}
-+	else
-+		{
-+		freelist = sp->next;
-+		}
-+
-+	if (sp->pid != 0 && sp->pid != getpid())
-+		{
-+		/*
-+		 * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited
-+		 * PK11_SESSION objects.
-+		 */
-+		while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL)
-+			{
-+			freelist = sp1->next;
-+			/*
-+			 * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions()
-+			 * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11
-+			 * sessions and destroy all objects.
-+			 */
-+			pk11_free_nums(sp1);
-+			OPENSSL_free(sp1);
-+			}
-+
-+		/* Initialize the process */
-+		rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
-+		if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+			{
-+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE,
-+			    rv);
-+			OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+			sp = NULL;
-+			goto err;
-+			}
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this
-+		 * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one
-+		 * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found.
-+		 * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more
-+		 * information.
-+		 */
-+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+		if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
-+			goto err;
-+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+		if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0)
-+			goto err;
-+
-+		/* Open the global_session for the new process */
-+		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
-+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+			{
-+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION,
-+			    rv);
-+			OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+			sp = NULL;
-+			goto err;
-+			}
-+
-+		/* It is an inherited session and needs re-initialization.
-+		 */
-+		if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
-+			{
-+			OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+			sp = NULL;
-+			}
-+		}
-+	else if (sp->pid == 0)
-+		{
-+		/* It is a new session and needs initialization. */
-+		if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
-+			{
-+			OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+			sp = NULL;
-+			}
-+		}
-+
-+	switch (optype)
-+		{
-+		case OP_PUBKEY:
-+			pubkey_free_session = freelist;
-+			break;
-+		case OP_RAND:
-+			rand_free_session = freelist;
-+			break;
-+		case OP_DIGEST:
-+		case OP_CIPHER:
-+			free_session = freelist;
-+			break;
-+		}
-+
-+err:
-+	if (sp != NULL)
-+		sp->next = NULL;
-+
-+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+
-+	return sp;
-+	}
-+
-+
-+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+	{
-+	if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid())
-+		return;
-+	
-+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+
-+	switch (optype)
-+		{
-+		case OP_PUBKEY:
-+			sp->next = pubkey_free_session;
-+			pubkey_free_session = sp;
-+			break;
-+		case OP_RAND:
-+			sp->next = rand_free_session;
-+			rand_free_session = sp;
-+			break;
-+		case OP_DIGEST:
-+		case OP_CIPHER:
-+			sp->next = free_session;
-+			free_session = sp;
-+			break;
-+		}
-+
-+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+	}
-+
-+
-+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished
-+ */
-+static int pk11_free_all_sessions()
-+	{
-+	int ret = 1;
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+	(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
-+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+	(void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL);
-+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+	(void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL);
-+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+	(void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL);
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will
-+	 * return 0 on exit.
-+	 */
-+	if (pk11_free_session_list(&free_session) == 0)
-+		ret = 0;
-+	if (pk11_free_session_list(&pubkey_free_session) == 0)
-+		ret = 0;
-+	if (pk11_free_session_list(&rand_free_session) == 0)
-+		ret = 0;
-+
-+	return ret;
-+	}
-+	
-+/*
-+ * Destroy session structures from the specified linked list. Free as many
-+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we return
-+ * an error on return.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_SESSION **sessions)
-+	{
-+	CK_RV rv;
-+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+	pid_t mypid = getpid();
-+	int ret = 1;
-+
-+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+	while ((sp = *sessions) != NULL)
-+		{
-+		if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
-+			{
-+			rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
-+			if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+				{
-+				PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 
-+					PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
-+				ret = 0;
-+				}
-+			}
-+		if (sp->session_cipher != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
-+			{
-+			rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session_cipher);
-+			if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+				{
-+				PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 
-+					PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
-+				ret = 0;
-+				}
-+			}
-+		*sessions = sp->next;
-+		pk11_free_nums(sp);
-+		OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+		}
-+
-+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+	return ret;
-+	}
-+
-+
-+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+	{
-+	CK_RV rv;
-+	CK_SLOT_ID myslot;
-+
-+	switch (optype)
-+		{
-+		case OP_PUBKEY:
-+			myslot = pubkey_SLOTID;
-+			break;
-+		case OP_RAND:
-+			myslot = rand_SLOTID;
-+			break;
-+		case OP_DIGEST:
-+		case OP_CIPHER:
-+			myslot = SLOTID;
-+			break;
-+		default:
-+			PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION,
-+			    PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+			return 0;
