SF.net SVN: gar:[22854] csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk

chninkel at users.sourceforge.net chninkel at users.sourceforge.net
Sun Jan 19 11:44:28 CET 2014


Revision: 22854
          http://sourceforge.net/p/gar/code/22854
Author:   chninkel
Date:     2014-01-19 10:44:27 +0000 (Sun, 19 Jan 2014)
Log Message:
-----------
openssl1/trunk: updated pkcs11 engine patch straight from solaris userland source

Modified Paths:
--------------
    csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/Makefile

Added Paths:
-----------
    csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/files/openssl-1.0.1f-pkcs11-engine.patch
    csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/files/update-pkcs11-patch.sh

Modified: csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/Makefile
===================================================================
--- csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/Makefile	2014-01-19 07:00:51 UTC (rev 22853)
+++ csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/Makefile	2014-01-19 10:44:27 UTC (rev 22854)
@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@
 
 DOCFILES = CHANGES CHANGES.SSLeay PROBLEMS README FAQ README.ASN1 INSTALL NEWS README.ENGINE
 
+# List of engines that will be shipped in the packages
+ENGINES = 4758cca aep atalla cswift gmp chil nuron sureware ubsec padlock capi
+
 # configure targets patchs needs to be different for Solaris 9 as some map files
 # are not available 
 ifeq ($(shell /usr/bin/uname -r),5.9)
@@ -121,12 +124,9 @@
 
 # support for pkcs11 engine http://blogs.sun.com/chichang1/entry/how_to_integrate_pkcs11_engine
 ifneq ($(shell /usr/bin/uname -r),5.9)
-# There is a problem with this patch under sparc when using tls protocol
-# See https://www.opencsw.org/mantis/view.php?id=5098
-ifneq ($(shell /usr/bin/uname -p),sparc)
-       PATCHFILES += pkcs11_engine-1.0.1b.patch.2012-04-30
+       PATCHFILES += openssl-1.0.1f-pkcs11-engine.patch
+       ENGINES += pk11
 endif
-endif
 
 # support for sparc t4 crypto engine 
 # see http://bubbva.blogspot.fr/2011/11/exciting-crypto-advances-with-t4.html
@@ -135,11 +135,12 @@
 # To update the patch, do:
 #   cd files && ./update-t4-patch.sh OPENSSL_VERSION
 #
-ifeq ($(shell /usr/bin/uname -rp),5.11 sparc) 
-	PATCHFILES += openssl-1.0.1e-t4-engine.sparc-patch
-	PATCHFILES += openssl-1.0.1e-t4-engine.sparc-patch.sparcv9+vis
-endif
+PATCHFILES.sparc.5.11 += openssl-1.0.1e-t4-engine.sparc-patch
+PATCHFILES.sparc.5.11 += openssl-1.0.1e-t4-engine.sparc-patch.sparcv9+vis
 
+PATCHFILES += $(PATCHFILES.$(GARCH).$(GAROSREL))
+
+
 LICENSE = LICENSE
 
 ##### Build and installation information #####
@@ -183,6 +184,13 @@
 # but openssl doesn't use it by default so we manually enable it
 CONFIGURE_FLAGS = -DHAVE_ISSETUGID
 
+# PKCS11 Patch also works on sparc64 athena processors thanks for the FJAES 
+# instruction set. The presence of this instruction set is checked at runtime
+# by looking for the AV_SPARC_JFAES instruction set bit, unfortunately the
+# corresponding macro in not present in Solaris 9-11 headers, so we manually 
+# define it.
+CONFIGURE_FLAGS += -DAV_SPARC_FJAES=0
+
 # --libdir must only be given if the directory is actually different from lib or the creation will fail
 # as the directory is already there
 LIBDIR_64 = --libdir=lib/64
@@ -194,9 +202,7 @@
 ifneq ($(shell /usr/bin/uname -r),5.9)
 # There is a problem with this patch under sparc when using tls protocol
 # See https://www.opencsw.org/mantis/view.php?id=5098
-ifneq ($(shell /usr/bin/uname -p),sparc)
-        CONFIGURE_ARGS += --pk11-libname=$(abspath /usr/lib/$(MM_LIBDIR)/libpkcs11.so) 
-endif
+	CONFIGURE_ARGS += --pk11-libname=$(abspath /usr/lib/$(MM_LIBDIR)/libpkcs11.so) 
 endif 
 
 # For now we want the sun perl to be used
@@ -220,6 +226,7 @@
 
 TEST_SCRIPTS = 
 
+
 include gar/category.mk
 
 # We remove SSE2 hardware capability in the elf header of libcrypto as
@@ -238,7 +245,7 @@
 	cd $(WORKSRC) && ln -nf Configure configure
 	ln -nf $(WORKDIR)/map.openssl.libcrypto $(WORKSRC)/map.openssl.libcrypto 
 	ln -nf $(WORKDIR)/map.openssl.libssl $(WORKSRC)/map.openssl.libssl 
-	for ENGINE in 4758cca aep atalla cswift gmp chil nuron sureware ubsec padlock capi; do \
+	for ENGINE in 4758cca aep atalla cswift gmp chil nuron sureware ubsec padlock capi pk11; do \
 		ln -nf $(WORKDIR)/map.openssl.engines $(WORKSRC)/engines/map.openssl.lib$$ENGINE; \
 	done 
 	ln -nf $(WORKDIR)/map.openssl.engines $(WORKSRC)/engines/ccgost/map.openssl.libgost

