[csw-devel] SF.net SVN: gar:[10888] csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk
chninkel at users.sourceforge.net
chninkel at users.sourceforge.net
Thu Sep 2 00:45:15 CEST 2010
Revision: 10888
http://gar.svn.sourceforge.net/gar/?rev=10888&view=rev
Author: chninkel
Date: 2010-09-01 22:45:15 +0000 (Wed, 01 Sep 2010)
Log Message:
-----------
openssh: readded openssh gsskex patch
Modified Paths:
--------------
csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/Makefile
Added Paths:
-----------
csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/openssh-5.6p1-gsskex-all-20100902.patch
Modified: csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/Makefile
===================================================================
--- csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/Makefile 2010-09-01 22:43:26 UTC (rev 10887)
+++ csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/Makefile 2010-09-01 22:45:15 UTC (rev 10888)
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
GARNAME = openssh
GARVERSION = 5.6p1
GSSKEX_PATCH_VERSION = $(GARVERSION)
-GSSKEX_PATCH_DATE = 20100901
+GSSKEX_PATCH_DATE = 20100902
CATEGORIES = server
DESCRIPTION = OpenSSH Secure Shell
Added: csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/openssh-5.6p1-gsskex-all-20100902.patch
===================================================================
--- csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/openssh-5.6p1-gsskex-all-20100902.patch (rev 0)
+++ csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/openssh-5.6p1-gsskex-all-20100902.patch 2010-09-01 22:45:15 UTC (rev 10888)
@@ -0,0 +1,2933 @@
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/ChangeLog.gssapi openssh-5.4p1/ChangeLog.gssapi
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/ChangeLog.gssapi 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/ChangeLog.gssapi 2010-03-13 00:39:22.276624764 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
++20090615
++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
++ sshd.c ]
++ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
++ Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
++ Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
++ Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
++ Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
++ Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
++ Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
++ Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
++ Cast data.length before printing
++ If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
++
++20090201
++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
++ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
++ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
++ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
++
++20080404
++ - [ gss-serv.c ]
++ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
++ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
++ Stoichkov
++
++20070317
++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a
++ function
++
++20061220
++ - [ servconf.c ]
++ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and
++ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
++
++20060910
++ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
++ ssh-gss.h ]
++ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
++ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
++ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
++ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
++ <Bugzilla #928>
++ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
++ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
++ configuration files
++ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
++ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
++ Limit length of error messages displayed by client
++
++20060909
++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
++ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
++ only, where they belong
++ <Bugzilla #1225>
++
++20060829
++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment
++ variable
++
++20060828
++ - [ gss-genr.c ]
++ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
++ <Fixed upstream 20060829>
++
++20060818
++ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
++ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled
++ <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
++
++20060421
++ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
++ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
++ fix compiler errors/warnings
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
++ fix uninitialized variable warnings
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ - [ gssgenr.c ]
++ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ <Bugzilla #1220 >
++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ <Fixed upstream 20060304>
++ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c
++ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
++ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/Makefile.in openssh-5.4p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/Makefile.in 2010-02-24 08:18:51.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/Makefile.in 2010-03-13 00:39:54.547584984 +0100
+@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@
+ monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o kexdh.o \
+ kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o \
+ entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o schnorr.o \
+- ssh-pkcs11.o
++ ssh-pkcs11.o kexgssc.o
+
+ SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
+ sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \
+@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@
+ auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-jpake.o \
+ monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o \
+ auth-krb5.o \
+- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
++ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\
+ loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
+ audit.o audit-bsm.o platform.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+ roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/auth-krb5.c openssh-5.4p1/auth-krb5.c
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/auth-krb5.c 2009-12-21 00:49:22.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/auth-krb5.c 2010-03-13 00:39:22.287877739 +0100
+@@ -170,8 +170,13 @@
+
+ len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
+ authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
++ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
++#else
+ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
+ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
++#endif
+
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -226,15 +231,22 @@
+ #ifndef HEIMDAL
+ krb5_error_code
+ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+- int tmpfd, ret;
++ int ret;
+ char ccname[40];
+ mode_t old_umask;
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++ char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
++#else
++ char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
++ int tmpfd;
++#endif
+
+ ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
++ cctemplate, geteuid());
+ if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+ return ENOMEM;
+
++#ifndef USE_CCAPI
+ old_umask = umask(0177);
+ tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+ umask(old_umask);
+@@ -249,6 +261,7 @@
+ return errno;
+ }
+ close(tmpfd);
++#endif
+
+ return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+ }
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/auth.h openssh-5.4p1/auth.h
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/auth.h 2010-03-04 11:53:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/auth.h 2010-03-13 00:39:22.290248539 +0100
+@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
+ int valid; /* user exists and is allowed to login */
+ int attempt;
+ int failures;
++ int server_caused_failure;
+ int force_pwchange;
+ char *user; /* username sent by the client */
+ char *service;
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/auth2-gss.c openssh-5.4p1/auth2-gss.c
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/auth2-gss.c 2007-12-02 12:59:45.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/auth2-gss.c 2010-03-13 00:39:22.294875029 +0100
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.16 2007/10/29 00:52:45 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -52,6 +52,40 @@
+ static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
+ static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
++/*
++ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
++ */
++static int
++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
++{
++ int authenticated = 0;
++ Buffer b;
++ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
++ u_int len;
++
++ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
++ mic.length = len;
++
++ packet_check_eom();
++
++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
++ "gssapi-keyex");
++
++ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
++ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
++
++ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
++ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
++ &gssbuf, &mic))))
++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++ authctxt->pw));
++
++ buffer_free(&b);
++ xfree(mic.value);
++
++ return (authenticated);
++}
++
+ /*
+ * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
+ * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
+@@ -102,6 +136,7 @@
+
+ if (!present) {
+ xfree(doid);
++ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+@@ -109,6 +144,7 @@
+ if (ctxt != NULL)
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+ xfree(doid);
++ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+@@ -242,7 +278,8 @@
+
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++ authctxt->pw));
+
+ authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+@@ -277,7 +314,8 @@
+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
+- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
++ authenticated =
++ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
+ else
+ logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+
+@@ -292,6 +330,12 @@
+ userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic");
+ }
+
++Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
++ "gssapi-keyex",
++ userauth_gsskeyex,
++ &options.gss_authentication
++};
++
+ Authmethod method_gssapi = {
