SF.net SVN: gar:[25660] csw/mgar/pkg/samba/branches/samba3
lblume at users.sourceforge.net
lblume at users.sourceforge.net
Fri Apr 15 17:13:23 CEST 2016
Revision: 25660
http://sourceforge.net/p/gar/code/25660
Author: lblume
Date: 2016-04-15 15:13:22 +0000 (Fri, 15 Apr 2016)
Log Message:
-----------
samba/branches/samba3: Add patches for recent CVEs
Modified Paths:
--------------
csw/mgar/pkg/samba/branches/samba3/Makefile
Added Paths:
-----------
csw/mgar/pkg/samba/branches/samba3/files/CVE-2015-5370-v3-6.patch
csw/mgar/pkg/samba/branches/samba3/files/CVE-2016-2110-v3-6.patch
csw/mgar/pkg/samba/branches/samba3/files/CVE-2016-2111-v3-6.patch
csw/mgar/pkg/samba/branches/samba3/files/CVE-2016-2112-v3-6.patch
csw/mgar/pkg/samba/branches/samba3/files/CVE-2016-2115-v3-6.patch
csw/mgar/pkg/samba/branches/samba3/files/CVE-2016-2118-v3-6.patch
csw/mgar/pkg/samba/branches/samba3/files/CVE-preparation-v3-6.patch
csw/mgar/pkg/samba/branches/samba3/files/samba-3.6.25-security-2015-12-16.patch
Modified: csw/mgar/pkg/samba/branches/samba3/Makefile
===================================================================
--- csw/mgar/pkg/samba/branches/samba3/Makefile 2016-04-15 13:55:00 UTC (rev 25659)
+++ csw/mgar/pkg/samba/branches/samba3/Makefile 2016-04-15 15:13:22 UTC (rev 25660)
@@ -30,6 +30,16 @@
PATCHFILES += 0002-smbd-patch-for-setgroups.c.patch
PATCHFILES += 0003-rename-nss-modules.patch
+# Upstream patches for recent CVEs
+PATCHFILES += samba-3.6.25-security-2015-12-16.patch
+PATCHFILES += CVE-preparation-v3-6.patch
+PATCHFILES += CVE-2016-2118-v3-6.patch
+PATCHFILES += CVE-2016-2115-v3-6.patch
+PATCHFILES += CVE-2016-2112-v3-6.patch
+PATCHFILES += CVE-2016-2111-v3-6.patch
+PATCHFILES += CVE-2016-2110-v3-6.patch
+PATCHFILES += CVE-2015-5370-v3-6.patch
+
BUILD_DEP_PKGS += CSWlibtalloc-dev
BUILD_DEP_PKGS += CSWopenldap-dev
BUILD_DEP_PKGS += CSWlibkrb5-dev
@@ -418,8 +428,8 @@
# Studio 12 is the last supported on Solaris 9
GARCOMPILER_5.9 = SOS12
-GARCOMPILER_5.10 = SOS12U3
-GARCOMPILER_5.11 = SOS12U3
+GARCOMPILER_5.10 = GCC5
+GARCOMPILER_5.11 = GCC5
GARCOMPILER = $(GARCOMPILER_$(GAROSREL))
# Set the target dir for modules with the proper arch
Added: csw/mgar/pkg/samba/branches/samba3/files/CVE-2015-5370-v3-6.patch
===================================================================
--- csw/mgar/pkg/samba/branches/samba3/files/CVE-2015-5370-v3-6.patch (rev 0)
+++ csw/mgar/pkg/samba/branches/samba3/files/CVE-2015-5370-v3-6.patch 2016-04-15 15:13:22 UTC (rev 25660)
@@ -0,0 +1,3080 @@
+From 8716bb5e03cc4f10e2d4edc704d8defe7e8045f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2015 22:46:05 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 01/40] CVE-2015-5370: dcerpc.idl: add
+ DCERPC_{NCACN_PAYLOAD,FRAG}_MAX_SIZE defines
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+---
+ librpc/idl/dcerpc.idl | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/librpc/idl/dcerpc.idl b/librpc/idl/dcerpc.idl
+index 75ef2ec..bbb42d1 100644
+--- a/librpc/idl/dcerpc.idl
++++ b/librpc/idl/dcerpc.idl
+@@ -475,9 +475,11 @@ interface dcerpc
+ const uint8 DCERPC_PFC_OFFSET = 3;
+ const uint8 DCERPC_DREP_OFFSET = 4;
+ const uint8 DCERPC_FRAG_LEN_OFFSET = 8;
++ const uint32 DCERPC_FRAG_MAX_SIZE = 5840;
+ const uint8 DCERPC_AUTH_LEN_OFFSET = 10;
+ const uint8 DCERPC_CALL_ID_OFFSET = 12;
+ const uint8 DCERPC_NCACN_PAYLOAD_OFFSET = 16;
++ const uint32 DCERPC_NCACN_PAYLOAD_MAX_SIZE = 0x400000; /* 4 MByte */
+
+ /* little-endian flag */
+ const uint8 DCERPC_DREP_LE = 0x10;
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From 3b1cdbd2dc1c4d3773b4a1ef86ad1643abc5c208 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2015 01:19:57 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 02/40] CVE-2015-5370: librpc/rpc: simplify and harden
+ dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+---
+ librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ librpc/rpc/rpc_common.h | 4 +--
+ 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c b/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
+index 97ef798..f936ef4 100644
+--- a/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
++++ b/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
+@@ -92,31 +92,44 @@ uint8_t dcerpc_get_endian_flag(DATA_BLOB *blob)
+ *
+ * @return - A NTSTATUS error code.
+ */
+-NTSTATUS dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
++NTSTATUS dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(const struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+- DATA_BLOB *pkt_trailer,
++ const DATA_BLOB *pkt_trailer,
+ struct dcerpc_auth *auth,
+- uint32_t *auth_length,
++ uint32_t *_auth_length,
+ bool auth_data_only)
+ {
+ struct ndr_pull *ndr;
+ enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
+- uint32_t data_and_pad;
++ uint16_t data_and_pad;
++ uint16_t auth_length;
++ uint32_t tmp_length;
+
+- data_and_pad = pkt_trailer->length
+- - (DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH + pkt->auth_length);
++ ZERO_STRUCTP(auth);
++ if (_auth_length != NULL) {
++ *_auth_length = 0;
++ }
+
+- /* paranoia check for pad size. This would be caught anyway by
+- the ndr_pull_advance() a few lines down, but it scared
+- Jeremy enough for him to call me, so we might as well check
+- it now, just to prevent someone posting a bogus YouTube
+- video in the future.