Added: csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/files/openssl-1.0.1f-pkcs11-engine.patch
===================================================================
--- csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/files/openssl-1.0.1f-pkcs11-engine.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/files/openssl-1.0.1f-pkcs11-engine.patch	2014-01-19 10:44:27 UTC (rev 22854)
@@ -0,0 +1,9007 @@
+--- /tmp/Configure	Fri Feb 11 14:40:39 2011
++++ openssl-1.0.0d/Configure	Fri Feb 11 14:41:36 2011
+@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
+ 
+ # see INSTALL for instructions.
+ 
+-my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
++my $usage="Usage: Configure --pk11-libname=PK11_LIB_LOCATION [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
+ 
+ # Options:
+ #
+@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@
+ # --prefix      prefix for the OpenSSL include, lib and bin directories
+ #               (Default: the OPENSSLDIR directory)
+ #
++# --pk11-libname  PKCS#11 library name.
++#               (Default: none)
++#
+ # --install_prefix  Additional prefix for package builders (empty by
+ #               default).  This needn't be set in advance, you can
+ #               just as well use "make INSTALL_PREFIX=/whatever install".
+@@ -657,6 +661,9 @@
+ my $idx_arflags = $idx++;
+ my $idx_multilib = $idx++;
+ 
++# PKCS#11 engine patch
++my $pk11_libname="";
++
+ my $prefix="";
+ my $libdir="";
+ my $openssldir="";
+@@ -876,6 +879,10 @@
+				$_ =~ s/%([0-9a-f]{1,2})/chr(hex($1))/gei;
+				$flags.=$_." ";
+				}
++			elsif (/^--pk11-libname=(.*)$/)
++				{
++				$pk11_libname=$1;
++				}
+			elsif (/^--prefix=(.*)$/)
+				{
+				$prefix=$1;
+@@ -1043,6 +1054,13 @@
+ 	exit 0;
+ }
+ 
++if (! $pk11_libname)
++        {
++        print STDERR "You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.\n";
++        print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n";
++        exit 1;
++        }
++
+ if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) {
+ 	$target = "Cygwin".$1;
+ }
+@@ -1209,6 +1226,8 @@
+ if ($flags ne "")	{ $cflags="$flags$cflags"; }
+ else			{ $no_user_cflags=1;       }
+ 
++$cflags="-DPK11_LIB_LOCATION=\"$pk11_libname\" $cflags";
++
+ # Kerberos settings.  The flavor must be provided from outside, either through
+ # the script "config" or manually.
+ if (!$no_krb5)
+@@ -1598,6 +1617,7 @@
+ 	s/^VERSION=.*/VERSION=$version/;
+ 	s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/;
+ 	s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/;
++	s/^PK11_LIB_LOCATION=.*/PK11_LIB_LOCATION=$pk11_libname/;
+ 	s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/;
+ 	s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/;
+ 	s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/;
+--- /tmp/Makefile.org	Fri Feb 11 14:41:54 2011
++++ openssl-1.0.0d/Makefile.org	Fri Feb 11 14:38:01 2011
+@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@
+ INSTALL_PREFIX=
+ INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl
+ 
++# You must set this through --pk11-libname configure option.
++PK11_LIB_LOCATION=
++
+ # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this!
+ OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl
+ 
+--- /tmp/Makefile	Mon Feb 14 14:59:22 2011
++++ openssl-1.0.0d/engines/Makefile	Mon Feb 14 15:00:35 2011
+@@ -26,7 +26,8 @@
+ APPS=
+ 
+ LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a
+-LIBNAMES= 4758cca aep atalla cswift gmp chil nuron sureware ubsec padlock capi
++LIBNAMES= 4758cca aep atalla cswift gmp chil nuron sureware ubsec padlock capi \
++	  pk11
+ 
+ LIBSRC=	e_4758cca.c \
+ 	e_aep.c \
+@@ -38,7 +39,8 @@
+ 	e_sureware.c \
+ 	e_ubsec.c \
+ 	e_padlock.c \
+-	e_capi.c
++	e_capi.c \
++	e_pk11.c
+ LIBOBJ= e_4758cca.o \
+ 	e_aep.o \
+ 	e_atalla.o \
+@@ -49,7 +51,8 @@
+ 	e_sureware.o \
+ 	e_ubsec.o \
+ 	e_padlock.o \
+-	e_capi.o
++	e_capi.o \
++	e_pk11.o
+ 
+ SRC= $(LIBSRC)
+ 
+@@ -63,7 +66,8 @@
+ 	e_nuron_err.c e_nuron_err.h \
+ 	e_sureware_err.c e_sureware_err.h \
+ 	e_ubsec_err.c e_ubsec_err.h \
+-	e_capi_err.c e_capi_err.h
++	e_capi_err.c e_capi_err.h \
++	e_pk11.h e_pk11_uri.h e_pk11_err.h e_pk11_pub.c e_pk11_uri.c e_pk11_err.c
+ 
+ ALL=    $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER)
+ 
+@@ -78,7 +82,7 @@
+ 		for l in $(LIBNAMES); do \
+ 			$(MAKE) -f ../Makefile.shared -e \
+ 				LIBNAME=$$l LIBEXTRAS=e_$$l.o \
+-				LIBDEPS='-L.. -lcrypto $(EX_LIBS)' \
++				LIBDEPS='-L.. -lcrypto -lcryptoutil $(EX_LIBS)' \
+ 				link_o.$(SHLIB_TARGET); \
+ 		done; \
+ 	else \
+--- crypto/engine/eng_all.c Thu Sep  5 12:59:50 2013
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/engine/eng_all.c Thu Sep  5 12:59:50 2013
+@@ -59,6 +59,16 @@
+ #include "cryptlib.h"
+ #include "eng_int.h"
+
++/*
++ * pkcs11 engine no longer is a built-in engine, and ENGINE_load_pk11() needs to be
++ * defined in libcrypto.so for ssh.  Instead of load pkcs11 engine, it load dynamic
++ * engines.
++ */
++void ENGINE_load_pk11(void)
++	{
++	ENGINE_load_dynamic();
++	}
++
+ void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void)
+ 	{
+ 	/* Some ENGINEs need this */
+--- crypto/dso/dso_lib.c Thu Sep  5 12:59:50 2013
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c Thu Sep  5 12:59:50 2013
+@@ -426,6 +426,26 @@
+ 		DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_CONVERT_FILENAME,DSO_R_NO_FILENAME);
+ 		return(NULL);
+ 		}
++	/*
++	 * For pkcs11 engine, use libpk11.so (instead of libpkcs11.so) to
++	 * avoid the name collision with PKCS#11 library.
++	 */
++	if (strcmp(filename, "pkcs11") == 0)
++		{
++#ifdef	_LP64
++		char *fullpath = "/lib/openssl/engines/64/libpk11.so";
++#else
++		char *fullpath = "/lib/openssl/engines/libpk11.so";
++#endif
++		result = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(fullpath) + 1);
++		if(result == NULL)
++			{
++			DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_CONVERT_FILENAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			return(NULL);
++			}
++		BUF_strlcpy(result, fullpath, strlen(fullpath) + 1);
++		return (result);
++		}
+ 	if((dso->flags & DSO_FLAG_NO_NAME_TRANSLATION) == 0)
+ 		{
+ 		if(dso->name_converter != NULL)
+--- /tmp/engine.h       Fri Feb 11 14:46:24 2011
++++ openssl-1.0.0d/crypto/engine/engine.h       Fri Feb 11 14:47:32 2011
+@@ -351,6 +351,7 @@
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void);
++void ENGINE_load_pk11(void);
+ void ENGINE_load_rsax(void);
+ void ENGINE_load_rdrand(void);
+ void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void);
+Index: crypto//e_pk11.c
+===================================================================
+diff -uNr openssl-1.0.1f/engines/e_pk11.c openssl-1.0.1f/engines/e_pk11.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1f/engines/e_pk11.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1f/engines/e_pk11.c 2014-01-19 00:24:23.%N +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,3710 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2013, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
++ */
++
++/* crypto/engine/e_pk11.c */
++/*
++ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
++ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
++ *
++ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
++ * Afchine Madjlessi.
++ */
++/*
++ * ====================================================================
++ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ *
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ *
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
++ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
++ *    distribution.
++ *
++ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
++ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
++ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
++ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
++ *
++ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
++ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
++ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
++ *    licensing at OpenSSL.org.
++ *
++ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
++ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
++ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
++ *
++ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
++ *    acknowledgment:
++ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
++ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
++ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
++ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
++ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
++ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
++ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ * ====================================================================
++ *
++ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
++ * (eay at cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
++ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
++ *
++ */
++
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include <strings.h>
++
++#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/engine.h>
++#include <openssl/dso.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++#include <openssl/md5.h>
++#include <openssl/pem.h>
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++#include <openssl/rsa.h>
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++#include <openssl/dsa.h>
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++#include <openssl/dh.h>
++#endif
++#include <openssl/rand.h>
++#include <openssl/objects.h>
++#include <openssl/x509.h>
++#include <openssl/aes.h>
++#include <dlfcn.h>
++#include <pthread.h>
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
++
++/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */
++#define	PK11_DBG	"PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG"
++/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */
++#undef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++/*
++ * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more
++ * information.
++ */
++#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun)
++#define	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++#endif
++
++#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++#include <sys/auxv.h>
++#endif
++
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++#define	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(...) fprintf(stderr, __VA_ARGS__)
++#else
++#define	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(...)
++#endif
++
++#include <security/cryptoki.h>
++#include <security/pkcs11.h>
++#include "e_pk11.h"
++#include "e_pk11_uri.h"
++
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_true = CK_TRUE;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_false = CK_FALSE;
++#define	PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME "PKCS#11 engine"
++#include "e_pk11_err.c"
++#include "e_pk11_uri.c"
++#include "e_pk11_pub.c"
++
++/*
++ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(),
++ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the
++ * RSA keys by reference feature.
++ */
++pthread_mutex_t *uri_lock = NULL;
++
++#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++/*
++ * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel
++ * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information.
++ */
++int *hw_cnids;
++int *hw_dnids;
++#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */
++static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX];
++
++/*
++ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when
++ * logging into the token.
++ */
++CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
++
++/*
++ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for
++ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given
++ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be
++ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already
++ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each
++ * PK11_SESSION object.
++ *
++ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the
++ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also
++ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another
++ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in
++ * invalid handle returned from the search operation.
++ *
++ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores.
++ * They are also used for active list protection.
++ */
++pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
++
++/*
++ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one
++ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session
++ * list) for given algorithm type
++ */
++PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
++
++/*
++ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available
++ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed
++ * without losing the secret key objects.
++ */
++static CK_SESSION_HANDLE	global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++
++/* Index for the supported ciphers */
++enum pk11_cipher_id
++	{
++	PK11_DES_CBC,
++	PK11_DES3_CBC,
++	PK11_DES_ECB,
++	PK11_DES3_ECB,
++	PK11_RC4,
++	PK11_AES_128_CBC,
++	PK11_AES_192_CBC,
++	PK11_AES_256_CBC,
++	PK11_AES_128_ECB,
++	PK11_AES_192_ECB,
++	PK11_AES_256_ECB,
++	PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC,
++	PK11_AES_128_CTR,
++	PK11_AES_192_CTR,
++	PK11_AES_256_CTR,
++	PK11_CIPHER_MAX
++	};
++
++/* Index for the supported digests */
++enum pk11_digest_id
++	{
++	PK11_MD5,
++	PK11_SHA1,
++	PK11_SHA224,
++	PK11_SHA256,
++	PK11_SHA384,
++	PK11_SHA512,
++	PK11_DIGEST_MAX
++	};
++
++typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st
++	{
++	enum pk11_cipher_id	id;
++	int			nid;
++	int			iv_len;
++	int			min_key_len;
++	int			max_key_len;
++	CK_KEY_TYPE		key_type;
++	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE	mech_type;
++	} PK11_CIPHER;
++
++typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st
++	{
++	enum pk11_digest_id	id;
++	int			nid;
++	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE	mech_type;
++	} PK11_DIGEST;
++
++/* ENGINE level stuff */
++static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e);
++static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e);
++static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e);
++static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)());
++static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e);
++
++/* RAND stuff */
++static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
++static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