+ "gssapi-with-mic",
+ userauth_gssapi,
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/auth2.c openssh-5.4p1/auth2.c
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/auth2.c 2009-06-22 08:11:07.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.4p1/auth2.c 2010-03-13 00:39:22.298679511 +0100
+@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
+ extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
+ extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
+ extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
+ #endif
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@
+ &method_none,
+ &method_pubkey,
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++ &method_gsskeyex,
+ &method_gssapi,
+ #endif
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+@@ -274,6 +276,7 @@
+ #endif
+
+ authctxt->postponed = 0;
++ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0;
+
+ /* try to authenticate user */
+ m = authmethod_lookup(method);
+@@ -346,7 +349,8 @@
+ } else {
+
+ /* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */
+- if (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0)
++ if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure &&
++ (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0))
+ authctxt->failures++;
+ if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/clientloop.c openssh-5.4p1/clientloop.c
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/clientloop.c 2010-01-30 07:28:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/clientloop.c 2010-03-13 00:39:22.309033482 +0100
+@@ -111,6 +111,10 @@
+ #include "msg.h"
+ #include "roaming.h"
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#endif
++
+ /* import options */
+ extern Options options;
+
+@@ -1431,6 +1435,13 @@
+ /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
+ if (!rekeying) {
+ channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
++
++ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) {
++ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
++ need_rekeying = 1;
++ }
++
+ if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) {
+ debug("need rekeying");
+ xxx_kex->done = 0;
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/configure.ac openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/configure.ac 2010-03-05 05:04:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac 2010-03-13 00:39:22.319807465 +0100
+@@ -477,6 +477,30 @@
+ [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
+ AC_DEFINE(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF, 1,
+ [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
++ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API)
++ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
++ [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
++ AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1,
++ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
++ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
++ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)])
++ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache)
++ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
++ [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
++ [cc_context_t c;
++ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
++ [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1,
++ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
++ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
++ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
++ AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***)
++ fi],
++ [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]
++ )
+ m4_pattern_allow(AU_IPv)
+ AC_CHECK_DECL(AU_IPv4, [],
+ AC_DEFINE(AU_IPv4, 0, [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/gss-genr.c openssh-5.4p1/gss-genr.c
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/gss-genr.c 2009-06-22 08:11:07.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.4p1/gss-genr.c 2010-03-13 00:39:22.326293909 +0100
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.20 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -39,12 +39,167 @@
+ #include "buffer.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+ extern u_char *session_id2;
+ extern u_int session_id2_len;
+
++typedef struct {
++ char *encoded;
++ gss_OID oid;
++} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
++
++/*
++ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
++ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
++ */
++
++Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
++
++static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
++
++int
++ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() {
++ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
++ *
++ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
++ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
++ */
++
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
++ gss_OID_set gss_supported;
++ OM_uint32 min_status;
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
++ return NULL;
++
++ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
++ host, client));
++}
++
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
++ const char *host, const char *client) {
++ Buffer buf;
++ size_t i;
++ int oidpos, enclen;
++ char *mechs, *encoded;
++ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
++ char deroid[2];
++ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
++ EVP_MD_CTX md;
++
++ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
++ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
++ xfree(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
++ xfree(gss_enc2oid);
++ }
++
++ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
++ (gss_supported->count + 1));
++
++ buffer_init(&buf);
++
++ oidpos = 0;
++ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
++ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
++ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
++
++ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
++ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
++
++ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
++ gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
++ gss_supported->elements[i].length);
++ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
++
++ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
++ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
++ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
++
++ if (oidpos != 0)
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++
++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++
++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
++ oidpos++;
++ }
++ }
++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
++
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
++
++ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
++ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
++ buffer_free(&buf);
++
++ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
++ xfree(mechs);
++ mechs = NULL;
++ }
++
++ return (mechs);
++}
++
++gss_OID
++ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
++ int i = 0;
++
++ switch (kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
++ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
++ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
++ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++ break;
++ default:
++ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ }
++
++ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
++ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
++ i++;
++
++ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
++ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
++
++ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
++}
++
+ /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
+ int
+ ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
+@@ -197,7 +352,7 @@
+ }
+
+ ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
+- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
++ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
+ GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
+ 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
+
+@@ -227,8 +382,42 @@
+ }
+
+ OM_uint32
++ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
++{
++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
++ gss_name_t gssname;
++ OM_uint32 status;
++ gss_OID_set oidset;
++
++ gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
++ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
++
++ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
++
++ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
++ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
++
++ if (!ctx->major)
++ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
++ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE,
++ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
++
++ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++
++ if (ctx->major)
++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++
++ return(ctx->major);
++}
++
++OM_uint32
+ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
+ {
++ if (ctx == NULL)
++ return -1;
++
+ if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+ GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+@@ -236,6 +425,19 @@
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
++/* Priviledged when used by server */
++OM_uint32
++ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
++{
++ if (ctx == NULL)
++ return -1;
++
++ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
++ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
++
++ return (ctx->major);
++}
++
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
+ const char *context)
+@@ -249,11 +451,16 @@
+ }
+
+ int
+-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
++ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host,
++ const char *client)
+ {
+ gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
+ gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
++ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
++
++ if (ctx == NULL)
++ ctx = &intctx;
+
+ /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
+ if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
+@@ -263,6 +470,10 @@
+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
+ major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
++
++ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
++ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
++
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+ major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