+- */
+- if (data_and_pad > pkt_trailer->length) {
+- return NT_STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
++ /* Paranoia checks for auth_length. The caller should check this... */
++ if (pkt->auth_length > pkt->frag_length) {
++ return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++ }
++ tmp_length = DCERPC_NCACN_PAYLOAD_OFFSET;
++ tmp_length += DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH;
++ tmp_length += pkt->auth_length;
++ if (tmp_length > pkt->frag_length) {
++ return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++ }
++ if (pkt_trailer->length > UINT16_MAX) {
++ return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+- *auth_length = pkt_trailer->length - data_and_pad;
++ auth_length = DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH + pkt->auth_length;
++ if (pkt_trailer->length < auth_length) {
++ return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
++ }
++
++ data_and_pad = pkt_trailer->length - auth_length;
+
+ ndr = ndr_pull_init_blob(pkt_trailer, mem_ctx);
+ if (!ndr) {
+@@ -136,14 +149,28 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
+ ndr_err = ndr_pull_dcerpc_auth(ndr, NDR_SCALARS|NDR_BUFFERS, auth);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ talloc_free(ndr);
++ ZERO_STRUCTP(auth);
+ return ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
+ }
+
++ if (data_and_pad < auth->auth_pad_length) {
++ DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": ERROR: pad length mismatch. "
++ "Calculated %u got %u\n",
++ (unsigned)data_and_pad,
++ (unsigned)auth->auth_pad_length));
++ talloc_free(ndr);
++ ZERO_STRUCTP(auth);
++ return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
++ }
++
+ if (auth_data_only && data_and_pad != auth->auth_pad_length) {
+- DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": WARNING: pad length mismatch. "
++ DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": ERROR: pad length mismatch. "
+ "Calculated %u got %u\n",
+ (unsigned)data_and_pad,
+ (unsigned)auth->auth_pad_length));
++ talloc_free(ndr);
++ ZERO_STRUCTP(auth);
++ return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(6,(__location__ ": auth_pad_length %u\n",
+@@ -152,6 +179,10 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
+ talloc_steal(mem_ctx, auth->credentials.data);
+ talloc_free(ndr);
+
++ if (_auth_length != NULL) {
++ *_auth_length = auth_length;
++ }
++
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+diff --git a/librpc/rpc/rpc_common.h b/librpc/rpc/rpc_common.h
+index fe8129d..98a2e95 100644
+--- a/librpc/rpc/rpc_common.h
++++ b/librpc/rpc/rpc_common.h
+@@ -158,9 +158,9 @@ uint8_t dcerpc_get_endian_flag(DATA_BLOB *blob);
+ *
+ * @return - A NTSTATUS error code.
+ */
+-NTSTATUS dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
++NTSTATUS dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(const struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+- DATA_BLOB *pkt_trailer,
++ const DATA_BLOB *pkt_trailer,
+ struct dcerpc_auth *auth,
+ uint32_t *auth_length,
+ bool auth_data_only);
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From 3aa9e6ec1cf2b2220968c3e0f711dfeca9ee3450 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2015 10:24:45 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 03/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:librpc/rpc: don't call
+ dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer() if auth_length is 0
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+All other paranoia checks are done within dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer()
+now.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+---
+ source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c | 12 ++----------
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
+index 24f2f52..76f2acc 100644
+--- a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
++++ b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
+@@ -899,16 +899,8 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_check_auth(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+- /* Paranioa checks for auth_length. */
+- if (pkt->auth_length > pkt->frag_length) {
+- return NT_STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
+- }
+- if (((unsigned int)pkt->auth_length
+- + DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH < (unsigned int)pkt->auth_length) ||
+- ((unsigned int)pkt->auth_length
+- + DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH < DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH)) {
+- /* Integer wrap attempt. */
+- return NT_STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
++ if (pkt->auth_length == 0) {
++ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ status = dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(pkt, pkt, pkt_trailer,
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From de179f2907134e2bc23d1e5cf9ac85a0c759dad3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2015 08:10:46 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 04/40] CVE-2015-5370: librpc/rpc: add a
+ dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header() helper function
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 8266be48f455a5e541d0f7f62a1c8c38e0835976)
+---
+ librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ librpc/rpc/rpc_common.h | 5 ++++
+ 2 files changed, 78 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c b/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
+index f936ef4..2f599d5 100644
+--- a/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
++++ b/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
+@@ -186,6 +186,79 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(const struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
++/**
++* @brief Verify the fields in ncacn_packet header.
++*
++* @param pkt - The ncacn_packet strcuture
++* @param ptype - The expected PDU type
++* @param max_auth_info - The maximum size of a possible auth trailer
++* @param required_flags - The required flags for the pdu.
++* @param optional_flags - The possible optional flags for the pdu.
++*
++* @return - A NTSTATUS error code.
++*/
++NTSTATUS dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header(const struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
++ enum dcerpc_pkt_type ptype,
++ size_t max_auth_info,
++ uint8_t required_flags,
++ uint8_t optional_flags)
++{
++ if (pkt->rpc_vers != 5) {
++ return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
++ }
++
++ if (pkt->rpc_vers_minor != 0) {
++ return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
++ }
++
++ if (pkt->auth_length > pkt->frag_length) {
++ return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
++ }
++
++ if (pkt->ptype != ptype) {
++ return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
++ }
++
++ if (max_auth_info > UINT16_MAX) {
++ return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++ }
++
++ if (pkt->auth_length > 0) {
++ size_t max_auth_length;
++
++ if (max_auth_info <= DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH) {
++ return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
++ }
++ max_auth_length = max_auth_info - DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH;
++
++ if (pkt->auth_length > max_auth_length) {
++ return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
++ }
++ }
++
++ if ((pkt->pfc_flags & required_flags) != required_flags) {
++ return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
++ }
++ if (pkt->pfc_flags & ~(optional_flags|required_flags)) {
++ return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
++ }
++
++ if (pkt->drep[0] & ~DCERPC_DREP_LE) {
++ return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
++ }
++ if (pkt->drep[1] != 0) {
++ return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
++ }
++ if (pkt->drep[2] != 0) {
++ return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
++ }
++ if (pkt->drep[3] != 0) {
++ return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
++ }
++
++ return NT_STATUS_OK;
++}
++
+ struct dcerpc_read_ncacn_packet_state {
+ #if 0
+ struct {
+diff --git a/librpc/rpc/rpc_common.h b/librpc/rpc/rpc_common.h
+index 98a2e95..b3ae5b2 100644
+--- a/librpc/rpc/rpc_common.h
++++ b/librpc/rpc/rpc_common.h
+@@ -164,6 +164,11 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(const struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
+ struct dcerpc_auth *auth,
+ uint32_t *auth_length,
+ bool auth_data_only);
++NTSTATUS dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header(const struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
++ enum dcerpc_pkt_type ptype,
++ size_t max_auth_info,
++ uint8_t required_flags,
++ uint8_t optional_flags);
+ struct tevent_req *dcerpc_read_ncacn_packet_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct tevent_context *ev,
+ struct tstream_context *stream);
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From 4fda096df6005abdb964032bd4017da6496c1b50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 13:05:01 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 05/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: move AS/U hack to the top
+ of cli_pipe_validate_current_pdu()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 665b874b6022bfcdec3f13a9f5a844e5d1784aba)
+---
+ source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c | 24 +++++++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+index 5ddabb7..295b88f 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+@@ -414,6 +414,19 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_pipe_validate_current_pdu(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ */
+ *rdata = *pdu;
+
++ if ((pkt->ptype == DCERPC_PKT_BIND_ACK) &&
++ !(pkt->pfc_flags & DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST)) {
++ /*
++ * TODO: do we still need this hack which was introduced
++ * in commit a42afcdcc7ab9aa9ed193ae36d3dbb10843447f0.