-+		}
-+
-+	sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype);
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+	rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+		NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+	if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED)
-+		{
-+		/*
-+		 * We are probably a child process so force the
-+		 * reinitialize of the session
-+		 */
-+		pk11_library_initialized = 0;
-+		(void) pk11_library_init(NULL);
-+		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+		}
-+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+		{
-+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+		return 0;
-+		}
-+
-+	sp->session_cipher = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+	rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+		NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session_cipher);
-+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+		{
-+		(void) pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
-+		sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+		return 0;
-+		}
-+
-+	sp->pid = getpid();
-+	sp->rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+	sp->rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+	sp->dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+	sp->dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+	sp->dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+	sp->cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+	sp->rsa_pub = NULL;
-+	sp->rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+	sp->rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+	sp->rsa_priv = NULL;
-+	sp->rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+	sp->dsa_pub = NULL;
-+	sp->dsa_pub_num = NULL;
-+	sp->dsa_priv = NULL;
-+	sp->dsa_priv_num = NULL;
-+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+	sp->dh = NULL;
-+	sp->dh_priv_num = NULL;
-+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+	sp->encrypt = -1;
-+
-+	return 1;
-+	}
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+	{
-+	int ret = 0;
-+
-+	if (sp->rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+		{
-+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp->session, sp->rsa_pub_key, ret, uselock);
-+		sp->rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+		sp->rsa_pub = NULL;
-+		if (sp->rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+			BN_free(sp->rsa_n_num);
-+		sp->rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+		if (sp->rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+			BN_free(sp->rsa_e_num);
-+		sp->rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+		}
-+
-+	return (ret);
-+	}
-+
-+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+	{
-+	int ret = 0;
-+
-+	if (sp->rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+		{
-+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp->session, sp->rsa_priv_key, ret, uselock);
-+		sp->rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+		sp->rsa_priv = NULL;
-+		if (sp->rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+			BN_free(sp->rsa_d_num);
-+		sp->rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+		}
-+
-+	return (ret);
-+	}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
-+ * objects in the free list.
-+ */
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+	{
-+	int ret = 1;
-+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+	CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
-+
-+	if (session != NULL)
-+		local_free_session = session;
-+	else
-+		{
-+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+		local_free_session = pubkey_free_session;
-+		uselock = FALSE;
-+		}
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
-+	 */
-+	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+		{
-+		local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+		 * destroy operations fails.
-+		 */
-+		if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+			{
-+			ret = 0;
-+			continue;
-+			}
-+		if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+			{
-+			ret = 0;
-+			continue;
-+			}
-+		}
-+
-+	if (session == NULL)
-+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+
-+	return ret;
-+	}
-+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */
-+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+	{
-+	int ret = 0;
-+
-+	if (sp->dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+		{
-+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp->session, sp->dsa_pub_key, ret, uselock);
-+		sp->dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+		sp->dsa_pub = NULL;
-+		if (sp->dsa_pub_num != NULL)
-+			BN_free(sp->dsa_pub_num);
-+		sp->dsa_pub_num = NULL;
-+		}
-+
-+	return (ret);
-+	}
-+
-+/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */
-+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+	{
-+	int ret = 0;
-+
-+	if (sp->dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+		{
-+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp->session, sp->dsa_priv_key, ret, uselock);
-+		sp->dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+		sp->dsa_priv = NULL;
-+		if (sp->dsa_priv_num != NULL)
-+			BN_free(sp->dsa_priv_num);
-+		sp->dsa_priv_num = NULL;
-+		}
-+
-+	return (ret);
-+	}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
-+ * objects in the free list.
-+ */
-+int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+	{
-+	int ret = 1;
-+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+	CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
-+
-+	if (session != NULL)
-+		local_free_session = session;
-+	else
-+		{
-+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+		local_free_session = pubkey_free_session;
-+		uselock = FALSE;
-+		}
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
-+	 */
-+	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+		{
-+		local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+		 * destroy operations fails.