+ NULL);
+@@ -272,10 +483,67 @@
+ GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ }
+
+- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
++ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
+
+ return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
+ }
+
++int
++ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
++ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
++ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ static gss_name_t name;
++ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
++ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
++ int equal;
++ gss_cred_usage_t usage = GSS_C_INITIATE;
++
++ now = time(NULL);
++
++ if (ctxt) {
++ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
++
++ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
++ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
++
++ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
++ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
++
++ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
++ saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
++ saved_lifetime+= now;
++ } else {
++ /* Handle the error */
++ }
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ if (now - last_call < 10)
++ return 0;
++
++ last_call = now;
++
++ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++ return 0;
++
++ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
++ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
++ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
++ return 0;
++ else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
++ return 0;
++
++ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
++ gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
++ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
++ return 0;
++
++ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
++ return 1;
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/gss-serv-krb5.c openssh-5.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/gss-serv-krb5.c 2006-09-01 07:38:36.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2010-03-13 00:39:22.329666310 +0100
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@
+ krb5_principal princ;
+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+ int len;
++ const char *new_ccname;
+
+ if (client->creds == NULL) {
+ debug("No credentials stored");
+@@ -168,11 +169,16 @@
+ return;
+ }
+
+- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
++ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
++
+ client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
+- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
+- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
+- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
++ client->store.filename = NULL;
++#else
++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname);
++ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
++#endif
+
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -184,6 +190,71 @@
+ return;
+ }
+
++int
++ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
++ ssh_gssapi_client *client)
++{
++ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
++ krb5_principal principal = NULL;
++ char *name = NULL;
++ krb5_error_code problem;
++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
++
++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
++ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache,
++ &principal))) {
++ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
++ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++
++ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
++ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
++ return 0;
++ }
++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
++
++ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
++
++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
++ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++
++ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
++ ccache))) {
++ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ return 1;
++}
++
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
+ "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
+ "Kerberos",
+@@ -191,7 +262,8 @@
+ NULL,
+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
+ NULL,
+- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
+ };
+
+ #endif /* KRB5 */
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/gss-serv.c openssh-5.4p1/gss-serv.c
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/gss-serv.c 2008-05-19 07:05:07.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.4p1/gss-serv.c 2010-03-13 00:39:22.335213222 +0100
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.22 2008/05/08 12:02:23 djm Exp $ */
+
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -45,15 +45,20 @@
+ #include "channels.h"
+ #include "session.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
++#include "servconf.h"
++#include "uidswap.h"
+
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
++
++extern ServerOptions options;
+
+ static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
+ { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
+- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}};
++ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
+
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
+- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
++ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+
+ #ifdef KRB5
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
+@@ -81,25 +86,32 @@
+ char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+ gss_OID_set oidset;
+
+- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+- gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
++ if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) {
++ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
++
++ if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++ return (-1);
++ }
+
+- if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
+- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+- return (-1);
+- }
++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++ return (ctx->major);
++ }
++
++ if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
++ ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds,
++ NULL, NULL)))
++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+- if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+ return (ctx->major);
++ } else {
++ ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++ ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+ }
+-
+- if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
+- ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL)))
+- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+-
+- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+- return (ctx->major);
++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+
+ /* Privileged */
+@@ -114,6 +126,29 @@
+ }
+
+ /* Unprivileged */
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
++ gss_OID_set supported;
++
++ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
++ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
++ NULL, NULL));
++}
++
++/* Unprivileged */
++int
++ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
++ const char *dummy) {
++ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
++ int res;
++
++ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
++
++ return (res);
++}
++
++/* Unprivileged */
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
+ {
+@@ -123,7 +158,9 @@
+ gss_OID_set supported;
+
+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
+- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
++ return;
+
+ while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
+@@ -247,8 +284,48 @@
+ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ {
+ int i = 0;
++ int equal = 0;
++ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++
++ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
++ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
++ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
++ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
++ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++ }
++
++ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
++ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
++ NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++ return (ctx->major);
++ }
++
++ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
++ new_name, &equal);
+
+- gss_buffer_desc ename;
++ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++ return (ctx->major);
++ }
++
++ if (!equal) {
++ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++ }
++
++ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
++
++ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
++ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
++ client->name = new_name;
++ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
++ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
++ client->updated = 1;
++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++ }
+
+ client->mech = NULL;
+
+@@ -263,6 +340,13 @@
+ if (client->mech == NULL)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
++ if (ctx->client_creds &&
++ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
++ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++ return (ctx->major);
++ }
++
+ if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
+ &client->displayname, NULL))) {
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+@@ -280,6 +364,8 @@
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
++ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
++
+ /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+@@ -327,7 +413,7 @@
+
+ /* Privileged */
+ int
+-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
++ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 lmin;
+
+@@ -337,9 +423,11 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
+- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
++ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
++ gssapi_client.used = 1;
++ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
+ return 1;
+- else {
++ } else {
+ /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
+ gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
+ gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
+@@ -352,14 +440,90 @@
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+-/* Privileged */
+-OM_uint32
+-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
++/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
++ * as the user, the monitor is root.