++static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void);
++static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
++static int pk11_rand_status(void);
++
++/* These functions are also used in other files */
++PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
++void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
++
++/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */
++extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type);
++extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type);
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
++int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
++int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
++int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++#endif
++
++/* Local helper functions */
++static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void);
++static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
++static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
++static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
++static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE handle, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
++    CK_BBOOL persistent);
++static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
++static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
++static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name);
++
++/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */
++static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
++static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids);
++static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids);
++static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
++	const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
++static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp);
++static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
++	const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
++static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
++static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
++	const int **nids, int nid);
++static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
++	const int **nids, int nid);
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
++	const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp);
++static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
++	int key_len);
++static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
++static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
++static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
++	size_t count);
++static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
++static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from);
++static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
++
++static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found);
++static void pk11_choose_rand_slot(CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info,
++    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot);
++static void pk11_choose_pubkey_slot(CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info,
++    CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info, CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, CK_RV rv,
++    int best_number_of_mechs, CK_SLOT_ID best_pubkey_slot_sofar);
++static void pk11_choose_cipher_digest(int *local_cipher_nids,
++    int *local_digest_nids, CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
++    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot);
++static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
++    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
++    int *local_cipher_nids);
++static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
++    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest,
++    int *local_digest_nids);
++static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id,
++    int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids,
++    PK11_CIPHER *cipher);
++static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
++    int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
++    PK11_DIGEST *digest);
++
++static int pk11_init_all_locks(void);
++static void pk11_free_all_locks(void);
++
++#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++static int check_hw_mechanisms(void);
++static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table);
++static int hw_aes_instruction_set_present(void);
++#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++#define	TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type)	\
++	{								\
++	if (uselock)							\
++		LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type);				\
++	if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1)			\
++		{							\
++		retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl,	\
++		    sp->persistent);					\
++		}							\
++	if (uselock)							\
++		UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type);				\
++	}
++
++static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
++static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
++static int cipher_count		= 0;
++static int digest_count		= 0;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa	= CK_FALSE;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa	= CK_FALSE;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh	= CK_FALSE;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE;
++
++/*
++ * Static list of ciphers.
++ * Note, that ciphers array is indexed by member PK11_CIPHER.id,
++ * thus ciphers[i].id == i
++ * Rows must be kept in sync with enum pk11_cipher_id.
++ */
++static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] =
++	{
++	{ PK11_DES_CBC,		NID_des_cbc,		8,	 8,   8,
++		CKK_DES,	CKM_DES_CBC, },
++	{ PK11_DES3_CBC,	NID_des_ede3_cbc,	8,	24,  24,
++		CKK_DES3,	CKM_DES3_CBC, },
++	{ PK11_DES_ECB,		NID_des_ecb,		0,	 8,   8,
++		CKK_DES,	CKM_DES_ECB, },
++	{ PK11_DES3_ECB,	NID_des_ede3_ecb,	0,	24,  24,
++		CKK_DES3,	CKM_DES3_ECB, },
++	{ PK11_RC4,		NID_rc4,		0,	16, 256,
++		CKK_RC4,	CKM_RC4, },
++	{ PK11_AES_128_CBC,	NID_aes_128_cbc,	16,	16,  16,
++		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CBC, },
++	{ PK11_AES_192_CBC,	NID_aes_192_cbc,	16,	24,  24,
++		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CBC, },
++	{ PK11_AES_256_CBC,	NID_aes_256_cbc,	16,	32,  32,
++		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CBC, },
++	{ PK11_AES_128_ECB,	NID_aes_128_ecb,	0,	16,  16,
++		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_ECB, },
++	{ PK11_AES_192_ECB,	NID_aes_192_ecb,	0,	24,  24,
++		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_ECB, },
++	{ PK11_AES_256_ECB,	NID_aes_256_ecb,	0,	32,  32,
++		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_ECB, },
++	{ PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC,	NID_bf_cbc,		8,	16,  16,
++		CKK_BLOWFISH,	CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, },
++	{ PK11_AES_128_CTR,	NID_aes_128_ctr,	16,	16,  16,
++		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CTR, },
++	{ PK11_AES_192_CTR,	NID_aes_192_ctr,	16,	24,  24,
++		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CTR, },
++	{ PK11_AES_256_CTR,	NID_aes_256_ctr,	16,	32,  32,
++		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CTR, },
++	};
++
++/*
++ * Static list of digests.
++ * Note, that digests array is indexed by member PK11_DIGEST.id,
++ * thus digests[i].id == i
++ * Rows must be kept in sync with enum pk11_digest_id.
++ */
++static PK11_DIGEST digests[] =
++	{
++	{PK11_MD5,	NID_md5,	CKM_MD5, },
++	{PK11_SHA1,	NID_sha1,	CKM_SHA_1, },
++	{PK11_SHA224,	NID_sha224,	CKM_SHA224, },
++	{PK11_SHA256,	NID_sha256,	CKM_SHA256, },
++	{PK11_SHA384,	NID_sha384,	CKM_SHA384, },
++	{PK11_SHA512,	NID_sha512,	CKM_SHA512, },
++	{0,		NID_undef,	0xFFFF, },
++	};
++
++/*
++ * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in
++ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11
++ * session in multiple cipher_update calls
++ */
++typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st
++	{
++	PK11_SESSION	*sp;
++	} PK11_CIPHER_STATE;
++
++
++/*
++ * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets
++ * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID.
++ *
++ * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here.
++ */
++
++/* DES CBC EVP */
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc =
++	{
++	NID_des_cbc,
++	8, 8, 8,
++	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++/* 3DES CBC EVP */
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc =
++	{
++	NID_des_ede3_cbc,
++	8, 24, 8,
++	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++/*
++ * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
++ * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL.
++ */
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb =
++	{
++	NID_des_ecb,
++	8, 8, 8,
++	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	NULL,
++	NULL,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb =
++	{
++	NID_des_ede3_ecb,
++	8, 24, 8,
++	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	NULL,
++	NULL,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc =
++	{
++	NID_aes_128_cbc,
++	16, 16, 16,
++	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc =
++	{
++	NID_aes_192_cbc,
++	16, 24, 16,
++	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc =
++	{
++	NID_aes_256_cbc,
++	16, 32, 16,
++	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++/*
++ * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
++ * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL.
++ */
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb =
++	{
++	NID_aes_128_ecb,
++	16, 16, 0,
++	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	NULL,
++	NULL,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb =
++	{
++	NID_aes_192_ecb,
++	16, 24, 0,
++	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	NULL,
++	NULL,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb =
++	{
++	NID_aes_256_ecb,
++	16, 32, 0,
++	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	NULL,
++	NULL,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr =
++	{
++	NID_aes_128_ctr,
++	16, 16, 16,
++	EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr =
++	{
++	NID_aes_192_ctr,
++	16, 24, 16,
++	EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr =
++	{
++	NID_aes_256_ctr,
++	16, 32, 16,
++	EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc =
++	{
++	NID_bf_cbc,
++	8, 16, 8,
++	EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 =
++	{
++	NID_rc4,
++	1, 16, 0,
++	EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	NULL,
++	NULL,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 =
++	{
++	NID_md5,
++	NID_md5WithRSAEncryption,
++	MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
++	0,
++	pk11_digest_init,
++	pk11_digest_update,
++	pk11_digest_final,
++	pk11_digest_copy,
++	pk11_digest_cleanup,
++	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
++	MD5_CBLOCK,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	};
++
++static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 =
++	{
++	NID_sha1,
++	NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption,
++	SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
++	EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
++	pk11_digest_init,
++	pk11_digest_update,
++	pk11_digest_final,
++	pk11_digest_copy,
++	pk11_digest_cleanup,
++	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
++	SHA_CBLOCK,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	};
++
++static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 =
++	{
++	NID_sha224,
++	NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption,
++	SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH,
++	EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
++	pk11_digest_init,
++	pk11_digest_update,
++	pk11_digest_final,
++	pk11_digest_copy,
++	pk11_digest_cleanup,
++	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
++	/* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */
++	SHA256_CBLOCK,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	};
++
++static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 =
++	{
++	NID_sha256,
++	NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption,
++	SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
++	EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
++	pk11_digest_init,
++	pk11_digest_update,
++	pk11_digest_final,
++	pk11_digest_copy,
++	pk11_digest_cleanup,
++	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
++	SHA256_CBLOCK,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	};
++
++static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 =
++	{
++	NID_sha384,
++	NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption,
++	SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
++	EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
++	pk11_digest_init,
++	pk11_digest_update,
++	pk11_digest_final,
++	pk11_digest_copy,
++	pk11_digest_cleanup,
++	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
++	/* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */
++	SHA512_CBLOCK,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	};
++
++static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 =
++	{
++	NID_sha512,
++	NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption,
++	SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
++	EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
++	pk11_digest_init,
++	pk11_digest_update,
++	pk11_digest_final,
++	pk11_digest_copy,
++	pk11_digest_cleanup,
++	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
++	SHA512_CBLOCK,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	};
++
++/*
++ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
++ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine
++ */
++#define	PK11_CMD_SO_PATH		ENGINE_CMD_BASE
++static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] =
++	{
++		{
++		PK11_CMD_SO_PATH,
++		"SO_PATH",
++		"Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library",
++		ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
++		},
++		{0, NULL, NULL, 0}
++	};
++
++
++static RAND_METHOD pk11_random =
++	{
++	pk11_rand_seed,
++	pk11_rand_bytes,
++	pk11_rand_cleanup,
++	pk11_rand_add,
++	pk11_rand_bytes,
++	pk11_rand_status
++	};
++
++
++/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
++static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11";
++static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support";
++
++CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL;