-+		 */
-+		if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+			{
-+			ret = 0;
-+			continue;
-+			}
-+		if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+			{
-+			ret = 0;
-+			continue;
-+			}
-+		}
-+
-+	if (session == NULL)
-+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+
-+	return ret;
-+	}
-+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+/* Destroy DH key from single session. */
-+int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+	{
-+	int ret = 0;
-+
-+	if (sp->dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+		{
-+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp->session, sp->dh_key, ret, uselock);
-+		sp->dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+		sp->dh = NULL;
-+		if (sp->dh_priv_num != NULL)
-+			BN_free(sp->dh_priv_num);
-+		sp->dh_priv_num = NULL;
-+		}
-+
-+	return (ret);
-+	}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy DH key object wrapper.
-+ *
-+ * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure
-+ *       if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list
-+ */
-+int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+	{
-+	int ret = 1;
-+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+	CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
-+
-+	if (session != NULL)
-+		local_free_session = session;
-+	else
-+		{
-+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+		local_free_session = pubkey_free_session;
-+		uselock = FALSE;
-+		}
-+
-+	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+		{
-+		local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+		 * destroy operations fails.
-+		 */
-+		if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+			{
-+			ret = 0;
-+			continue;
-+			}
-+		}
-+err:
-+	if (session == NULL)
-+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+
-+	return ret;
-+	}
-+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh)
-+	{
-+	CK_RV rv;
-+	rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh);
-+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+		{
-+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,
-+		    rv);
-+		return 0;
-+		}
-+
-+	return 1;
-+	}
-+
-+
-+/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions
-+ */
-+
-+static int
-+cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
-+	{
-+	int i;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++)
-+		if (ciphers[i].nid == nid)
-+			return (ciphers[i].id);
-+	return (-1);
-+	}
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids)
-+	{
-+	if (cipher_count > 0)
-+		*nids = cipher_nids;
-+	else
-+		*nids = NULL;
-+	return (cipher_count);
-+	}
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids)
-+	{
-+	if (digest_count > 0)
-+		*nids = digest_nids;
-+	else
-+		*nids = NULL;
-+	return (digest_count);
-+	}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher,
-+	PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech)
-+	{
-+	CK_RV rv;
-+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+	CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params;
-+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+	
-+	/*
-+	 * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and
-+	 * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before
-+	 * pk11_init_symetric() is called.
-+	 */
-+	OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != NULL);
-+	OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL);
-+	OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0);
-+
-+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+	if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr ||
-+	    ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr ||
-+	    ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
-+		{
-+		pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params);
-+		pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof(ctr_params);
-+		/*
-+		 * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter,
-+		 * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344
-+		 * needs. For more information on internal structure of the
-+		 * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can
-+		 * add code so that the counter length can be set via
-+		 * ENGINE_ctrl() function.
-+		 */
-+		ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
-+		OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+		memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+		}
-+	else
-+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+		{
-+		if (pcipher->iv_len > 0)
-+			{
-+			pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv;
-+			pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len;
-+			}
-+		}
-+
-+	/* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */
-+	if (ctx->encrypt)
-+		rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session_cipher, pmech,
-+			sp->cipher_key);
-+	else
-+		rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session_cipher, pmech,
-+			sp->cipher_key);
-+
-+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+		{
-+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ?
-+		    PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
-+		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+		return (0);
-+		}
-+
-+	return (1);
-+	}
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
-+    const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-+	{
-+	CK_MECHANISM mech;
-+	int index;
-+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
-+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+	PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row;
-+	
-+	state->sp = NULL;
-+
-+	index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid);
-+	if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index];
-+	/*
-+	 * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the
-+	 * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our
-+	 * ciphers table. The key length must match precisely. Every application
-+	 * can define its own EVP functions so this code serves as a sanity
-+	 * check.
-+	 *
-+	 * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be
-+	 * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs
-+	 * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES
-+	 * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV.
-+	 */
-+	if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len ||
-+	    ctx->key_len != p_ciph_table_row->key_len)
-+		{
-+		PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM);
-+		return 0;
-+		}
-+
-+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	/* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */
-+	mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type;
-+	mech.pParameter = NULL;
-+	mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
-+
-+	/* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key
-+	 */
-+	(void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_len);
-+	
-+	/* If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same,
-+	 * then just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the
-+	 * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup().