++ *
++ * I don't even know what AS/U might be...
++ */
++ DEBUG(5, (__location__ ": bug in server (AS/U?), setting "
++ "fragment first/last ON.\n"));
++ pkt->pfc_flags |= DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST | DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST;
++ }
++
+ /* Ensure we have the correct type. */
+ switch (pkt->ptype) {
+ case DCERPC_PKT_ALTER_RESP:
+@@ -518,17 +531,6 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_pipe_validate_current_pdu(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+- /* Do this just before return - we don't want to modify any rpc header
+- data before now as we may have needed to do cryptographic actions on
+- it before. */
+-
+- if ((pkt->ptype == DCERPC_PKT_BIND_ACK) &&
+- !(pkt->pfc_flags & DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST)) {
+- DEBUG(5, (__location__ ": bug in server (AS/U?), setting "
+- "fragment first/last ON.\n"));
+- pkt->pfc_flags |= DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST | DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST;
+- }
+-
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From e0d9dfcb27d6d76f819c32db4c1f3dd720f7c964 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 13:05:01 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 06/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: remove useless
+ frag_length check in rpc_api_pipe_got_pdu()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+dcerpc_pull_ncacn_packet() already verifies this.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 9a3f045244b12ff9f77d2664396137c390042297)
+---
+ source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c | 8 --------
+ 1 file changed, 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+index 295b88f..2787fbc 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+@@ -898,14 +898,6 @@ static void rpc_api_pipe_got_pdu(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+ return;
+ }
+
+- if (state->incoming_frag.length != state->pkt->frag_length) {
+- DEBUG(5, ("Incorrect pdu length %u, expected %u\n",
+- (unsigned int)state->incoming_frag.length,
+- (unsigned int)state->pkt->frag_length));
+- tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+- return;
+- }
+-
+ status = cli_pipe_validate_current_pdu(state,
+ state->cli, state->pkt,
+ &state->incoming_frag,
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From 39c53a768b5b4eac7a644d4bd1afeb1cd7fb8ef1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2015 08:10:46 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 07/40] CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: no authentication is
+ indicated by pkt->auth_length == 0
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+pkt->u.*.auth_info.length is not the correct thing to check.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(packported from commit c0236de09e542dbb168969d8ae9f0c150a75198e)
+---
+ source4/rpc_server/dcesrv_auth.c | 23 ++++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/dcesrv_auth.c b/source4/rpc_server/dcesrv_auth.c
+index 1e6aa24..61f2176 100644
+--- a/source4/rpc_server/dcesrv_auth.c
++++ b/source4/rpc_server/dcesrv_auth.c
+@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ bool dcesrv_auth_bind(struct dcesrv_call_state *call)
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ uint32_t auth_length;
+
+- if (pkt->u.bind.auth_info.length == 0) {
++ if (pkt->auth_length == 0) {
+ dce_conn->auth_state.auth_info = NULL;
+ return true;
+ }
+@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ NTSTATUS dcesrv_auth_bind_ack(struct dcesrv_call_state *call, struct ncacn_packe
+ struct dcesrv_connection *dce_conn = call->conn;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+
+- if (!call->conn->auth_state.gensec_security) {
++ if (call->pkt.auth_length == 0) {
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+@@ -155,10 +155,16 @@ bool dcesrv_auth_auth3(struct dcesrv_call_state *call)
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ uint32_t auth_length;
+
+- /* We can't work without an existing gensec state, and an new blob to feed it */
+- if (!dce_conn->auth_state.auth_info ||
+- !dce_conn->auth_state.gensec_security ||
+- pkt->u.auth3.auth_info.length == 0) {
++ if (pkt->auth_length == 0) {
++ return false;
++ }
++
++ if (!dce_conn->auth_state.auth_info) {
++ return false;
++ }
++
++ /* We can't work without an existing gensec state */
++ if (!dce_conn->auth_state.gensec_security) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+@@ -203,7 +209,7 @@ bool dcesrv_auth_alter(struct dcesrv_call_state *call)
+ uint32_t auth_length;
+
+ /* on a pure interface change there is no auth blob */
+- if (pkt->u.alter.auth_info.length == 0) {
++ if (pkt->auth_length == 0) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+@@ -238,8 +244,7 @@ NTSTATUS dcesrv_auth_alter_ack(struct dcesrv_call_state *call, struct ncacn_pack
+
+ /* on a pure interface change there is no auth_info structure
+ setup */
+- if (!call->conn->auth_state.auth_info ||
+- dce_conn->auth_state.auth_info->credentials.length == 0) {
++ if (call->pkt.auth_length == 0) {
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From f37e77ea11f691fe0717797890c0ac2d4fc76792 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Sat, 27 Jun 2015 10:31:48 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 08/40] CVE-2015-5370: s4:librpc/rpc: check pkt->auth_length
+ before calling dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
+(backported from 630dcb55ad7a3a89bcd8643c98a5cdbfb8735ef7)
+---
+ source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.c | 13 ++++++++++---
+ source4/rpc_server/dcesrv_auth.c | 5 +++++
+ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.c b/source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.c
+index 742d710..cfbccd6 100644
+--- a/source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.c
++++ b/source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.c
+@@ -701,6 +701,14 @@ static NTSTATUS ncacn_pull_request_auth(struct dcecli_connection *c, TALLOC_CTX
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_LEVEL;
+ }
+
++ if (pkt->auth_length == 0) {
++ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE;
++ }
++
++ if (c->security_state.generic_state == NULL) {
++ return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++ }
++
+ status = dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(pkt, mem_ctx,
+ &pkt->u.response.stub_and_verifier,
+ &auth, &auth_length, false);
+@@ -1074,7 +1082,7 @@ static void dcerpc_bind_recv_handler(struct rpc_request *req,
+ }
+
+ /* the bind_ack might contain a reply set of credentials */
+- if (conn->security_state.auth_info && pkt->u.bind_ack.auth_info.length) {
++ if (conn->security_state.auth_info && pkt->auth_length) {
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ uint32_t auth_length;
+ status = dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(pkt, conn, &pkt->u.bind_ack.auth_info,
+@@ -1847,8 +1855,7 @@ static void dcerpc_alter_recv_handler(struct rpc_request *req,
+ }
+
+ /* the alter_resp might contain a reply set of credentials */
+- if (recv_pipe->conn->security_state.auth_info &&
+- pkt->u.alter_resp.auth_info.length) {
++ if (recv_pipe->conn->security_state.auth_info && pkt->auth_length) {
+ struct dcecli_connection *conn = recv_pipe->conn;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ uint32_t auth_length;
+diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/dcesrv_auth.c b/source4/rpc_server/dcesrv_auth.c
+index 61f2176..3051c1c 100644
+--- a/source4/rpc_server/dcesrv_auth.c
++++ b/source4/rpc_server/dcesrv_auth.c
+@@ -320,6 +320,11 @@ bool dcesrv_auth_request(struct dcesrv_call_state *call, DATA_BLOB *full_packet)
+ return false;
+ }
+
++ if (pkt->auth_length == 0) {
++ DEBUG(1,("dcesrv_auth_request: unexpected auth_length of 0\n"));
++ return false;
++ }
++
+ status = dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(pkt, call,
+ &pkt->u.request.stub_and_verifier,
+ &auth, &auth_length, false);
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From d3e41f6a15df3669b52009e48ce808b50bb837e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2015 01:19:57 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 09/40] CVE-2015-5370: librpc/rpc: don't allow pkt->auth_length
+ == 0 in dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+All callers should have already checked that.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 1ed83c7657a3b405db1928db06c29f41d2738186)
+---
+ librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c b/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
+index 2f599d5..89b7597 100644
+--- a/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
++++ b/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
+@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(const struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
+ }
+
+ /* Paranoia checks for auth_length. The caller should check this... */
++ if (pkt->auth_length == 0) {
++ return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++ }