++static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList";
++
++/*
++ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function
++ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether
++ * this is 32 or 64 bit build.
++ */
++static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION;
++
++/* Needed in e_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */
++CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0;
++static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0;
++static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = CK_FALSE;
++static int pk11_pid = 0;
++static ENGINE* pk11_engine = NULL;
++
++static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL;
++
++/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */
++static int pk11_init_all_locks(void)
++	{
++	int type;
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++	find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
++	if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL)
++		goto malloc_err;
++	(void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], NULL);
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++
++	if ((uri_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL)
++		goto malloc_err;
++	(void) pthread_mutex_init(uri_lock, NULL);
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++	find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
++	if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL)
++		goto malloc_err;
++	(void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], NULL);
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++	find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
++	if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL)
++		goto malloc_err;
++	(void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], NULL);
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++
++	for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
++		{
++		session_cache[type].lock =
++		    OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
++		if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL)
++			goto malloc_err;
++		(void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, NULL);
++		}
++
++	return (1);
++
++malloc_err:
++	pk11_free_all_locks();
++	PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++	return (0);
++	}
++
++static void pk11_free_all_locks(void)
++	{
++	int type;
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++	if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL)
++		{
++		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
++		OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
++		find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL;
++		}
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++	if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL)
++		{
++		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
++		OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
++		find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL;
++		}
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++	if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL)
++		{
++		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]);
++		OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]);
++		find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL;
++		}
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++
++	for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
++		{
++		if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL)
++			{
++			(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock);
++			OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock);
++			session_cache[type].lock = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++	/* Free uri_lock */
++	(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(uri_lock);
++	OPENSSL_free(uri_lock);
++	uri_lock = NULL;
++	}
++
++/*
++ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support.
++ */
++static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e)
++	{
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++	const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL;
++	RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA();
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
++		if (!pk11_library_init(e))
++			return (0);
++
++	if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) ||
++	    !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) ||
++	    !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) ||
++	    !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests))
++		return (0);
++
++	if (!ENGINE_set_pkey_meths(e, pk11_engine_pkey_methods))
++		return (0);
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++	if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE)
++		{
++		if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) ||
++		    !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) ||
++		    !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey))
++			return (0);
++		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG);
++		}
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++	if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE)
++		{
++		if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA()))
++			return (0);
++		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG);
++		}
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++	if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE)
++		{
++		if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH()))
++			return (0);
++		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG);
++		}
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++	if (pk11_have_random)
++		{
++		if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random))
++			return (0);
++		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG);
++		}
++	if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) ||
++	    !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) ||
++	    !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) ||
++	    !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) ||
++	    !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns))
++		return (0);
++
++/*
++ * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup
++ * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp
++ * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation.
++ * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern.
++ */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++	rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
++	pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp;
++	pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp;
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++
++	/* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */
++	ERR_load_pk11_strings();
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
++	{
++	if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0))
++		return (0);
++
++	if (!bind_pk11(e))
++		return (0);
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
++IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
++
++/*
++ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and
++ * the function symbol names to bind to.
++ */
++static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
++
++static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
++	{
++	if (PK11_LIBNAME)
++		return (PK11_LIBNAME);
++
++	return (def_PK11_LIBNAME);
++	}
++
++static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
++	{
++	if (PK11_LIBNAME)
++		OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME);
++
++	PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
++	}
++
++static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name)
++	{
++	free_PK11_LIBNAME();
++
++	return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0);
++	}
++
++/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */
++static void pk11_fork_prepare(void)
++	{
++	int i;
++
++	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
++		return;
++
++	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
++	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
++	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
++	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
++		{
++		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock);
++		}
++	}
++
++/* release all engine specific mutexes */
++static void pk11_fork_parent(void)
++	{
++	int i;
++
++	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
++		return;
++
++	for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
++		{
++		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock);
++		}
++	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
++	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
++	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them
++ * accessible to all threads.
++ */
++static void pk11_fork_child(void)
++	{
++	int i;
++
++	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
++		return;
++
++	for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
++		{
++		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock);
++		}
++	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
++	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
++	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
++	}
++
++/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */
++static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e)
++	{
++	return (pk11_library_init(e));
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Helper function that unsets reference to current engine (pk11_engine = NULL).
++ *
++ * Use of local variable only seems clumsy, it needs to be this way!
++ * This is to prevent double free in the unlucky scenario:
++ *     ENGINE_free calls pk11_destroy calls pk11_finish calls ENGINE_free
++ * Setting pk11_engine to NULL prior to ENGINE_free() avoids this.
++ */
++static void pk11_engine_free()
++	{
++	ENGINE* old_engine = pk11_engine;
++
++	if (old_engine)
++		{
++		pk11_engine = NULL;
++		}
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
++ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also
++ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and
++ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function
++ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default.
++ */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e)
++	{
++	CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
++	CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
++	CK_INFO info;
++	CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
++	int any_slot_found;
++	int i;
++
++	if (e != pk11_engine)
++		{
++		pk11_engine_free();
++		pk11_engine = e;
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which is called
++	 * from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still at least one
++	 * existing functional reference to the engine (see engine(3) for more
++	 * information), pk11_finish() is skipped. For example, this can happen
++	 * if an application forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a
++	 * fork() when the application is finishing the engine so that it can be
++	 * reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional reference causes
++	 * pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In that case we need the PID
++	 * check so that we properly initialize the engine again.
++	 */
++	if (pk11_library_initialized)
++		{
++		if (pk11_pid == getpid())
++			{
++			return (1);
++			}
++		else
++			{
++			global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++			/*
++			 * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case
++			 * the application calls fork() without finishing the
++			 * engine first.
++			 */
++			pk11_free_all_locks();
++			}
++		}
++
++
++	/* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */
++	if (!pk11_dso)
++		{
++		pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
++		if (pk11_dso == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++
++#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++	if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
++		goto err;
++#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++	/* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */
++	p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso,
++		PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST);
++	if (!p)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	/* get the full function list from the loaded library */
++	rv = p(&pFuncList);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
++	if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0)
++		goto err;
++
++	/*
++	 * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any
++	 * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an
++	 * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11
++	 * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just
++	 * because no slot was present.
++	 */
++	if (any_slot_found == 0)
++		return (1);
++
++	if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		/* Open the global_session for the new process */
++		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
++			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT,
++			    PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since
++	 * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function
++	 */
++	if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len)
++			== CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
++		{
++		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, "
++		    "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG);
++		digest_count = 0;
++		}
++
++	pk11_library_initialized = CK_TRUE;
++	pk11_pid = getpid();
++	/*
++	 * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks()
++	 * will do the cleanup.
++	 */
++	if (!pk11_init_all_locks())
++		goto err;
++	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
++		session_cache[i].head = NULL;
++	/*
++	 * initialize active lists. We only use active lists
++	 * for asymmetric ciphers.
++	 */
++	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
++		active_list[i] = NULL;
++
++	if (!pk11_atfork_initialized)
++		{
++		if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent,
++		    pk11_fork_child) != 0)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		pk11_atfork_initialized = CK_TRUE;
++		}
++
++	return (1);
++
++err:
++	return (0);
++	}
++
++/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e)
++	{
++	int rtn = 1;
++
++	free_PK11_LIBNAME();
++	ERR_unload_pk11_strings();
++	if (pk11_library_initialized == CK_TRUE)