-+	 */
-+	if (sp->cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->encrypt == ctx->encrypt)
-+		{
-+		state->sp = sp;
-+		if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
-+			return (0);
-+
-+		return (1);
-+		}
-+
-+	/* Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object
-+	 * needs to be created.
-+	 */
-+	if (sp->cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+		{
-+		sp->cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key(
-+			ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp);
-+		}
-+
-+	if (sp->encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->encrypt != -1)
-+		{
-+		/* The previous encryption/decryption
-+		 * is different. Need to terminate the previous
-+		 * active encryption/decryption here
-+		 */
-+		if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp))
-+			{
-+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+			return 0;
-+			}
-+		}
-+
-+	if (sp->cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+		{
-+		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+		return 0;
-+		}
-+
-+	/* now initialize the context with a new key */
-+	if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
-+		return (0);
-+
-+	sp->encrypt = ctx->encrypt;
-+	state->sp = sp;
-+
-+	return 1;
-+	}
-+
-+/* When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a 
-+ * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session
-+ * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so
-+ * that it needs not be recreated.
-+ *
-+ * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this
-+ * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return
-+ * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good
-+ * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix
-+ * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp)
-+	{
-+	CK_RV rv;
-+
-+	rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session_cipher);
-+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+		{
-+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
-+		return 0;
-+		}
-+
-+	rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+		NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session_cipher);
-+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+		{
-+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+		return 0;
-+		}
-+
-+	return 1;
-+	}
-+
-+/* An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient
-+ * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results */
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
-+	const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl)
-+	{
-+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
-+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+	CK_RV rv;
-+	unsigned long outl = inl;
-+
-+	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp;
-+
-+	if (!inl)
-+		return 1;
-+
-+	/* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */
-+	if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	if (ctx->encrypt)
-+		{
-+		rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session_cipher, 
-+			(unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
-+
-+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+			{
-+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 
-+			    PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv);
-+			return 0;
-+			}
-+		}
-+	else
-+		{
-+		rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session_cipher, 
-+			(unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
-+
-+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+			{
-+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
-+			    PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv);
-+			return 0;
-+			}
-+		}
-+
-+	/* for DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always
-+	 * the same size of input
-+	 * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with 
-+	 * correctly aligned buffers.
-+	 */
-+	if (inl != outl)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	return 1;
-+	}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal()
-+ * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's
-+ * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but
-+ * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't
-+ * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with
-+ * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness,
-+ * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used
-+ * context is initialized without finalizing it first.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-+	{
-+	CK_RV rv;
-+	CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH;
-+	CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
-+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data;
-+
-+	if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
-+		{
-+		/*
-+		 * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get
-+		 * rid of the context.
-+		 */
-+		if (ctx->encrypt)
-+			rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal(
-+			    state->sp->session_cipher, buf, &len);
-+		else
-+			rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal(
-+			    state->sp->session_cipher, buf, &len);
-+
-+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+			{
-+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ?
-+			    PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv);
-+			pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+			return (0);
-+			}
-+
-+		pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+		state->sp = NULL;
-+		}
-+
-+	return (1);
-+	}
-+
-+/* Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with
-+ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the
-+ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
-+	const int **nids, int nid)
-+	{
-+	if (!cipher)
-+		return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids));
-+
-+	switch (nid)
-+		{
-+		case NID_des_ede3_cbc:
-+			*cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc;
-+			break;
-+		case NID_des_cbc:
-+			*cipher = &pk11_des_cbc;
-+			break;
-+		case NID_des_ede3_ecb:
-+			*cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb;
-+			break;
-+		case NID_des_ecb:
-+			*cipher = &pk11_des_ecb;
-+			break;
-+		case NID_aes_128_cbc:
-+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc;
-+			break;
-+		case NID_aes_192_cbc:
-+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc;
-+			break;
-+		case NID_aes_256_cbc:
-+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc;
-+			break;
-+		case NID_aes_128_ecb:
-+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb;
-+			break;
-+		case NID_aes_192_ecb:
-+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb;
-+			break;
-+		case NID_aes_256_ecb:
-+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb;
-+			break;
-+		case NID_bf_cbc:
-+			*cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc;
-+			break;
-+		case NID_rc4:
-+			*cipher = &pk11_rc4;
-+			break;
-+		default:
-+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+			/*
-+			 * These can't be in separated cases because the NIDs
-+			 * here are not constants.