++
++ /* Paranoia checks for auth_length. The caller should check this... */
+ if (pkt->auth_length > pkt->frag_length) {
+ return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From fc994e4614d7ff43736ff2a516d42bb43b7c8ec9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2015 07:59:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 10/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:librpc/rpc: remove auth trailer and
+ possible padding within dcerpc_check_auth()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This simplifies the callers a lot.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit df3cdf072d1c1e6fd0a58e0374348758f5c65a49)
+---
+ source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h | 5 ++---
+ source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------
+ source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c | 33 ++++++++++-----------------------
+ source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 17 +----------------
+ 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h
+index d14d8e0..e7cca9e 100644
+--- a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h
++++ b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h
+@@ -85,9 +85,8 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_add_auth_footer(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
+ NTSTATUS dcerpc_check_auth(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
+ struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
+ DATA_BLOB *pkt_trailer,
+- size_t header_size,
+- DATA_BLOB *raw_pkt,
+- size_t *pad_len);
++ uint8_t header_size,
++ DATA_BLOB *raw_pkt);
+
+ /* The following definitions come from librpc/rpc/rpc_common.c */
+
+diff --git a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
+index 76f2acc..d871339 100644
+--- a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
++++ b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
+@@ -844,19 +844,18 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_add_auth_footer(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
+ *
+ * @param auth The auth data for the connection
+ * @param pkt The actual ncacn_packet
+-* @param pkt_trailer The stub_and_verifier part of the packet
++* @param pkt_trailer [in][out] The stub_and_verifier part of the packet,
++* the auth_trailer and padding will be removed.
+ * @param header_size The header size
+ * @param raw_pkt The whole raw packet data blob
+-* @param pad_len [out] The padding length used in the packet
+ *
+ * @return A NTSTATUS error code
+ */
+ NTSTATUS dcerpc_check_auth(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
+ struct ncacn_packet *pkt,
+ DATA_BLOB *pkt_trailer,
+- size_t header_size,
+- DATA_BLOB *raw_pkt,
+- size_t *pad_len)
++ uint8_t header_size,
++ DATA_BLOB *raw_pkt)
+ {
+ struct schannel_state *schannel_auth;
+ struct auth_ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_ctx;
+@@ -868,6 +867,14 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_check_auth(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
+ DATA_BLOB full_pkt;
+ DATA_BLOB data;
+
++ /*
++ * These check should be done in the caller.
++ */
++ SMB_ASSERT(raw_pkt->length == pkt->frag_length);
++ SMB_ASSERT(header_size <= pkt->frag_length);
++ SMB_ASSERT(pkt_trailer->length < pkt->frag_length);
++ SMB_ASSERT((pkt_trailer->length + header_size) <= pkt->frag_length);
++
+ switch (auth->auth_level) {
+ case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY:
+ DEBUG(10, ("Requested Privacy.\n"));
+@@ -881,7 +888,6 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_check_auth(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
+ if (pkt->auth_length != 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+- *pad_len = 0;
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+
+ case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE:
+@@ -890,7 +896,6 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_check_auth(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
+ "authenticated connection!\n"));
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+- *pad_len = 0;
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+
+ default:
+@@ -909,10 +914,11 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_check_auth(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
+ return status;
+ }
+
++ pkt_trailer->length -= auth_length;
+ data = data_blob_const(raw_pkt->data + header_size,
+- pkt_trailer->length - auth_length);
+- full_pkt = data_blob_const(raw_pkt->data,
+- raw_pkt->length - auth_info.credentials.length);
++ pkt_trailer->length);
++ full_pkt = data_blob_const(raw_pkt->data, raw_pkt->length);
++ full_pkt.length -= auth_info.credentials.length;
+
+ switch (auth->auth_type) {
+ case DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE:
+@@ -988,10 +994,13 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_check_auth(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
+ * pkt_trailer actually has a copy of the raw data, and they
+ * are still both used in later calls */
+ if (auth->auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
++ if (pkt_trailer->length != data.length) {
++ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
++ }
+ memcpy(pkt_trailer->data, data.data, data.length);
+ }
+
+- *pad_len = auth_info.auth_pad_length;
++ pkt_trailer->length -= auth_info.auth_pad_length;
+ data_blob_free(&auth_info.credentials);
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+index 2787fbc..776e2bf 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+@@ -404,9 +404,9 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_pipe_validate_current_pdu(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ DATA_BLOB *rdata,
+ DATA_BLOB *reply_pdu)
+ {
+- struct dcerpc_response *r;
++ const struct dcerpc_response *r = NULL;
++ DATA_BLOB tmp_stub = data_blob_null;
+ NTSTATUS ret = NT_STATUS_OK;
+- size_t pad_len = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Point the return values at the real data including the RPC
+@@ -440,37 +440,24 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_pipe_validate_current_pdu(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+
+ r = &pkt->u.response;
+
++ tmp_stub.data = r->stub_and_verifier.data;
++ tmp_stub.length = r->stub_and_verifier.length;
++
+ /* Here's where we deal with incoming sign/seal. */
+ ret = dcerpc_check_auth(cli->auth, pkt,
+- &r->stub_and_verifier,
++ &tmp_stub,
+ DCERPC_RESPONSE_LENGTH,
+- pdu, &pad_len);
++ pdu);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+- if (pkt->frag_length < DCERPC_RESPONSE_LENGTH + pad_len) {
+- return NT_STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+- }
+-
+ /* Point the return values at the NDR data. */
+- rdata->data = r->stub_and_verifier.data;
+-
+- if (pkt->auth_length) {
+- /* We've already done integer wrap tests in
+- * dcerpc_check_auth(). */
+- rdata->length = r->stub_and_verifier.length
+- - pad_len
+- - DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH
+- - pkt->auth_length;
+- } else {
+- rdata->length = r->stub_and_verifier.length;
+- }
++ *rdata = tmp_stub;
+
+- DEBUG(10, ("Got pdu len %lu, data_len %lu, ss_len %u\n",
++ DEBUG(10, ("Got pdu len %lu, data_len %lu\n",
+ (long unsigned int)pdu->length,
+- (long unsigned int)rdata->length,
+- (unsigned int)pad_len));
++ (long unsigned int)rdata->length));
+
+ /*
+ * If this is the first reply, and the allocation hint is
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+index 964b843..0ab7dc6 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+@@ -1848,7 +1848,6 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_auth_request(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
+ {
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ size_t hdr_size = DCERPC_REQUEST_LENGTH;
+- size_t pad_len;
+
+ DEBUG(10, ("Checking request auth.\n"));
+
+@@ -1859,25 +1858,11 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_auth_request(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
+ /* in case of sealing this function will unseal the data in place */
+ status = dcerpc_check_auth(auth, pkt,
+ &pkt->u.request.stub_and_verifier,
+- hdr_size, raw_pkt,
+- &pad_len);
++ hdr_size, raw_pkt);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ return status;
+ }
+
+-
+- /* remove padding and auth trailer,
+- * this way the caller will get just the data */
+- if (pkt->auth_length) {
+- size_t trail_len = pad_len
+- + DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH
+- + pkt->auth_length;
+- if (pkt->u.request.stub_and_verifier.length < trail_len) {
+- return NT_STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
+- }
+- pkt->u.request.stub_and_verifier.length -= trail_len;
+- }
+-
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From 79bd5e74ad984a4f805e34bff5c4199da522c923 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2015 07:59:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 11/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:librpc/rpc: let dcerpc_check_auth()
+ auth_{type,level} against the expected values.