++		rtn = pk11_finish(e);
++
++	return (rtn);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11
++ * library.
++ */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e)
++	{
++	int i;
++
++	/*
++	 * Make sure, right engine instance is being destroyed.
++	 * Engine e may be the wrong instance if
++	 * 	1) either someone calls ENGINE_load_pk11 twice
++	 * 	2) or last ref. to an already finished engine is being destroyed
++	 */
++	if (e != pk11_engine)
++		goto err;
++
++	if (pk11_dso == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL);
++
++	if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0)
++		goto err;
++
++	/* free all active lists */
++	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
++		pk11_free_active_list(i);
++
++	pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session);
++	global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++
++	/*
++	 * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
++	 * may have side-effects.
++	 */
++#if 0
++	pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL);
++#endif
++	if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso))
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++	pk11_dso = NULL;
++	pFuncList = NULL;
++	pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE;
++	pk11_pid = 0;
++	pk11_engine_free();
++	/*
++	 * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than
++	 * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason
++	 * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out
++	 * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes
++	 * the engine before calling fork().
++	 */
++	pk11_free_all_locks();
++
++	return (1);
++
++err:
++	return (0);
++	}
++
++/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)())
++	{
++	int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
++
++	switch (cmd)
++		{
++	case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH:
++		if (p == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
++			return (0);
++			}
++
++		if (initialized)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
++			return (0);
++			}
++
++		return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p));
++	default:
++		break;
++		}
++
++	PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
++
++	return (0);
++	}
++
++
++/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
++static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void)
++	{
++	return;
++	}
++
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
++	{
++	PK11_SESSION *sp;
++
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
++		return;
++
++	/*
++	 * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since
++	 * the calling functions do not care anyway
++	 */
++	pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num);
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
++
++	return;
++	}
++
++static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
++	{
++	pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0);
++	}
++
++static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp;
++
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
++		return (0);
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv);
++		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
++static int pk11_rand_status(void)
++	{
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */
++static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++	{
++	switch (optype)
++		{
++#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++		case OP_RSA:
++			if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
++				{
++				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
++				sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
++				}
++			if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
++				{
++				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
++				sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
++				}
++			if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
++				{
++				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
++				sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
++				}
++			break;
++#endif
++#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++		case OP_DSA:
++			if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
++				{
++				BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
++				sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
++				}
++			if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
++				{
++				BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
++				sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
++				}
++			break;
++#endif
++#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_DH
++		case OP_DH:
++			if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
++				{
++				BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
++				sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
++				}
++			break;
++#endif
++		default:
++			break;
++		}
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have
++ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here
++ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist.
++ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist.
++ */
++PK11_SESSION *
++pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++	{
++	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist;
++	pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
++	static pid_t pid = 0;
++	pid_t new_pid;
++	CK_RV rv;
++
++	switch (optype)
++		{
++		case OP_RSA:
++		case OP_DSA:
++		case OP_DH:
++		case OP_RAND:
++		case OP_DIGEST:
++		case OP_CIPHER:
++			freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
++			break;
++		default:
++			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
++				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
++			return (NULL);
++		}
++	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
++
++	/*
++	 * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in
++	 * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session
++	 * here, with no PID information.
++	 */
++	if (pid == 0)
++		pid = getpid();
++
++	freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
++	sp = freelist;
++
++	/*
++	 * If the free list is empty, allocate new uninitialized (filled
++	 * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first
++	 * structure from the freelist.
++	 */
++	if (sp == NULL)
++		{
++		if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
++				PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		(void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION));
++
++		/*
++		 * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the
++		 * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so
++		 * mark them as unused.
++		 */
++		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		}
++	else
++		freelist = sp->next;
++
++	/*
++	 * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all
++	 * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones.
++	 */
++	if (pid != (new_pid = getpid()))
++		{
++		pid = new_pid;
++
++		/*
++		 * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited
++		 * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which
++		 * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the
++		 * head of the list).
++		 */
++		while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL)
++			{
++			freelist = sp1->next;
++			/*
++			 * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions()
++			 * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11
++			 * sessions and destroy all objects.
++			 */
++			pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype);
++			OPENSSL_free(sp1);
++			}
++
++		/* we have to free the active list as well. */
++		pk11_free_active_list(optype);
++
++		/* Initialize the process */
++		rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
++		if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE,
++			    rv);
++			OPENSSL_free(sp);
++			sp = NULL;
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++		/*
++		 * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this
++		 * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one
++		 * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found.
++		 * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more
++		 * information.
++		 */
++#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++		if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
++			goto err;
++#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++		if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0)
++			goto err;
++
++		/* Open the global_session for the new process */
++		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
++			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION,
++			    rv);
++			OPENSSL_free(sp);
++			sp = NULL;
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++		/*
++		 * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs
++		 * re-initialization.
++		 */
++		if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
++			{
++			OPENSSL_free(sp);
++			sp = NULL;
++			goto err;
++			}
++		if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0)
++			{
++			/*
++			 * We will keep the session in the cache list and let
++			 * the caller cope with the situation.
++			 */
++			freelist = sp;
++			sp = NULL;
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++
++	if (sp->pid == 0)
++		{
++		/* It is a new session and needs initialization. */
++		if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
++			{
++			OPENSSL_free(sp);
++			sp = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++
++	/* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */
++	session_cache[optype].head = freelist;
++
++err:
++	if (sp != NULL)
++		sp->next = NULL;
++
++	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
++
++	return (sp);
++	}
++
++
++void
++pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++	{
++	pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
++	PK11_SESSION *freelist;
++
++	/*
++	 * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and
++	 * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the
++	 * next time we will ask for a new session.
++	 */
++	if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid())
++		return;
++
++	switch (optype)
++		{
++		case OP_RSA:
++		case OP_DSA:
++		case OP_DH:
++		case OP_RAND:
++		case OP_DIGEST:
++		case OP_CIPHER:
++			freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
++			break;
++		default:
++			PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION,
++				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
++			return;
++		}
++
++	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
++	freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
++	sp->next = freelist;
++	session_cache[optype].head = sp;
++	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
++	}
++
++
++/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */
++static int pk11_free_all_sessions()
++	{
++	int ret = 1;
++	int type;
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++	(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++	(void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL);
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++	(void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL);
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++	(void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL);
++
++	/*
++	 * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will
++	 * return 0 on exit.
++	 */
++	for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
++		{
++		if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0)
++			ret = 0;
++		}
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many
++ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we
++ * return an error on return.
++ */
++static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++	PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL;
++	pid_t mypid = getpid();
++	pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
++	int ret = 1;
++
++	switch (optype)
++		{
++		case OP_RSA:
++		case OP_DSA:
++		case OP_DH:
++		case OP_RAND:
++		case OP_DIGEST:
++		case OP_CIPHER:
++			freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
++			break;
++		default:
++			PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
++				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
++			return (0);
++		}
++
++	(void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
++	freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
++	while ((sp = freelist) != NULL)
++		{
++		if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
++			{
++			rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
++			if (rv != CKR_OK)
++				{
++				PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
++					PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
++				ret = 0;
++				}
++			}
++		freelist = sp->next;
++		pk11_free_nums(sp, optype);
++		OPENSSL_free(sp);
++		}
++
++	(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++
++static int
++pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_SLOT_ID myslot;
++
++	switch (optype)
++		{
++		case OP_RSA:
++		case OP_DSA:
++		case OP_DH:
++			myslot = pubkey_SLOTID;
++			break;
++		case OP_RAND:
++			myslot = rand_SLOTID;
++			break;
++		case OP_DIGEST:
++		case OP_CIPHER:
++			myslot = SLOTID;
++			break;
++		default:
++			PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION,
++			    PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
++			return (0);
++		}
++
++	sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype);
++	rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
++		NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
++	if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED)
++		{
++		/*
++		 * We are probably a child process so force the
++		 * reinitialize of the session
++		 */
++		pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE;
++		if (!pk11_library_init(NULL))
++			return (0);
++		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
++			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
++		}
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	sp->pid = getpid();
++
++	switch (optype)
++		{
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++		case OP_RSA:
++			sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++			sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++			sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
++			sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
++			sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
++			sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