++ *
++ * In the child, we want to :
++ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
++ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
++ */
++
++/* Stuff for PAM */
++
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
++ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+ {
+- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
++ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
++}
++#endif
+
+- return (ctx->major);
++void
++ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
++ int ok;
++ int ret;
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
++ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
++ char *envstr;
++#endif
++
++ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
++ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
++ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
++ return;
++
++ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
++
++ if (!ok)
++ return;
++
++ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
++
++ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
++ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
++ * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
++ */
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++ if (!use_privsep) {
++ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
++ return;
++ }
++
++ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
++ &pamconv, &pamh);
++ if (ret)
++ return;
++
++ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
++ gssapi_client.store.envval);
++
++ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
++ if (!ret)
++ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
++ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
++#endif
++}
++
++int
++ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
++ int ok = 0;
++
++ /* Check we've got credentials to store */
++ if (!gssapi_client.updated)
++ return 0;
++
++ gssapi_client.updated = 0;
++
++ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
++ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
++ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
++ else
++ debug("No update function for this mechanism");
++
++ restore_uid();
++
++ return ok;
+ }
+
+ #endif
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/kex.c openssh-5.4p1/kex.c
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/kex.c 2010-01-08 06:50:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/kex.c 2010-03-13 00:39:22.339231004 +0100
+@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@
+ #include "monitor.h"
+ #include "roaming.h"
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#endif
++
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
+ # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
+ # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
+@@ -326,6 +330,20 @@
+ k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256;
+ k->evp_md = evp_ssh_sha256();
+ #endif
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
++ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1;
++ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
++ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
++ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1;
++ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
++ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
++ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1;
++ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
++#endif
+ } else
+ fatal("bad kex alg %s", k->name);
+ }
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/kex.h openssh-5.4p1/kex.h
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/kex.h 2010-02-26 21:55:05.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/kex.h 2010-03-13 00:39:22.342872379 +0100
+@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@
+ KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1,
+ KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1,
+ KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
++ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
++ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
+ KEX_MAX
+ };
+
+@@ -123,6 +126,12 @@
+ sig_atomic_t done;
+ int flags;
+ const EVP_MD *evp_md;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ int gss_deleg_creds;
++ int gss_trust_dns;
++ char *gss_host;
++ char *gss_client;
++#endif
+ char *client_version_string;
+ char *server_version_string;
+ int (*verify_host_key)(Key *);
+@@ -146,6 +155,11 @@
+ void kexgex_client(Kex *);
+ void kexgex_server(Kex *);
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++void kexgss_client(Kex *);
++void kexgss_server(Kex *);
++#endif
++
+ void
+ kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
+ BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/kexgssc.c openssh-5.4p1/kexgssc.c
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/kexgssc.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/kexgssc.c 2010-03-13 00:39:22.345386953 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "buffer.h"
++#include "ssh2.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++#include "dh.h"
++
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++
++void
++kexgss_client(Kex *kex) {
++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
++ Gssctxt *ctxt;
++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
++ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen;
++ DH *dh;
++ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
++ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++ BIGNUM *p = NULL;
++ BIGNUM *g = NULL;
++ u_char *kbuf, *hash;
++ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
++ u_char *empty = "";
++ char *msg;
++ char *lang;
++ int type = 0;
++ int first = 1;
++ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
++
++ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
++ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
++ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type)
++ == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
++
++ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
++ fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
++
++ if (kex->gss_client &&
++ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
++ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
++
++ switch (kex->kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ dh = dh_new_group1();
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ dh = dh_new_group14();
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ debug("Doing group exchange\n");
++ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8);
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
++ packet_put_int(min);
++ packet_put_int(nbits);
++ packet_put_int(max);
++
++ packet_send();
++
++ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
++
++ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
++ fatal("BN_new() failed");
++ packet_get_bignum2(p);
++ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
++ fatal("BN_new() failed");
++ packet_get_bignum2(g);
++ packet_check_eom();
++
++ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
++ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
++ min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
++
++ dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++ }
++
++ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
++ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
++
++ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
++ dh_server_pub = BN_new();
++ if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
++ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
++
++ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
++
++ do {
++ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
++
++ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
++ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
++ &ret_flags);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
++ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++ send_tok.length);
++ }
++ fatal("gss_init_context failed");
++ }
++
++ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
++ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
++ xfree(recv_tok.value);
++
++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++ fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
++
++ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++ fatal("Integrity check failed");
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
++ * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
++ */
++ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++ if (first) {
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++ send_tok.length);
++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
++ first = 0;
++ } else {
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++ send_tok.length);
++ }
++ packet_send();
++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++
++ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
++ do {
++ type = packet_read();
++ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
++ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
++ if (serverhostkey)
++ fatal("Server host key received more than once");
++ serverhostkey =
++ packet_get_string(&slen);
++ }
++ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
++
++ switch (type) {
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
++ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
++ recv_tok.length = strlen;
++ break;
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
++ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
++ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
++ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
++ msg_tok.length = strlen;
++
++ /* Is there a token included? */
++ if (packet_get_char()) {
++ recv_tok.value=
++ packet_get_string(&strlen);