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 19f489d32c03ff5fafd34fe86a075d782af1989a)
+---
+ source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
+index d871339..c07835f 100644
+--- a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
++++ b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
+@@ -914,6 +914,14 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_check_auth(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
+ return status;
+ }
+
++ if (auth_info.auth_type != auth->auth_type) {
++ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
++ }
++
++ if (auth_info.auth_level != auth->auth_level) {
++ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
++ }
++
+ pkt_trailer->length -= auth_length;
+ data = data_blob_const(raw_pkt->data + header_size,
+ pkt_trailer->length);
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From acabcb860d2e77b5b8ef878696b4405599f8c761 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 13:05:01 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 12/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: make use of
+ dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The does much more validation than dcerpc_pull_dcerpc_auth().
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit acea87f158f02c3240abff45c3e54c7d5fa60b29)
+---
+ source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c | 20 ++++++--------------
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+index 776e2bf..27e37f8 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+@@ -1938,20 +1938,15 @@ static void rpc_pipe_bind_step_one_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+ rpc_pipe_bind_step_two_trigger(req);
+ return;
+
+- case DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NTLMSSP:
+- case DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO:
+- case DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_KRB5:
+- /* Paranoid lenght checks */
+- if (pkt->frag_length < DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH
+- + pkt->auth_length) {
+- tevent_req_nterror(req,
+- NT_STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
++ default:
++ if (pkt->auth_length == 0) {
++ tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
+ return;
+ }
+ /* get auth credentials */
+- status = dcerpc_pull_dcerpc_auth(talloc_tos(),
+- &pkt->u.bind_ack.auth_info,
+- &auth, false);
++ status = dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(pkt, talloc_tos(),
++ &pkt->u.bind_ack.auth_info,
++ &auth, NULL, true);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Failed to pull dcerpc auth: %s.\n",
+ nt_errstr(status)));
+@@ -1959,9 +1954,6 @@ static void rpc_pipe_bind_step_one_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+ return;
+ }
+ break;
+-
+- default:
+- goto err_out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From adf098f191acd3cb6ba2b8893b6c259af66d8696 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 13:05:01 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 13/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: make use of
+ dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header() in cli_pipe_validate_current_pdu()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 81bbffa14f5f6faa9801a3bf2d564d2762d49bb6)
+---
+ source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c | 111 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 96 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+index 27e37f8..6a22d38 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+@@ -429,17 +429,89 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_pipe_validate_current_pdu(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+
+ /* Ensure we have the correct type. */
+ switch (pkt->ptype) {
+- case DCERPC_PKT_ALTER_RESP:
++ case DCERPC_PKT_BIND_NAK:
++ DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": Bind NACK received from %s!\n",
++ rpccli_pipe_txt(talloc_tos(), cli)));
++
++ ret = dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header(pkt,
++ DCERPC_PKT_BIND_NAK,
++ 0, /* max_auth_info */
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST,
++ 0); /* optional flags */
++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
++ DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": Connection to %s got an unexpected "
++ "RPC packet type - %u, expected %u: %s\n",
++ rpccli_pipe_txt(talloc_tos(), cli),
++ pkt->ptype, expected_pkt_type,
++ nt_errstr(ret)));
++ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
++ return ret;
++ }
++
++ /* Use this for now... */
++ return NT_STATUS_NETWORK_ACCESS_DENIED;
++
+ case DCERPC_PKT_BIND_ACK:
++ ret = dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header(pkt,
++ expected_pkt_type,
++ pkt->u.bind_ack.auth_info.length,
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST,
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_CONC_MPX |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_SUPPORT_HEADER_SIGN);
++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
++ DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": Connection to %s got an unexpected "
++ "RPC packet type - %u, expected %u: %s\n",
++ rpccli_pipe_txt(talloc_tos(), cli),
++ pkt->ptype, expected_pkt_type,
++ nt_errstr(ret)));
++ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
++ return ret;
++ }
+
+- /* Client code never receives this kind of packets */
+ break;
+
++ case DCERPC_PKT_ALTER_RESP:
++ ret = dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header(pkt,
++ expected_pkt_type,
++ pkt->u.alter_resp.auth_info.length,
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST,
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_CONC_MPX |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_SUPPORT_HEADER_SIGN);
++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
++ DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": Connection to %s got an unexpected "
++ "RPC packet type - %u, expected %u: %s\n",
++ rpccli_pipe_txt(talloc_tos(), cli),
++ pkt->ptype, expected_pkt_type,
++ nt_errstr(ret)));
++ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
++ return ret;
++ }
++
++ break;
+
+ case DCERPC_PKT_RESPONSE:
+
+ r = &pkt->u.response;
+
++ ret = dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header(pkt,
++ expected_pkt_type,
++ r->stub_and_verifier.length,
++ 0, /* required_flags */
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST);
++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
++ DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": Connection to %s got an unexpected "
++ "RPC packet type - %u, expected %u: %s\n",
++ rpccli_pipe_txt(talloc_tos(), cli),
++ pkt->ptype, expected_pkt_type,
++ nt_errstr(ret)));
++ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
++ return ret;
++ }
++
+ tmp_stub.data = r->stub_and_verifier.data;
+ tmp_stub.length = r->stub_and_verifier.length;
+
+@@ -449,6 +521,12 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_pipe_validate_current_pdu(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ DCERPC_RESPONSE_LENGTH,