++			sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
++			break;
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++		case OP_DSA:
++			sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++			sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++			sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
++			sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
++			sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
++			sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
++			break;
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++		case OP_DH:
++			sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++			sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
++			sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
++			break;
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++		case OP_CIPHER:
++			sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++			sp->opdata_encrypt = -1;
++			break;
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent
++	 * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so.
++	 */
++	sp->persistent = CK_FALSE;
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++/*
++ * Destroy all non-NULL RSA parameters. For the RSA keys by reference code,
++ * public components 'n'/'e' are the key components we use to check for the
++ * cache hit even for the private keys. So, no matter whether we are destroying
++ * a public or a private key, we always free what we can.
++ */
++static void
++destroy_all_rsa_params(PK11_SESSION *sp)
++	{
++	if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
++		{
++		BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
++		sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
++		}
++	if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
++		{
++		BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
++		sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
++		}
++	if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
++		{
++		BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
++		sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
++		}
++	}
++
++/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */
++int
++pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
++	{
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key,
++		    ret, uselock, OP_RSA);
++		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
++		destroy_all_rsa_params(sp);
++		}
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */
++int
++pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
++	{
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
++		    ret, uselock, OP_RSA);
++		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
++		destroy_all_rsa_params(sp);
++		}
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
++ * objects in the free list.
++ */
++int
++pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
++	{
++	int ret = 1;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
++	CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE;
++
++	if (session != NULL)
++		local_free_session = session;
++	else
++		{
++		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock);
++		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head;
++		uselock = CK_FALSE;
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
++	 */
++	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
++		{
++		local_free_session = sp->next;
++
++		/*
++		 * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
++		 * destroy operations fails.
++		 */
++		if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
++			{
++			ret = 0;
++			continue;
++			}
++		if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
++			{
++			ret = 0;
++			continue;
++			}
++		}
++
++	if (session == NULL)
++		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock);
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */
++int
++pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
++	{
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key,
++		    ret, uselock, OP_DSA);
++		sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
++		if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
++			{
++			BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
++			sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */
++int
++pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
++	{
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key,
++		    ret, uselock, OP_DSA);
++		sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
++		if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
++			{
++			BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
++			sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
++ * objects in the free list.
++ */
++int
++pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
++	{
++	int ret = 1;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
++	CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE;
++
++	if (session != NULL)
++		local_free_session = session;
++	else
++		{
++		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock);
++		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head;
++		uselock = CK_FALSE;
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
++	 */
++	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
++		{
++		local_free_session = sp->next;
++
++		/*
++		 * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
++		 * destroy operations fails.
++		 */
++		if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
++			{
++			ret = 0;
++			continue;
++			}
++		if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
++			{
++			ret = 0;
++			continue;
++			}
++		}
++
++	if (session == NULL)
++		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock);
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++/* Destroy DH key from single session. */
++int
++pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
++	{
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key,
++		    ret, uselock, OP_DH);
++		sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
++		if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
++			{
++			BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
++			sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Destroy DH key object wrapper.
++ *
++ * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure
++ *       if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list
++ */
++int
++pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
++	{
++	int ret = 1;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
++	CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE;
++
++	if (session != NULL)
++		local_free_session = session;
++	else
++		{
++		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock);
++		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head;
++		uselock = CK_FALSE;
++		}
++
++	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
++		{
++		local_free_session = sp->next;
++
++		/*
++		 * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
++		 * destroy operations fails.
++		 */
++		if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0)
++			{
++			ret = 0;
++			continue;
++			}
++		}
++err:
++	if (session == NULL)
++		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock);
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++
++static int
++pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
++    CK_BBOOL persistent)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++
++	/*
++	 * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects
++	 * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so
++	 * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here.
++	 */
++	if (persistent == CK_TRUE)
++		return (1);
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,
++		    rv);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++
++/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */
++
++static int
++cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
++	{
++	int i;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++)
++		if (ciphers[i].nid == nid)
++			return (ciphers[i].id);
++	return (-1);
++	}
++
++static int
++pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids)
++	{
++	if (cipher_count > 0)
++		*nids = cipher_nids;
++	else
++		*nids = NULL;
++	return (cipher_count);
++	}
++
++static int
++pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids)
++	{
++	if (digest_count > 0)
++		*nids = digest_nids;
++	else
++		*nids = NULL;
++	return (digest_count);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key.
++ */
++static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher,
++	PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params;
++
++	/*
++	 * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and
++	 * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before
++	 * pk11_init_symmetric() is called.
++	 */
++	OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != NULL);
++	OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL);
++	OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0);
++
++	if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr ||
++	    ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr ||
++	    ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
++		{
++		pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params);
++		pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params);
++		/*
++		 * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter,
++		 * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344
++		 * needs. For more information on internal structure of the
++		 * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can
++		 * add code so that the counter length can be set via
++		 * ENGINE_ctrl() function.
++		 */
++		ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
++		OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++		(void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++		}
++	else
++		{
++		if (pcipher->iv_len > 0)
++			{
++			pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv;
++			pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len;
++			}
++		}
++
++	/* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */
++	if (ctx->encrypt)
++		rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
++			sp->opdata_cipher_key);
++	else
++		rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
++			sp->opdata_cipher_key);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ?
++		    PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
++		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int
++pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
++    const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
++	{
++	CK_MECHANISM mech;
++	int index;
++	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp;
++	PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row;
++
++	state->sp = NULL;
++
++	index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid);
++	if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX)
++		return (0);
++
++	p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index];
++	/*
++	 * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the
++	 * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our
++	 * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From
++	 * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a
++	 * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key
++	 * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this
++	 * code serves as a sanity check.
++	 *
++	 * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be
++	 * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs
++	 * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES
++	 * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV.
++	 */
++	if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len ||
++	    ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len ||
++	    ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL)
++		return (0);
++
++	/* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */
++	mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type;
++	mech.pParameter = NULL;
++	mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
++
++	/* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */
++	(void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len);
++
++	/*
++	 * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then
++	 * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the
++	 * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup().
++	 */
++	if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE &&
++	    sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt)
++		{
++		state->sp = sp;
++		if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
++			return (0);
++
++		return (1);
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object
++	 * needs to be created.
++	 */
++	if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key(
++			ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp);
++		}
++
++	if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1)
++		{
++		/*
++		 * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to
++		 * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here.
++		 */
++		if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp))
++			{
++			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
++			return (0);
++			}
++		}
++
++	if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	/* now initialize the context with a new key */
++	if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
++		return (0);
++
++	sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt;
++	state->sp = sp;
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a
++ * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session
++ * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so
++ * that it needs not be recreated.
++ *
++ * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this
++ * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return
++ * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good
++ * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix
++ * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem.
++ */
++static int
++pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
++		NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient
++ * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results.
++ */
++static int
++pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
++	const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
++	{
++	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp;
++	CK_RV rv;
++	unsigned long outl = inl;
++