-+			 */
-+			if (nid == NID_aes_128_ctr)
-+				*cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr;
-+			else if (nid == NID_aes_192_ctr)
-+				*cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr;
-+			else if (nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
-+				*cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr;
-+			else
-+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+			*cipher = NULL;
-+			break;
-+		}
-+	return (*cipher != NULL);
-+	}
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
-+	const int **nids, int nid)
-+	{
-+	if (!digest)
-+		return (pk11_usable_digests(nids));
-+
-+	switch (nid)
-+		{
-+		case NID_md5:
-+			*digest = &pk11_md5; 
-+			break;
-+		case NID_sha1:
-+			*digest = &pk11_sha1; 
-+			break;
-+		case NID_sha224:
-+			*digest = &pk11_sha224; 
-+			break;
-+		case NID_sha256:
-+			*digest = &pk11_sha256; 
-+			break;
-+		case NID_sha384:
-+			*digest = &pk11_sha384; 
-+			break;
-+		case NID_sha512:
-+			*digest = &pk11_sha512; 
-+			break;
-+		default:
-+			*digest = NULL;
-+			break;
-+		}
-+	return (*digest != NULL);
-+	}
-+
-+
-+/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session
-+ */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, 
-+	const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp)
-+	{
-+	CK_RV rv;
-+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
-+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6;
-+
-+	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
-+		{
-+		{CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+		{CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof(false)},
-+		{CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
-+		{CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
-+		{CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0},
-+		};
-+
-+	/* Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions
-+	 * can use the key handles. Here is why:
-+	 * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key.
-+	 * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key.
-+	 * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with
-+	 * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES 
-+	 * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and
-+	 * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session
-+	 * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key 
-+	 * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to
-+	 * terminate the active operation.
-+	 */
-+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session;
-+	a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key;
-+	a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
-+	a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key;
-+	a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len;
-+
-+	rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, 
-+		a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+		{
-+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
-+		    rv);
-+		goto err;
-+		}
-+
-+	/* Save the key information used in this session.
-+	 * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX.
-+	 */
-+	sp->key_len = ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX ? 
-+		PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX : ctx->key_len;
-+	memcpy(sp->key, key, sp->key_len);
-+err:
-+
-+	return h_key;
-+	}
-+
-+static int
-+md_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
-+	{
-+	int i;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++)
-+		if (digests[i].nid == nid)
-+			return (digests[i].id);
-+	return (-1);
-+	}
-+
-+static int 
-+pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-+        { 
-+	CK_RV rv;
-+	CK_MECHANISM mech;
-+	int index;
-+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+	PK11_DIGEST *pdp;
-+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
-+	
-+	state->sp = NULL;
-+
-+	index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type);
-+	if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	pdp = &digests[index];
-+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	/* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */
-+	mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type;
-+	mech.pParameter = NULL;
-+	mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
-+
-+	rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech);
-+
-+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+		{
-+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv);
-+		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+		return 0;
-+		}
-+
-+	state->sp = sp;
-+
-+	return 1;
-+	}
-+
-+static int 
-+pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,const void *data,size_t count)
-+        { 
-+	CK_RV rv;
-+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
-+	
-+	/* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */
-+	if (count == 0)
-+		return 1;
-+
-+	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data,
-+		count);
-+
-+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+		{
-+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv);
-+		pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+		state->sp = NULL;
-+		return 0;
-+		}
-+
-+	return 1;
-+	}
-+
-+static int 
-+pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,unsigned char *md)
-+        { 
-+	CK_RV rv;
-+	unsigned long len;
-+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
-+	len = ctx->digest->md_size;
-+	
-+	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len);
-+