++ recv_tok.length = strlen;
++ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
++ } else {
++ /* No token included */
++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
++ }
++ break;
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
++ debug("Received Error");
++ maj_status = packet_get_int();
++ min_status = packet_get_int();
++ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
++ lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
++ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
++ default:
++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
++ type);
++ }
++ token_ptr = &recv_tok;
++ } else {
++ /* No data, and not complete */
++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
++ }
++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
++
++ /*
++ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
++ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
++ */
++
++ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
++ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
++
++ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
++ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
++ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
++
++ /* compute K=f^x mod p */
++ klen = DH_size(dh);
++ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
++ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
++ if (kout < 0)
++ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
++
++ shared_secret = BN_new();
++ if (shared_secret == NULL)
++ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
++
++ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
++ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
++
++ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
++ xfree(kbuf);
++
++ switch (kex->kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string,
++ kex->server_version_string,
++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
++ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
++ dh->pub_key, /* e */
++ dh_server_pub, /* f */
++ shared_secret, /* K */
++ &hash, &hashlen
++ );
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ kexgex_hash(
++ kex->evp_md,
++ kex->client_version_string,
++ kex->server_version_string,
++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
++ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
++ min, nbits, max,
++ dh->p, dh->g,
++ dh->pub_key,
++ dh_server_pub,
++ shared_secret,
++ &hash, &hashlen
++ );
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++ }
++
++ gssbuf.value = hash;
++ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++
++ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
++ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
++
++ xfree(msg_tok.value);
++
++ DH_free(dh);
++ if (serverhostkey)
++ xfree(serverhostkey);
++ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
++
++ /* save session id */
++ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
++ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
++ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
++ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
++ }
++
++ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
++
++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
++ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
++ else
++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++
++ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
++ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++ kex_finish(kex);
++}
++
++#endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/kexgsss.c openssh-5.4p1/kexgsss.c
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/kexgsss.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/kexgsss.c 2010-03-13 00:39:22.347367946 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "buffer.h"
++#include "ssh2.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++#include "dh.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
++#include "servconf.h"
++
++extern ServerOptions options;
++
++void
++kexgss_server(Kex *kex)
++{
++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
++
++ /*
++ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
++ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
++ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
++ * activating this non-standard behaviour.
++ */
++
++ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
++ u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen;
++ u_char *kbuf, *hash;
++ DH *dh;
++ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
++ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
++ int type = 0;
++ gss_OID oid;
++ char *mechs;
++
++ /* Initialise GSSAPI */
++
++ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
++ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
++ * into life
++ */
++ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok())
++ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms()))
++ xfree(mechs);
++
++ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
++ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
++ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
++
++ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
++ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
++
++ switch (kex->kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ dh = dh_new_group1();
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ dh = dh_new_group14();
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ debug("Doing group exchange");
++ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
++ min = packet_get_int();
++ nbits = packet_get_int();
++ max = packet_get_int();
++ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
++ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
++ packet_check_eom();
++ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
++ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
++ min, nbits, max);
++ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
++ if (dh == NULL)
++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
++
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
++ packet_send();
++
++ packet_write_wait();
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++ }
++
++ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
++
++ do {
++ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
++ type = packet_read();
++ switch(type) {
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
++ if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
++ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
++ recv_tok.length = slen;
++
++ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
++ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
++
++ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
++
++ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
++ break;
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
++ recv_tok.length = slen;
++ break;
++ default:
++ packet_disconnect(
++ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
++ type);
++ }
++
++ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
++ &send_tok, &ret_flags));
++
++ xfree(recv_tok.value);
++
++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
++ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
++
++ if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
++ fatal("No client public key");
++
++ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
++ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++ packet_send();
++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++ }
++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
++ if (send_tok.length > 0) {
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++ packet_send();
++ }
++ fatal("accept_ctx died");
++ }
++
++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
++
++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
++
++ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
++ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
++
++ klen = DH_size(dh);
++ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
++ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
++ if (kout < 0)
++ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
++
++ shared_secret = BN_new();
++ if (shared_secret == NULL)
++ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
++
++ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
++ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
++
++ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
++ xfree(kbuf);
++
++ switch (kex->kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ kex_dh_hash(
++ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
++ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
++ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
++ &hash, &hashlen
++ );
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ kexgex_hash(
++ kex->evp_md,
++ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
++ NULL, 0,
++ min, nbits, max,
++ dh->p, dh->g,
++ dh_client_pub,
++ dh->pub_key,
++ shared_secret,
++ &hash, &hashlen
++ );
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++ }
++
++ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
++
++ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
++ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
++ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
++ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
++ }
++
++ gssbuf.value = hash;
++ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
++ fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
++
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
++ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
++
++ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++ packet_put_char(1); /* true */
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++ } else {