++	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
++		return (0);
++
++	sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp;
++
++	if (!inl)
++		return (1);
++
++	/* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */
++	if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0)
++		return (0);
++
++	if (ctx->encrypt)
++		{
++		rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session,
++			(unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
++
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
++			    PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv);
++			return (0);
++			}
++		}
++	else
++		{
++		rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session,
++			(unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
++
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
++			    PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv);
++			return (0);
++			}
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always
++	 * the same size of input.
++	 * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with
++	 * correctly aligned buffers.
++	 */
++	if (inl != outl)
++		return (0);
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal()
++ * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's
++ * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but
++ * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't
++ * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with
++ * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness,
++ * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used
++ * context is initialized without finalizing it first.
++ */
++static int
++pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH;
++	CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
++	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data;
++
++	if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
++		{
++		/*
++		 * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get
++		 * rid of the context.
++		 */
++		if (ctx->encrypt)
++			rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal(
++			    state->sp->session, buf, &len);
++		else
++			rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal(
++			    state->sp->session, buf, &len);
++
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ?
++			    PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv);
++			pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
++			return (0);
++			}
++
++		pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
++		state->sp = NULL;
++		}
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with
++ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the
++ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with
++ */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int
++pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
++	const int **nids, int nid)
++	{
++	if (!cipher)
++		return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids));
++
++	switch (nid)
++		{
++		case NID_des_ede3_cbc:
++			*cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc;
++			break;
++		case NID_des_cbc:
++			*cipher = &pk11_des_cbc;
++			break;
++		case NID_des_ede3_ecb:
++			*cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb;
++			break;
++		case NID_des_ecb:
++			*cipher = &pk11_des_ecb;
++			break;
++		case NID_aes_128_cbc:
++			*cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc;
++			break;
++		case NID_aes_192_cbc:
++			*cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc;
++			break;
++		case NID_aes_256_cbc:
++			*cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc;
++			break;
++		case NID_aes_128_ecb:
++			*cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb;
++			break;
++		case NID_aes_192_ecb:
++			*cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb;
++			break;
++		case NID_aes_256_ecb:
++			*cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb;
++			break;
++		case NID_aes_128_ctr:
++			*cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr;
++			break;
++		case NID_aes_192_ctr:
++			*cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr;
++			break;
++		case NID_aes_256_ctr:
++			*cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr;
++			break;
++		case NID_bf_cbc:
++			*cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc;
++			break;
++		case NID_rc4:
++			*cipher = &pk11_rc4;
++			break;
++		default:
++			*cipher = NULL;
++			break;
++		}
++	return (*cipher != NULL);
++	}
++
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int
++pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
++	const int **nids, int nid)
++	{
++	if (!digest)
++		return (pk11_usable_digests(nids));
++
++	switch (nid)
++		{
++		case NID_md5:
++			*digest = &pk11_md5;
++			break;
++		/*
++		 * A special case. For "openssl dgst -dss1 -engine pkcs11 ...",
++		 * OpenSSL calls EVP_get_digestbyname() on "dss1" which ends up
++		 * calling pk11_engine_digests() for NID_dsa. Internally, if an
++		 * engine is not used, OpenSSL uses SHA1_Init() as expected for
++		 * DSA. So, we must return pk11_sha1() for NID_dsa as well. Note
++		 * that this must have changed between 0.9.8 and 1.0.0 since we
++		 * did not have the problem with the 0.9.8 version.
++		 */
++		case NID_sha1:
++		case NID_dsa:
++			*digest = &pk11_sha1;
++			break;
++		case NID_sha224:
++			*digest = &pk11_sha224;
++			break;
++		case NID_sha256:
++			*digest = &pk11_sha256;
++			break;
++		case NID_sha384:
++			*digest = &pk11_sha384;
++			break;
++		case NID_sha512:
++			*digest = &pk11_sha512;
++			break;
++		default:
++			*digest = NULL;
++			break;
++		}
++	return (*digest != NULL);
++	}
++
++
++/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
++	const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++	CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
++	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6;
++
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
++		{
++		{CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
++		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
++		{CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
++		{CKA_ENCRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
++		{CKA_DECRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
++		{CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0},
++		};
++
++	/*
++	 * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions
++	 * can use the key handles. Here is why:
++	 * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key.
++	 * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key.
++	 * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with
++	 * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES
++	 * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and
++	 * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session
++	 * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key
++	 * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to
++	 * terminate the active operation.
++	 */
++	CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session;
++	a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key;
++	a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
++	a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key;
++	a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len;
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
++		a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
++		    rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * Save the key information used in this session.
++	 * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX.
++	 */
++	sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX ?
++		PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX : ctx->key_len;
++	(void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len);
++err:
++
++	return (h_key);
++	}
++
++static int
++md_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
++	{
++	int i;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++)
++		if (digests[i].nid == nid)
++			return (digests[i].id);
++	return (-1);
++	}
++
++static int
++pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_MECHANISM mech;
++	int index;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp;
++	PK11_DIGEST *pdp;
++	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
++
++	state->sp = NULL;
++
++	index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type);
++	if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX)
++		return (0);
++
++	pdp = &digests[index];
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL)
++		return (0);
++
++	/* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */
++	mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type;
++	mech.pParameter = NULL;
++	mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv);
++		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	state->sp = sp;
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++static int
++pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
++
++	/* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */
++	if (count == 0)
++		return (1);
++
++	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
++		return (0);
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data,
++		count);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv);
++		pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
++		state->sp = NULL;
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++static int
++pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	unsigned long len;
++	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
++	len = ctx->digest->md_size;
++
++	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
++		return (0);
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv);
++		pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
++		state->sp = NULL;
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	if (ctx->digest->md_size != len)
++		return (0);
++
++	/*
++	 * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session
++	 * to the pool
++	 */
++	pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
++	state->sp = NULL;
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++static int
++pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	int ret = 0;
++	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to;
++	CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL;
++	CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
++
++	if (from->md_data == NULL || to->digest->ctx_size == 0)
++		return (1);
++
++	/* The copy-from state */
++	state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data;
++	if (state->sp == NULL)
++		goto err;
++
++	/* Initialize the copy-to state */
++	if (!pk11_digest_init(to))
++		goto err;
++	state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data;
++
++	/* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL,
++		&ul_state_len);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
++		    rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++	if (ul_state_len == 0)
++		{
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len);
++	if (pstate == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	/* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate,
++		&ul_state_len);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
++		    rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	/* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */
++	rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate,
++		ul_state_len, 0, 0);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY,
++		    PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	ret = 1;
++err:
++	if (pstate != NULL)
++		OPENSSL_free(pstate);
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++/* Return any pending session state to the pool */
++static int
++pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
++	{
++	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data;
++	unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
++
++	if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
++		{
++		/*
++		 * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not
++		 * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory
++		 * that might have been allocated in the token when
++		 * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final()
++		 * will return the session to the cache.
++		 */
++		if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf))
++			return (0);
++		}
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key
++ * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key
++ * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for
++ * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first
++ * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same
++ * prefix.
++ */
++static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
++	int key_len)
++	{
++	if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len ||
++	    memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0)
++		{
++		(void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp);
++		return (0);
++		}
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */
++static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
++	{
++	int ret = 0;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
++
++	if (session != NULL)
++		local_free_session = session;
++	else
++		{
++		(void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock);
++		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head;
++		}
++
++	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
++		{
++		local_free_session = sp->next;
++
++		if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++			{
++			/*
++			 * The secret key object is created in the
++			 * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key().
++			 */
++			if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session,
++				sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0)
++				goto err;
++			sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++			}
++		}
++	ret = 1;
++err:
++
++	if (session == NULL)
++		(void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock);
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++
++/*
++ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported
++ *
++ * CKM_RSA_X_509
++ * CKM_RSA_PKCS
++ * CKM_DSA
++ *
++ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a
++ * public key slot.
++ *
++ * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported
++ *
++ * CKM_DES3_CBC
++ * CKM_DES_CBC
++ * CKM_AES_CBC
++ * CKM_DES3_ECB
++ * CKM_DES_ECB
++ * CKM_AES_ECB
++ * CKM_AES_CTR
++ * CKM_RC4
++ * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC
++ *
++ * Digests optionally supported
++ *
++ * CKM_MD5
++ * CKM_SHA_1
++ * CKM_SHA224
++ * CKM_SHA256
++ * CKM_SHA384
++ * CKM_SHA512
++ *
++ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which
++ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of
++ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global
++ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key
++ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests.
++ */
++static int
++pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found)
++	{
++	CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
++	CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
++	CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
++	CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
++	int i;
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_SLOT_ID best_pubkey_slot_sofar;
++	CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0;
++	int best_number_of_mechs = 0;
++	int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
++	int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
++
++	/* let's initialize the output parameter */
++	if (any_slot_found != NULL)
++		*any_slot_found = 0;
++
++	/* Get slot list for memory allocation */
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	/* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */
++	if (ulSlotCount == 0)
++		{
++		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG);
++		return (1);
++		}
++
++	pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
++
++	if (pSlotList == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	/* Get the slot list for processing */
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
++		OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME);
++	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
++
++	pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
++	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
++		{
++		current_slot = pSlotList[i];
++		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: == checking slot: %d ==\n", PK11_DBG,
++		    current_slot);
++		rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			continue;
++
++		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG,
++		    token_info.label);
++
++		pk11_choose_rand_slot(token_info, current_slot);
++
++		pk11_choose_pubkey_slot(mech_info, token_info, current_slot,
++			rv, best_number_of_mechs, best_pubkey_slot_sofar);
++
++		pk11_choose_cipher_digest(&local_cipher_nids,
++			&local_digest_nids, pFuncList, current_slot);
++		}
++
++	if (best_number_of_mechs == 0)
++		{
++		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG);
++		}
++	else
++		{
++		pubkey_SLOTID = best_pubkey_slot_sofar;
++		}
++
++	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID);
++	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID);
++	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID);
++	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa);
++	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa);
++	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh);
++	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random);
++	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count);
++	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count);
++
++	if (pSlotList != NULL)
++		OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
++
++#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++	OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids);
++	OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids);
++#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++	if (any_slot_found != NULL)
++		*any_slot_found = 1;
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++static void pk11_choose_rand_slot(CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info,
++    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot)
++	{
++	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking rand slots\n", PK11_DBG);
++	if (((token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) != 0) && !pk11_have_random)
++		{
++		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG);
++		pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE;
++		rand_SLOTID = current_slot;
++		}
++	}
++
++static void pk11_choose_pubkey_slot(CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info,
++    CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info, CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, CK_RV rv,
++    int best_number_of_mechs, CK_SLOT_ID best_pubkey_slot_sofar)
++	{
++	CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE;
++	CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE;
++	CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE;
++	int current_number_of_mechs = 0;
++
++	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking pubkey slots\n", PK11_DBG);
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++	/*
++	 * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
++	 * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS.
++	 */
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
++		&mech_info);
++
++	if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
++			(mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
++		{
++		/*
++		 * Check if this slot is capable of encryption,
++		 * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509.
++		 */
++		rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
++		    CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info);
++
++		if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
++		    (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) &&
++		    (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
++		    (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER) &&
++		    (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)))
++			{
++			slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE;
++			current_number_of_mechs++;
++			}
++		}
++#endif  /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++	/*
++	 * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
++	 * verifying with CKM_DSA.
++	 */
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA,
++		&mech_info);
++	if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
++	    (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
++		{
++		slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE;
++		current_number_of_mechs++;
++		}
++#endif  /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++	/*
++	 * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and
++	 * derivation.
++	 */
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
++	    CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info);
++
++	if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR))
++		{
++		rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
++			CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info);
++		if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE))
++			{
++			slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE;
++			current_number_of_mechs++;
++			}
++		}
++#endif  /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++
++	if (current_number_of_mechs > best_number_of_mechs)
++		{
++		best_pubkey_slot_sofar = current_slot;
++		pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa;
++		pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa;
++		pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh;
++		best_number_of_mechs = current_number_of_mechs;
++		/*
++		 * Cache the flags for later use. We might need those if
++		 * RSA keys by reference feature is used.
++		 */
++		pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags;
++		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pubkey flags changed to "
++		    "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags);
++		}
++	}
++
++static void pk11_choose_cipher_digest(int *local_cipher_nids,
++    int *local_digest_nids, CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
++    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot)
++	{
++	int current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
++	int current_slot_n_digest = 0;
++
++	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking cipher/digest\n", PK11_DBG);
++
++	(void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
++	(void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids));
++
++	pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot,
++	    &current_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids);
++
++	pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot,
++	    &current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids);
++
++	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG,
++		current_slot_n_cipher);
++	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG,
++		current_slot_n_digest);
++	/*
++	 * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than
++	 * the previous best one we change the current best to this one,
++	 * otherwise leave it where it is.
++	 */
++	if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) >
++	    (cipher_count + digest_count))
++		{
++		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: changing best slot to %d\n",
++			PK11_DBG, current_slot);
++		SLOTID = current_slot;
++		cipher_count = current_slot_n_cipher;
++		digest_count = current_slot_n_digest;
++		(void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids,
++			sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
++		(void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids,
++			sizeof (local_digest_nids));
++		}
++	}
++
++static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
++    int slot_id, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids,
++    PK11_CIPHER *cipher)
++	{
++	static CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
++	static CK_RV rv;
++	static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE last_checked_mech = (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)-1;
++
++	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, cipher->mech_type);
++	if (cipher->mech_type != last_checked_mech)
++		{
++		rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, cipher->mech_type,
++		    &mech_info);
++		}
++
++	last_checked_mech = cipher->mech_type;
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" not found\n");
++		return;
++		}
++
++	if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
++	    (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))
++		{
++		if (mech_info.ulMinKeySize > cipher->min_key_len ||
++		    mech_info.ulMaxKeySize < cipher->max_key_len)
++			{
++			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" engine key size range <%i-%i> does not"
++			    " match mech range <%lu-%lu>\n",
++			    cipher->min_key_len, cipher->max_key_len,
++			    mech_info.ulMinKeySize, mech_info.ulMaxKeySize);
++			return;
++			}
++#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++		if (nid_in_table(cipher->nid, hw_cnids))
++#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++			{
++			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" usable\n");
++			local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] =
++			    cipher->nid;
++			}
++#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++		else
++			{
++			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
++			    " rejected, software implementation only\n");
++			}
++#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++		}
++	else
++		{
++		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" unusable\n");
++		}
++
++	return;
++	}
++
++static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
++    int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, PK11_DIGEST *digest)
++	{
++	CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
++	CK_RV rv;
++
++	DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, digest->mech_type);
++	rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, digest->mech_type, &mech_info);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" not found\n");
++		return;
++		}
++
++	if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST)
++		{
++#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++		if (nid_in_table(digest->nid, hw_dnids))
++#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++			{
++			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" usable\n");
++			local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] =
++			    digest->nid;
++			}
++#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++		else
++			{
++			DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
++			    " rejected, software implementation only\n");
++			}
++#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++		}
++	else
++		{
++		DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" unusable\n");
++		}
++
++	return;
++	}
++
++/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */
++static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
++    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids)
++	{
++	int i;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i)
++		{
++		pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot,
++		    current_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids, &ciphers[i]);
++		}
++	}
++
++/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */
++static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
++    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids)
++	{
++	int i;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i)
++		{
++		pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, current_slot_n_digest,
++		    local_digest_nids, &digests[i]);
++		}
++	}
++
++#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++/*
++ * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library
++ * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation
++ * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code
++ * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the
++ * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some
++ * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a
++ * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code,
++ * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the
++ * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte
++ * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products
++ * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression
++ * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the
++ * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea.
++ *

@@ Diff output truncated at 100000 characters. @@
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