-+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+		{
-+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv);
-+		pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+		state->sp = NULL;
-+		return 0;
-+		}
-+
-+	if (ctx->digest->md_size != len)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	/* Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session
-+	 * to the pool
-+	 */
-+	pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+	state->sp = NULL;
-+
-+	return 1;
-+	}
-+
-+static int 
-+pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to,const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
-+        { 
-+	CK_RV rv;
-+	int ret = 0;
-+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to;
-+	CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL;
-+	CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
-+	
-+	/* The copy-from state */
-+	state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data;
-+	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+		goto err;
-+
-+	/* Initialize the copy-to state */
-+	if (!pk11_digest_init(to))
-+		goto err;
-+	state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data;
-+
-+	/* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */
-+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL, 
-+		&ul_state_len);
-+
-+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+		{
-+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
-+		    rv);
-+		goto err;
-+		}
-+	if (ul_state_len == 0)
-+		{
-+		goto err;
-+		}
-+
-+	pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len);
-+	if (pstate == NULL)
-+		{
-+		PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+		goto err;
-+		}
-+
-+	/* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */
-+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate, 
-+		&ul_state_len);
-+
-+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+		{
-+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
-+		    rv);
-+		goto err;
-+		}
-+
-+	/* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */
-+	rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate, 
-+		ul_state_len, 0, 0);
-+
-+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+		{
-+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv);
-+		goto err;
-+		}
-+
-+	ret = 1;
-+err:
-+	if (pstate != NULL)
-+		OPENSSL_free(pstate);
-+
-+	return ret;
-+	}
-+
-+/* Return any pending session state to the pool */
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-+	{
-+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data;
-+	unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-+
-+	if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
-+		{
-+		/*
-+		 * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not
-+		 * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory
-+		 * that might have been allocated in the token when
-+		 * pk11_digest_init() was called.
-+		 */
-+		(void) pk11_digest_final(ctx,buf);
-+		pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+		state->sp = NULL;
-+		}
-+
-+	return 1;
-+	}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key
-+ * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key
-+ * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for
-+ * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first
-+ * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same
-+ * prefix.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
-+	int key_len)
-+	{
-+	if (sp->key_len != key_len || memcmp(sp->key, key, key_len) != 0)
-+		{
-+		(void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp);
-+		return (0);
-+		}
-+	return (1);
-+	}
-+
-+/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. 
-+ */
-+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+	{
-+	int ret = 0;
-+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+
-+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+	if (session)
-+		local_free_session = session;
-+	else
-+		local_free_session = free_session;
-+	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+		{
-+		local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+		if (sp->cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+			{
-+			/* The secret key object is created in the 
-+			 * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key
-+			 */
-+			if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session, 
-+				sp->cipher_key) == 0)
-+				goto err;
-+			sp->cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+			}
-+		}
-+	ret = 1;
-+err:
-+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
-+
-+	return ret;
-+	}
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported
-+ *
-+ * CKM_RSA_X_509
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS
-+ * CKM_DSA
-+ *
-+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a
-+ * public key slot.
-+ *
-+ * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported
-+ *
-+ * CKM_DES3_CBC
-+ * CKM_DES_CBC
-+ * CKM_AES_CBC
-+ * CKM_DES3_ECB
-+ * CKM_DES_ECB
-+ * CKM_AES_ECB
-+ * CKM_AES_CTR
-+ * CKM_RC4
-+ * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC
-+ *
-+ * Digests optionally supported
-+ *
-+ * CKM_MD5
-+ * CKM_SHA_1
-+ * CKM_SHA224
-+ * CKM_SHA256
-+ * CKM_SHA384
-+ * CKM_SHA512
-+ *
-+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which
-+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of
-+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global
-+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key
-+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests.