++ packet_put_char(0); /* false */
++ }
++ packet_send();
++
++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
++
++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
++ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
++ else
++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++
++ DH_free(dh);
++
++ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
++ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++ kex_finish(kex);
++
++ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
++ * just exchanged. */
++ if (options.gss_store_rekey)
++ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
++}
++#endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/key.c openssh-5.4p1/key.c
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/key.c 2010-03-04 11:52:18.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/key.c 2010-03-13 00:40:49.216211219 +0100
+@@ -969,7 +969,9 @@
+ return KEY_RSA_CERT;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-dss-cert-v00 at openssh.com") == 0) {
+ return KEY_DSA_CERT;
+- }
++ } else if (strcmp(name, "null") == 0) {
++ return KEY_NULL;
++ }
+ debug2("key_type_from_name: unknown key type '%s'", name);
+ return KEY_UNSPEC;
+ }
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/key.h openssh-5.4p1/key.h
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/key.h 2010-02-26 21:55:05.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/key.h 2010-03-13 00:40:17.733623904 +0100
+@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
+ KEY_DSA_CERT,
+ KEY_RSA_CERT_V00,
+ KEY_DSA_CERT_V00,
++ KEY_NULL,
+ KEY_UNSPEC
+ };
+ enum fp_type {
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/monitor.c openssh-5.4p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/monitor.c 2010-03-07 13:05:17.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/monitor.c 2010-03-13 00:39:22.367998455 +0100
+@@ -172,6 +172,8 @@
+ int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
+ #endif
+
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+@@ -241,6 +243,7 @@
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
+ #endif
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+ {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata},
+@@ -253,6 +256,12 @@
+ };
+
+ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
++#endif
+ {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
+@@ -357,6 +366,10 @@
+ /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
++#endif
+ } else {
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
+
+@@ -443,6 +456,10 @@
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
++#endif
+ } else {
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+@@ -1691,6 +1708,13 @@
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ }
++#endif
+ kex->server = 1;
+ kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
+ kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
+@@ -1897,6 +1921,9 @@
+ OM_uint32 major;
+ u_int len;
+
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
+ goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ goid.length = len;
+
+@@ -1924,6 +1951,9 @@
+ OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
+ u_int len;
+
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
+ in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ in.length = len;
+ major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
+@@ -1941,6 +1971,7 @@
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
+ }
+ return (0);
+ }
+@@ -1952,6 +1983,9 @@
+ OM_uint32 ret;
+ u_int len;
+
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
+ gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ gssbuf.length = len;
+ mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+@@ -1978,7 +2012,11 @@
+ {
+ int authenticated;
+
+- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
++ authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
++ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+@@ -1991,6 +2029,74 @@
+ /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
+ return (authenticated);
+ }
++
++int
++mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
++{
++ gss_buffer_desc data;
++ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++ OM_uint32 major, minor;
++ u_int len;
++
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
++ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++ data.length = len;
++ if (data.length != 20)
++ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
++ (int) data.length);
++
++ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
++ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
++ session_id2_len = data.length;
++ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
++ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
++ }
++ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
++
++ xfree(data.value);
++
++ buffer_clear(m);
++ buffer_put_int(m, major);
++ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
++
++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
++
++ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
++
++ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
++
++ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
++
++ return (0);
++}
++
++int
++mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
++ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
++ int ok;
++
++ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++
++ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
++
++ xfree(store.filename);
++ xfree(store.envvar);
++ xfree(store.envval);
++
++ buffer_clear(m);
++ buffer_put_int(m, ok);
++
++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
++
++ return(0);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/monitor.h openssh-5.4p1/monitor.h
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/monitor.h 2008-11-05 06:20:46.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/monitor.h 2010-03-13 00:39:22.370058530 +0100
+@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@
+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP,
+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK,
+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC,
++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN,
++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX,
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/monitor_wrap.c openssh-5.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/monitor_wrap.c 2010-03-07 13:05:17.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/monitor_wrap.c 2010-03-13 00:39:22.375677054 +0100
+@@ -1231,7 +1231,7 @@
+ }
+
+ int
+-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
++mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+ Buffer m;
+ int authenticated = 0;
+@@ -1248,6 +1248,51 @@
+ debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+ return (authenticated);
+ }
++
++OM_uint32
++mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
++{
++ Buffer m;
++ OM_uint32 major;
++ u_int len;
++
++ buffer_init(&m);
++ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
++
++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
++
++ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
++ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
++ hash->length = len;
++
++ buffer_free(&m);
++
++ return(major);
++}
++
++int
++mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
++{
++ Buffer m;
++ int ok;
++
++ buffer_init(&m);
++
++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
++
++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
++
++ ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
++
++ buffer_free(&m);
++
++ return (ok);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/monitor_wrap.h openssh-5.4p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/monitor_wrap.h 2009-03-05 14:58:22.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/monitor_wrap.h 2010-03-13 00:39:22.377770519 +0100
+@@ -57,8 +57,10 @@
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
+ gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
+-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
++int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
++OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
++int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
+ #endif
+
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/readconf.c openssh-5.4p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/readconf.c 2010-02-11 23:21:03.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/readconf.c 2010-03-13 00:39:22.384142845 +0100
+@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@
+ oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+ oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+ oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
++ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
+ oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+ oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oHashKnownHosts,
+ oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
+@@ -164,10 +165,18 @@
+ { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
+ #if defined(GSSAPI)
+ { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
+ { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
++ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
++ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
++ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
+ #else
+ { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
+ { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
++ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
++ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
++ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
+ #endif
+ { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
+ { "usersh", oDeprecated },
+@@ -456,10 +465,26 @@
+ intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case oGssKeyEx:
++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case oGssDelegateCreds:
+ intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case oGssTrustDns:
++ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
++ case oGssClientIdentity:
++ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
++ goto parse_string;
++
++ case oGssRenewalRekey:
++ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case oBatchMode:
+ intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+ goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1015,7 +1040,11 @@
+ options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+ options->gss_authentication = -1;
++ options->gss_keyex = -1;
+ options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
++ options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
++ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
++ options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
+ options->password_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+@@ -1107,8 +1136,14 @@
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ options->gss_authentication = 0;
++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
++ options->gss_keyex = 0;
+ if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+ options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
++ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
++ options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
++ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
++ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
+ if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ options->password_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/readconf.h openssh-5.4p1/readconf.h
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/readconf.h 2010-02-11 23:21:03.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/readconf.h 2010-03-13 00:39:22.386055410 +0100
+@@ -44,7 +44,11 @@
+ int challenge_response_authentication;
+ /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
+ int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
++ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */
+ int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
++ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
++ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
++ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
+ int password_authentication; /* Try password
+ * authentication. */
+ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/servconf.c openssh-5.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/servconf.c 2010-03-04 11:53:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/servconf.c 2010-03-13 00:39:22.394208388 +0100
+@@ -93,7 +93,10 @@
+ options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
+ options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
+ options->gss_authentication=-1;
++ options->gss_keyex = -1;
+ options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
++ options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
++ options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+ options->password_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+@@ -214,8 +217,14 @@
+ options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
+ if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ options->gss_authentication = 0;
++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
++ options->gss_keyex = 0;
+ if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
+ options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
++ if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
++ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
++ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
++ options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
+ if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ options->password_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+@@ -306,7 +315,9 @@
+ sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
+ sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
+ sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sAuthorizedKeysFile2,
+- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
++ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
++ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
++ sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+ sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+ sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
+@@ -369,9 +380,15 @@
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #else
+ { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
+ { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+@@ -925,10 +942,22 @@
+ intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case sGssKeyEx:
++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case sGssCleanupCreds:
+ intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case sGssStrictAcceptor:
++ intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
++ case sGssStoreRekey:
++ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case sPasswordAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/servconf.h openssh-5.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/servconf.h 2010-03-04 11:53:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/servconf.h 2010-03-13 00:39:22.397236772 +0100
+@@ -94,7 +94,10 @@
+ int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
+ * authenticated with Kerberos. */
+ int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
++ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+ int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
++ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
++ int gss_store_rekey;
+ int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
+ * authentication. */
+ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/ssh-gss.h openssh-5.4p1/ssh-gss.h
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/ssh-gss.h 2007-06-12 15:40:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.4p1/ssh-gss.h 2010-03-13 00:39:22.400061752 +0100
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.10 2007/06/12 08:20:00 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -60,10 +60,22 @@
+
+ #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
+
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41
++#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-"
++#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-"
++#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-"
++
+ typedef struct {
+ char *filename;
+ char *envvar;
+ char *envval;
++ struct passwd *owner;
+ void *data;
+ } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
+
+@@ -71,8 +83,11 @@
+ gss_buffer_desc displayname;
+ gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
+ gss_cred_id_t creds;
++ gss_name_t name;
+ struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
++ int used;
++ int updated;
+ } ssh_gssapi_client;
+
+ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+@@ -83,6 +98,7 @@
+ int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+ int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+ void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
++ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ } ssh_gssapi_mech;
+
+ typedef struct {
+@@ -93,10 +109,11 @@
+ gss_OID oid; /* client */
+ gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */
+ gss_name_t client; /* server */
+- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */
++ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */
+ } Gssctxt;
+
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
++extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
+
+ int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+@@ -116,16 +133,30 @@
+ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
++int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
++OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
++int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
+
+ /* In the server */
++typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
++ const char *);
++char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
++char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
++ const char *);
++gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
++int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
++ const char *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
++int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+ void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+
++char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
++int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok();
++
++int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+ #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/ssh_config openssh-5.4p1/ssh_config
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/ssh_config 2010-01-12 09:40:27.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/ssh_config 2010-03-13 00:39:22.401981567 +0100
+@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
+ # HostbasedAuthentication no
+ # GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
++# GSSAPIKeyExchange no
++# GSSAPITrustDNS no
+ # BatchMode no
+ # CheckHostIP yes
+ # AddressFamily any
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/ssh_config.5 openssh-5.4p1/ssh_config.5
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/ssh_config.5 2010-03-05 11:31:12.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/ssh_config.5 2010-03-13 00:39:22.405912908 +0100
+@@ -478,11 +478,38 @@
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
++GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
++If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
++identity will be used.