+ pdu);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
++ DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": Connection to %s got an unexpected "
++ "RPC packet type - %u, expected %u: %s\n",
++ rpccli_pipe_txt(talloc_tos(), cli),
++ pkt->ptype, expected_pkt_type,
++ nt_errstr(ret)));
++ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+@@ -478,14 +556,24 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_pipe_validate_current_pdu(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+
+ break;
+
+- case DCERPC_PKT_BIND_NAK:
+- DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": Bind NACK received from %s!\n",
+- rpccli_pipe_txt(talloc_tos(), cli)));
+- /* Use this for now... */
+- return NT_STATUS_NETWORK_ACCESS_DENIED;
+-
+ case DCERPC_PKT_FAULT:
+
++ ret = dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header(pkt,
++ DCERPC_PKT_FAULT,
++ 0, /* max_auth_info */
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST,
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_DID_NOT_EXECUTE);
++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
++ DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": Connection to %s got an unexpected "
++ "RPC packet type - %u, expected %u: %s\n",
++ rpccli_pipe_txt(talloc_tos(), cli),
++ pkt->ptype, expected_pkt_type,
++ nt_errstr(ret)));
++ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
++ return ret;
++ }
++
+ DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": RPC fault code %s received "
+ "from %s!\n",
+ dcerpc_errstr(talloc_tos(),
+@@ -502,13 +590,6 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_pipe_validate_current_pdu(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+- if (pkt->ptype != expected_pkt_type) {
+- DEBUG(3, (__location__ ": Connection to %s got an unexpected "
+- "RPC packet type - %u, not %u\n",
+- rpccli_pipe_txt(talloc_tos(), cli),
+- pkt->ptype, expected_pkt_type));
+- return NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+- }
+
+ if (pkt->call_id != call_id) {
+ DEBUG(3, (__location__ ": Connection to %s got an unexpected "
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From 46c9eb371fda87c5b0c5ba30e95c4f4992c9dd00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2015 14:48:38 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 14/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: protect
+ rpc_api_pipe_got_pdu() against too large payloads
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 98182969e761429e577064e1a0fd5cbc6b50d7d9)
+---
+ source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+index 6a22d38..755b458 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+@@ -1007,6 +1007,11 @@ static void rpc_api_pipe_got_pdu(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+ return;
+ }
+
++ if (state->reply_pdu_offset + rdata.length > MAX_RPC_DATA_SIZE) {
++ tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
++ return;
++ }
++
+ /* Now copy the data portion out of the pdu into rbuf. */
+ if (state->reply_pdu.length < state->reply_pdu_offset + rdata.length) {
+ if (!data_blob_realloc(NULL, &state->reply_pdu,
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From e7866caecb0433d490172f3b262280a7d6902c4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 22:51:18 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 15/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: verify auth_{type,level}
+ in rpc_pipe_bind_step_one_done()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit df51c22bea7fbf906613ceb160f16f298b2e3106)
+---
+ source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+index 755b458..1c4ff01 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+@@ -2039,6 +2039,21 @@ static void rpc_pipe_bind_step_one_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+ tevent_req_nterror(req, status);
+ return;
+ }
++
++ if (auth.auth_type != pauth->auth_type) {
++ DEBUG(0, (__location__ " Auth type %u mismatch expected %u.\n",
++ auth.auth_type, pauth->auth_type));
++ tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
++ return;
++ }
++
++ if (auth.auth_level != pauth->auth_level) {
++ DEBUG(0, (__location__ " Auth level %u mismatch expected %u.\n",
++ auth.auth_level, pauth->auth_level));
++ tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
++ return;
++ }
++
+ break;
+ }
+
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From b73d83a791237fe0262b4dcca8adf16b457eb188 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 13:05:01 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 16/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: make use of
+ dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer() in api_pipe_{bind_req,alter_context,bind_auth3}()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 2a92546590a78760d2fe0e63067a3888dbce53be)
+---
+ source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 62 +++++++++----------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+index 0ab7dc6..40b1b8e 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+@@ -1012,25 +1012,12 @@ static bool api_pipe_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ * Check if this is an authenticated bind request.
+ */
+ if (pkt->auth_length) {
+- /* Quick length check. Won't catch a bad auth footer,
+- * prevents overrun. */
+-
+- if (pkt->frag_length < RPC_HEADER_LEN +
+- DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH +
+- pkt->auth_length) {
+- DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: auth_len (%u) "
+- "too long for fragment %u.\n",
+- (unsigned int)pkt->auth_length,
+- (unsigned int)pkt->frag_length));
+- goto err_exit;
+- }
+-
+ /*
+ * Decode the authentication verifier.
+ */
+- status = dcerpc_pull_dcerpc_auth(pkt,
+- &pkt->u.bind.auth_info,
+- &auth_info, p->endian);
++ status = dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(pkt, pkt,
++ &pkt->u.bind.auth_info,
++ &auth_info, NULL, true);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Unable to unmarshall dcerpc_auth.\n"));
+ goto err_exit;
+@@ -1233,23 +1220,13 @@ bool api_pipe_bind_auth3(struct pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+- /* Ensure there's enough data for an authenticated request. */
+- if (pkt->frag_length < RPC_HEADER_LEN
+- + DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH
+- + pkt->auth_length) {
+- DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_ntlmssp_auth_process: auth_len "
+- "%u is too large.\n",
+- (unsigned int)pkt->auth_length));
+- goto err;
+- }
+-
+ /*
+ * Decode the authentication verifier response.
+ */
+
+- status = dcerpc_pull_dcerpc_auth(pkt,
+- &pkt->u.auth3.auth_info,
+- &auth_info, p->endian);
++ status = dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(pkt, pkt,
++ &pkt->u.auth3.auth_info,
++ &auth_info, NULL, true);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Failed to unmarshall dcerpc_auth.\n"));
+ goto err;
+@@ -1382,34 +1359,21 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ * Check if this is an authenticated alter context request.