-+ */
-+static int 
-+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found)
-+	{
-+	CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
-+	CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
-+	CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+	CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
-+	int i;
-+	CK_RV rv;
-+	CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar;
-+	CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
-+	int slot_n_cipher = 0;
-+	int slot_n_digest = 0;
-+	CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0;
-+	int current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
-+	int current_slot_n_digest = 0;
-+
-+	int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
-+	int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
-+
-+	/* let's initialize the output parameter */
-+	if (any_slot_found != NULL)
-+		*any_slot_found = 0;
-+
-+	/* Get slot list for memory allocation */
-+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
-+
-+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+		{
-+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
-+		return 0;
-+		}
-+
-+	/* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */
-+	if (ulSlotCount == 0) 
-+		{
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+		return 1;
-+		}
-+
-+	pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
-+
-+	if (pSlotList == NULL) 
-+		{
-+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+		return 0;
-+		}
-+
-+	/* Get the slot list for processing */
-+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
-+	if (rv != CKR_OK) 
-+		{
-+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
-+		OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+		return 0;
-+		}
-+
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME);
-+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
-+
-+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) 
-+		{
-+		current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+		/* Check if slot has random support. */
-+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
-+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+			continue;
-+
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+		if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG)
-+			{
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+			pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE;
-+			break;
-+			}
-+		}
-+
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) 
-+		{
-+		CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE;
-+		CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE;
-+		CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE;
-+		current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
-+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+			continue;
-+
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+		/*
-+		 * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
-+		 * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS.
-+		 */
-+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, 
-+			&mech_info);
-+
-+		if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
-+				(mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
-+			{
-+			/*
-+			 * Check if this slot is capable of encryption,
-+			 * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509.
-+			 */
-+			rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
-+			  CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info);
-+
-+			if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
-+			    (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) &&
-+			    (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
-+			    (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER) &&
-+			    (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)))
-+				{
-+				slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE;
-+				}
-+			}
-+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+		/*
-+		 * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
-+		 * verifying with CKM_DSA.
-+		 */
-+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA, 
-+			&mech_info);
-+		if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
-+		    (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
-+			{
-+			slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE;
-+			}
-+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+		/*
-+		 * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and
-+		 * derivation.
-+		 */
-+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
-+		  CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info);
-+
-+		if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR))
-+			{    
-+			rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
-+				CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info);
-+			if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE))
-+				{
-+				slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE;
-+				}
-+			}
-+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+		if (!found_candidate_slot &&
-+		    (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh))
-+			{
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+			fprintf(stderr,
-+			  "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot);
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+			best_slot_sofar = current_slot;
-+			pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa;
-+			pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa;
-+			pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh;
-+			found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE;
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+			fprintf(stderr,
-+		            "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n",
-+			    PK11_DBG);
-+			fprintf(stderr,
-+		            "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+		    	    best_slot_sofar);
-+			}
-+		else
-+			{
-+			fprintf(stderr,
-+			  "%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG);
-+			}
-+#else
-+			} /* if */
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+		} /* for */
-+
-+	if (found_candidate_slot)
-+		{
-+		pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar;
-+		}
-+
-+	found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
-+	best_slot_sofar = 0;
-+
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG);
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) 
-+		{
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+		current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+		current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
-+		current_slot_n_digest = 0;
-+		memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof(local_cipher_nids));
-+		memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof(local_digest_nids));
-+
-+		pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot,
-+		    &current_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids);
-+
-+		pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot,
-+		    &current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids);
-+
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+			current_slot_n_cipher);
-+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+			current_slot_n_digest);
-+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: best so far cipher/digest slot: %d\n",
-+			PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar);
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than 
-+		 * the previous best one we change the current best to this one.
-+		 * otherwise leave it where it is.