+ .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+-Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
++.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
++If set to
++.Dq yes
++then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
++ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed
++credentials to a session on the server.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
++Set to
++.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
++the name of the host being connected to. If
++.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/sshconnect2.c openssh-5.4p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/sshconnect2.c 2010-02-26 21:55:06.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/sshconnect2.c 2010-03-13 00:39:22.414196262 +0100
+@@ -106,9 +106,34 @@
+ {
+ Kex *kex;
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
++ char *gss_host = NULL;
++#endif
++
+ xxx_host = host;
+ xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
++ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++
++ if (options.gss_trust_dns)
++ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
++ else
++ gss_host = host;
++
++ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
++ if (gss) {
++ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
++ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
+ if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) {
+ logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
+ options.ciphers = NULL;
+@@ -136,6 +161,17 @@
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
+ options.hostkeyalgorithms;
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
++ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
++ if (options.gss_keyex && gss) {
++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
++ "%s,null", orig);
++ xfree(gss);
++ }
++#endif
++
+ if (options.rekey_limit)
+ packet_set_rekey_limit((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit);
+
+@@ -145,10 +181,26 @@
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++ }
++#endif
+ kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+ kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+ kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
++ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
++ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
++ kex->gss_host = gss_host;
++ }
++#endif
++
+ xxx_kex = kex;
+
+ dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
+@@ -243,6 +295,7 @@
+ void input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
+ void input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+ void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
++int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
+ #endif
+
+ void userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
+@@ -258,6 +311,10 @@
+
+ Authmethod authmethods[] = {
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++ {"gssapi-keyex",
++ userauth_gsskeyex,
++ &options.gss_authentication,
++ NULL},
+ {"gssapi-with-mic",
+ userauth_gssapi,
+ NULL,
+@@ -564,19 +621,29 @@
+ static u_int mech = 0;
+ OM_uint32 min;
+ int ok = 0;
++ const char *gss_host;
++
++ if (options.gss_trust_dns)
++ gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
++ else
++ gss_host = authctxt->host;
+
+ /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+ * once. */
+
+ if (gss_supported == NULL)
+- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
++ gss_supported = NULL;
++ return 0;
++ }
+
+ /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
+ while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
+ /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+ if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
+ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
+- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
++ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host,
++ options.gss_client_identity)) {
+ ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+ } else {
+ mech++;
+@@ -673,8 +740,8 @@
+ {
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+- int oidlen;
+- char *oidv;
++ u_int oidlen;
++ u_char *oidv;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+@@ -784,6 +851,48 @@
+ xfree(msg);
+ xfree(lang);
+ }
++
++int
++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
++{
++ Buffer b;
++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
++ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++ OM_uint32 ms;
++
++ static int attempt = 0;
++ if (attempt++ >= 1)
++ return (0);
++
++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
++ debug("No valid Key exchange context");
++ return (0);
++ }
++
++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
++ "gssapi-keyex");
++
++ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
++ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
++ buffer_free(&b);
++ return (0);
++ }
++
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
++ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
++ packet_send();
++
++ buffer_free(&b);
++ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
++
++ return (1);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+ int
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/sshd.c openssh-5.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/sshd.c 2010-03-07 13:05:17.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/sshd.c 2010-03-13 00:39:22.423749423 +0100
+@@ -120,6 +120,10 @@
+ #include "roaming.h"
+ #include "version.h"
+
++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
++#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef LIBWRAP
+ #include <tcpd.h>
+ #include <syslog.h>
+@@ -1577,10 +1581,13 @@
+ logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
+ options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
+ }
++#ifndef GSSAPI
++ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
+ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
+ logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
+ options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
+ }
++#endif
+ if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
+ logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
+ exit(1);
+@@ -1909,6 +1916,60 @@
+ /* Log the connection. */
+ verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
+
++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
++ /*
++ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
++ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
++ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not
++ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
++ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
++ *
++ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
++ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
++ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the
++ * same session (bad).
++ *
++ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
++ * automatically.
++ *
++ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
++ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
++ */
++ {
++ OSStatus err = 0;
++ SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
++ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
++
++ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
++ if (err)
++ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
++ (unsigned) err);
++ else
++ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
++ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
++
++ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
++ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
++ "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
++ else {
++ debug("Creating new security session...");
++ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
++ if (err)
++ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
++ (unsigned) err);
++
++ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid,
++ &sattrs);
++ if (err)
++ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
++ (unsigned) err);
++ else
++ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
++ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
+ * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
+@@ -2287,12 +2348,61 @@
+
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ {
++ char *orig;
++ char *gss = NULL;
++ char *newstr = NULL;
++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++
++ /*
++ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
++ * the other key exchange algorithms
++ */
++
++ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
++ orig = NULL;
++
++ if (options.gss_keyex)
++ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
++ else
++ gss = NULL;
++
++ if (gss && orig)
++ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++ else if (gss)
++ newstr = gss;
++ else if (orig)
++ newstr = orig;
++
++ /*
++ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
++ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
++ * host key algorithm we support
++ */
++ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
++
++ if (newstr)
++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
++ else
++ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
++ }
++#endif
++
+ /* start key exchange */
+ kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ }
++#endif
+ kex->server = 1;
+ kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+ kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/sshd_config openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/sshd_config 2009-10-11 12:51:09.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config 2010-03-13 00:39:22.426530018 +0100
+@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@
+ # GSSAPI options
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
++#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
++#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
+
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+diff -Nur openssh-5.4p1.orig/sshd_config.5 openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-5.4p1.orig/sshd_config.5 2010-03-05 00:41:45.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.5 2010-03-13 00:39:22.430994501 +0100
+@@ -379,12 +379,40 @@
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
++doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+ .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
+ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+ on logout.
+ The default is
+ .Dq yes .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
++Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
++a client authenticates against. If
++.Dq yes
++then the client must authenticate against the
++.Pa host
++service on the current hostname. If
++.Dq no
++then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the
++machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation
++on multi homed machines.
++The default is
++.Dq yes .
++Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections,
++and setting it to
++.Dq no
++may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries.
++.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
++Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a
++successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed
++or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
++.Dq no .
+ .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+ Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
+ with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
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