+ */
+ if (pkt->auth_length) {
+- /* Quick length check. Won't catch a bad auth footer,
+- * prevents overrun. */
+-
+- if (pkt->frag_length < RPC_HEADER_LEN +
+- DCERPC_AUTH_TRAILER_LENGTH +
+- pkt->auth_length) {
+- DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_alter_context: auth_len (%u) "
+- "too long for fragment %u.\n",
+- (unsigned int)pkt->auth_length,
+- (unsigned int)pkt->frag_length ));
++ /* We can only finish if the pipe is unbound for now */
++ if (p->pipe_bound) {
++ DEBUG(0, (__location__ ": Pipe already bound, "
++ "Altering Context not yet supported!\n"));
+ goto err_exit;
+ }
+
+- status = dcerpc_pull_dcerpc_auth(pkt,
+- &pkt->u.bind.auth_info,
+- &auth_info, p->endian);
++ status = dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(pkt, pkt,
++ &pkt->u.bind.auth_info,
++ &auth_info, NULL, true);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Unable to unmarshall dcerpc_auth.\n"));
+ goto err_exit;
+ }
+
+- /* We can only finish if the pipe is unbound for now */
+- if (p->pipe_bound) {
+- DEBUG(0, (__location__ ": Pipe already bound, "
+- "Altering Context not yet supported!\n"));
+- goto err_exit;
+- }
+-
+ if (auth_info.auth_type != p->auth.auth_type) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Auth type mismatch! Client sent %d, "
+ "but auth was started as type %d!\n",
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From 06e5f78341fbe220bd9fb8e27a7f2f8f4e593fa6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2015 12:38:55 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 17/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: let a failing
+ sec_verification_trailer mark the connection as broken
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 189c0fbb7a3405f0893f23e5b8d755d259f98eaf)
+---
+ source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+index 40b1b8e..da9b91c 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+@@ -1663,6 +1663,7 @@ static bool api_pipe_request(struct pipes_struct *p,
+
+ if (!srv_pipe_check_verification_trailer(p, pkt, pipe_fns)) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("srv_pipe_check_verification_trailer: failed\n"));
++ set_incoming_fault(p);
+ setup_fault_pdu(p, NT_STATUS(DCERPC_FAULT_ACCESS_DENIED));
+ data_blob_free(&p->out_data.rdata);
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From 38ff4f5913f5a323b635253748684f98fc63549c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 13:05:01 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 18/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: don't ignore failures of
+ dcerpc_push_ncacn_packet()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 25bf597124f217c55b5ca71a5ea9cb0ea83943e5)
+---
+ source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+index da9b91c..71b4665 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+@@ -1152,6 +1152,7 @@ static bool api_pipe_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Failed to marshall bind_ack packet. (%s)\n",
+ nt_errstr(status)));
++ goto err_exit;
+ }
+
+ if (auth_resp.length) {
+@@ -1469,6 +1470,7 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Failed to marshall bind_ack packet. (%s)\n",
+ nt_errstr(status)));
++ goto err_exit;
+ }
+
+ if (auth_resp.length) {
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From c24152e5778bcdc1f252bbbeacb89af0c6f4f578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 13:05:01 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 19/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: don't allow auth3 if the
+ authentication was already finished
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 69280e6acef7c3941407d4308b659c5e90ed702d)
+---
+ source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+index 71b4665..4e5b50d4 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+@@ -1216,8 +1216,15 @@ bool api_pipe_bind_auth3(struct pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
+
+ DEBUG(5, ("api_pipe_bind_auth3: decode request. %d\n", __LINE__));
+
++ /* We can only finish if the pipe is unbound for now */
++ if (p->pipe_bound) {
++ DEBUG(0, (__location__ ": Pipe already bound, "
++ "AUTH3 not supported!\n"));
++ goto err;
++ }
++
+ if (pkt->auth_length == 0) {
+- DEBUG(0, ("No auth field sent for bind request!\n"));
++ DEBUG(1, ("No auth field sent for auth3 request!\n"));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From 1156d7445ed3c86af2610f0bfd2ea38831010726 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 16:18:45 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 20/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: let a failing auth3 mark
+ the authentication as invalid
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 8c96ef7b4fbd925607b26d351b14ad9a95febd88)
+---
+ source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+index 4e5b50d4..d28ba8e 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+@@ -1304,7 +1304,7 @@ bool api_pipe_bind_auth3(struct pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
+ return true;
+
+ err:
+-
++ p->pipe_bound = false;
+ TALLOC_FREE(p->auth.auth_ctx);
+ return false;
+ }
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From da145d9e8a4c1b5d507734b599563fdb0fff90a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 13:05:01 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 21/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: make sure auth_level
+ isn't changed by alter_context or auth3
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 63d21d2546a1064be73582a499ec15b0e11e2708)
+---
+ source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 13 +++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+index d28ba8e..1b81a4c 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+@@ -1252,6 +1252,13 @@ bool api_pipe_bind_auth3(struct pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
++ if (auth_info.auth_level != p->auth.auth_level) {
++ DEBUG(1, ("Auth level mismatch! Client sent %d, "
++ "but auth was started as level %d!\n",
++ auth_info.auth_level, p->auth.auth_level));
++ goto err;
++ }
++
+ switch (auth_info.auth_type) {
+ case DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NTLMSSP:
+ ntlmssp_ctx = talloc_get_type_abort(p->auth.auth_ctx,
+@@ -1389,6 +1396,12 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ goto err_exit;
+ }
+
++ if (auth_info.auth_level != p->auth.auth_level) {
++ DEBUG(0, ("Auth level mismatch! Client sent %d, "
++ "but auth was started as level %d!\n",
++ auth_info.auth_level, p->auth.auth_level));
++ goto err_exit;
++ }
+
+ switch (auth_info.auth_type) {
+ case DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO:
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From 7a313b254fda2b7577a60bfb9d07ccd9c745abdf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 09:15:39 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 22/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: ensure that the message
+ ordering doesn't violate the spec
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The first pdu is always a BIND.
+
+REQUEST pdus are only allowed once the authentication
+is finished.
+
+A simple anonymous authentication is finished after the BIND.
+Real authentication may need additional ALTER or AUTH3 exchanges.
+
+Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 0239bfa562ee303c4ac204375b3c66ca287f6cb0)
+---
+ source3/include/ntdomain.h | 7 ++++++
+ source3/rpc_server/rpc_ncacn_np.c | 1 +
+ source3/rpc_server/rpc_server.c | 1 +
+ source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ 4 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/include/ntdomain.h b/source3/include/ntdomain.h
+index 650f1d0..b3c5451 100644
+--- a/source3/include/ntdomain.h
++++ b/source3/include/ntdomain.h
+@@ -139,6 +139,13 @@ struct pipes_struct {
+ bool pipe_bound;
+
+ /*
++ * States we can be in.
++ */
++ bool allow_alter;
++ bool allow_bind;
++ bool allow_auth3;
++
++ /*
+ * Set the DCERPC_FAULT to return.