-+		 */
-+		if ((current_slot_n_cipher > slot_n_cipher) ||
-+		    (current_slot_n_digest > slot_n_digest))
-+			{
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+			fprintf(stderr,
-+				"%s: changing best so far slot to %d\n",
-+				PK11_DBG, current_slot);
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+			best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot;
-+			slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher;
-+			slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest;
-+
-+			}
-+		}
-+
-+	if (slot_n_cipher > 0)
-+		{
-+		cipher_count = slot_n_cipher;
-+		memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids, 
-+			sizeof(local_cipher_nids));
-+		}
-+	if (slot_n_digest > 0)
-+		{
-+		digest_count = slot_n_digest;
-+		memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids, 
-+			sizeof(local_digest_nids));
-+		}
-+
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+	fprintf(stderr,
-+	  "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID);
-+	fprintf(stderr,
-+	  "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID);
-+	fprintf(stderr,
-+	  "%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID);
-+	fprintf(stderr,
-+	  "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa);
-+	fprintf(stderr,
-+	  "%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa);
-+	fprintf(stderr,
-+	  "%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh);
-+	fprintf(stderr,
-+	  "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random);
-+	fprintf(stderr,
-+	  "%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count);
-+	fprintf(stderr,
-+	  "%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count);
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+		
-+	if (pSlotList != NULL)
-+		OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+
-+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+	OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids);
-+	OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids);
-+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+	if (any_slot_found != NULL)
-+		*any_slot_found = 1;
-+	return 1;
-+	}
-+
-+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+    int slot_id, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
-+    int *local_cipher_nids, int id)
-+	{
-+	CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+	CK_RV rv;
-+
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech);
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+	rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info);
-+
-+	if (rv != CKR_OK) 
-+		{
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+		fprintf(stderr, " not found\n");
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+		return;
-+		}
-+
-+	if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
-+	    (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))
-+		{
-+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+		if (nid_in_table(ciphers[id].nid, hw_cnids))
-+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+			{
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+		fprintf(stderr, " usable\n");
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+			local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] =
-+			    ciphers[id].nid;
-+			}
-+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+		else
-+			{
-+		fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n");
-+			}
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+		}
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+	else
-+		{
-+		fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n");
-+		}
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+	return;
-+	}
-+
-+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
-+    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
-+    int id)
-+	{
-+	CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+	CK_RV rv;
-+
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech);
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+	rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info);
-+
-+	if (rv != CKR_OK) 
-+		{
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+		fprintf(stderr, " not found\n");
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+		return;
-+		}
-+
-+	if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST)
-+		{
-+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+	    	if (nid_in_table(digests[id].nid, hw_dnids))
-+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+			{
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+		fprintf(stderr, " usable\n");
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+			local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] =
-+			    digests[id].nid;
-+			}
-+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+		else
-+			{
-+		fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n");
-+			}
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+		}
-+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+	else
-+		{
-+		fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n");
-+		}
-+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+	return;
-+	}
-+
-+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
-+/* create a new NID when we have no OID for that mechanism */
-+static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln)
-+	{
-+	ASN1_OBJECT *o;
-+	int nid;
-+
-+	if ((o = ASN1_OBJECT_create(OBJ_new_nid(1), (unsigned char *)"",
-+	    1, sn, ln)) == NULL)
-+		{
-+		return 0;
-+		}
-+
-+	/* will return NID_undef on error */
-+	nid = OBJ_add_object(o);
-+	ASN1_OBJECT_free(o);
-+
-+	return (nid);
-+	}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create new NIDs for AES counter mode. OpenSSL doesn't support them now so we
-+ * have to help ourselves here.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void)
-+	{
-+	/* are we already set? */
-+	if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef)
-+		return 1;
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * There are no official names for AES counter modes yet so we just
-+	 * follow the format of those that exist.
-+	 */
-+	if ((NID_aes_128_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-128-CTR", "aes-128-ctr")) ==
-+	    NID_undef)
-+		goto err;
-+	ciphers[PK11_AES_128_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_128_ctr.nid = NID_aes_128_ctr;
-+	if ((NID_aes_192_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-192-CTR", "aes-192-ctr")) ==
-+	    NID_undef)
-+		goto err;
-+	ciphers[PK11_AES_192_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_192_ctr.nid = NID_aes_192_ctr;
-+	if ((NID_aes_256_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-256-CTR", "aes-256-ctr")) ==
-+	    NID_undef)
-+		goto err;
-+	ciphers[PK11_AES_256_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_256_ctr.nid = NID_aes_256_ctr;
-+	return 1;
-+
-+err:
-+	PK11err(PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED);
-+	return 0;
-+	}
-+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
-+
-+/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */
-+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids)
-+	{
-+	int i;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i)
-+		{
-+		pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot,
-+		    ciphers[i].mech_type, current_slot_n_cipher,
-+		    local_cipher_nids, ciphers[i].id);
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */
-+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids)
-+	{
-+	int i;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i)
-+		{
-+		pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, digests[i].mech_type,
-+		    current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids, digests[i].id);
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+/*
-+ * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library
-+ * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation
-+ * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code
-+ * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the
-+ * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some
-+ * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a

@@ Diff output truncated at 100000 characters. @@
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