+ */
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/rpc_ncacn_np.c b/source3/rpc_server/rpc_ncacn_np.c
+index efdee27..f2e9d10 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/rpc_ncacn_np.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_server/rpc_ncacn_np.c
+@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ struct pipes_struct *make_internal_rpc_pipe_p(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+
+ p->syntax = *syntax;
+ p->transport = NCALRPC;
++ p->allow_bind = true;
+
+ DEBUG(4,("Created internal pipe %s (pipes_open=%d)\n",
+ get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), syntax), pipes_open));
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/rpc_server.c b/source3/rpc_server/rpc_server.c
+index 8ec55bb..376d26a 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/rpc_server.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_server/rpc_server.c
+@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ static int make_server_pipes_struct(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ p->syntax = id;
+ p->transport = transport;
+ p->ncalrpc_as_system = ncalrpc_as_system;
++ p->allow_bind = true;
+
+ p->mem_ctx = talloc_named(p, 0, "pipe %s %p", pipe_name, p);
+ if (!p->mem_ctx) {
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+index 1b81a4c..41111aa 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+@@ -279,6 +279,9 @@ static bool setup_bind_nak(struct pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
+ p->auth.auth_level = DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE;
+ p->auth.auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
+ p->pipe_bound = False;
++ p->allow_bind = false;
++ p->allow_alter = false;
++ p->allow_auth3 = false;
+
+ return True;
+ }
+@@ -828,6 +831,11 @@ static NTSTATUS pipe_auth_verify_final(struct pipes_struct *p)
+ void *mech_ctx;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+
++ if (p->auth.auth_type == DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE) {
++ p->pipe_bound = true;
++ return NT_STATUS_OK;
++ }
++
+ switch (p->auth.auth_type) {
+ case DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NTLMSSP:
+ ntlmssp_ctx = talloc_get_type_abort(p->auth.auth_ctx,
+@@ -919,13 +927,11 @@ static bool api_pipe_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ DATA_BLOB auth_resp = data_blob_null;
+ DATA_BLOB auth_blob = data_blob_null;
+
+- /* No rebinds on a bound pipe - use alter context. */
+- if (p->pipe_bound) {
+- DEBUG(2,("api_pipe_bind_req: rejecting bind request on bound "
+- "pipe %s.\n",
+- get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), &p->syntax)));
++ if (!p->allow_bind) {
++ DEBUG(2,("Pipe not in allow bind state\n"));
+ return setup_bind_nak(p, pkt);
+ }
++ p->allow_bind = false;
+
+ if (pkt->u.bind.num_contexts == 0) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("api_pipe_bind_req: no rpc contexts around\n"));
+@@ -1192,6 +1198,22 @@ static bool api_pipe_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0;
+
+ TALLOC_FREE(auth_blob.data);
++
++ if (bind_ack_ctx.result == 0) {
++ p->allow_alter = true;
++ p->allow_auth3 = true;
++ if (p->auth.auth_type == DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE) {
++ status = pipe_auth_verify_final(p);
++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
++ DEBUG(0, ("pipe_auth_verify_final failed: %s\n",
++ nt_errstr(status)));
++ goto err_exit;
++ }
++ }
++ } else {
++ goto err_exit;
++ }
++
+ return True;
+
+ err_exit:
+@@ -1216,6 +1238,11 @@ bool api_pipe_bind_auth3(struct pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
+
+ DEBUG(5, ("api_pipe_bind_auth3: decode request. %d\n", __LINE__));
+
++ if (!p->allow_auth3) {
++ DEBUG(1, ("Pipe not in allow auth3 state.\n"));
++ goto err;
++ }
++
+ /* We can only finish if the pipe is unbound for now */
+ if (p->pipe_bound) {
+ DEBUG(0, (__location__ ": Pipe already bound, "
+@@ -1312,6 +1339,10 @@ bool api_pipe_bind_auth3(struct pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
+
+ err:
+ p->pipe_bound = false;
++ p->allow_bind = false;
++ p->allow_alter = false;
++ p->allow_auth3 = false;
++
+ TALLOC_FREE(p->auth.auth_ctx);
+ return false;
+ }
+@@ -1338,6 +1369,11 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
+
+ DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_alter_context: make response. %d\n", __LINE__));
+
++ if (!p->allow_alter) {
++ DEBUG(1, ("Pipe not in allow alter state.\n"));
++ goto err_exit;
++ }
++
+ if (pkt->u.bind.assoc_group_id != 0) {
+ assoc_gid = pkt->u.bind.assoc_group_id;
+ } else {
+@@ -1363,7 +1399,6 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ bind_ack_ctx.reason = 0;
+ bind_ack_ctx.syntax = pkt->u.bind.ctx_list[0].transfer_syntaxes[0];
+ } else {
+- p->pipe_bound = False;
+ /* Rejection reason: abstract syntax not supported */
+ bind_ack_ctx.result = DCERPC_BIND_PROVIDER_REJECT;
+ bind_ack_ctx.reason = DCERPC_BIND_REASON_ASYNTAX;
+@@ -1826,6 +1861,10 @@ void set_incoming_fault(struct pipes_struct *p)
+ p->in_data.pdu.length = 0;
+ p->fault_state = DCERPC_FAULT_CANT_PERFORM;
+
++ p->allow_alter = false;
++ p->allow_auth3 = false;
++ p->pipe_bound = false;
++
+ DEBUG(10, ("Setting fault state\n"));
+ }
+
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From 23147db714d05d113ca06d327ab65087f3420998 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 16:06:59 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 23/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: use 'alter' instead of
+ 'bind' for variables in api_pipe_alter_context()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit cdefee174d2f8920323e9e62966df4f4ced49ed3)
+---
+ source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++----------------
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+index 41111aa..382d94a 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+@@ -1359,7 +1359,7 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ uint16 assoc_gid;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ union dcerpc_payload u;
+- struct dcerpc_ack_ctx bind_ack_ctx;
++ struct dcerpc_ack_ctx alter_ack_ctx;
+ DATA_BLOB auth_resp = data_blob_null;
+ DATA_BLOB auth_blob = data_blob_null;
+ int pad_len = 0;
+@@ -1374,8 +1374,8 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ goto err_exit;
+ }
+
+- if (pkt->u.bind.assoc_group_id != 0) {
+- assoc_gid = pkt->u.bind.assoc_group_id;
++ if (pkt->u.alter.assoc_group_id != 0) {
++ assoc_gid = pkt->u.alter.assoc_group_id;
+ } else {
+ assoc_gid = 0x53f0;
+ }
+@@ -1385,24 +1385,24 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ */
+
+ /* If the requested abstract synt uuid doesn't match our client pipe,
+- reject the bind_ack & set the transfer interface synt to all 0's,
++ reject the alter_ack & set the transfer interface synt to all 0's,
+ ver 0 (observed when NT5 attempts to bind to abstract interfaces
+ unknown to NT4)
+ Needed when adding entries to a DACL from NT5 - SK */
+
+ if (check_bind_req(p,
+- &pkt->u.bind.ctx_list[0].abstract_syntax,
+- &pkt->u.bind.ctx_list[0].transfer_syntaxes[0],
+- pkt->u.bind.ctx_list[0].context_id)) {
++ &pkt->u.alter.ctx_list[0].abstract_syntax,
++ &pkt->u.alter.ctx_list[0].transfer_syntaxes[0],
++ pkt->u.alter.ctx_list[0].context_id)) {
+
+- bind_ack_ctx.result = 0;
+- bind_ack_ctx.reason = 0;
+- bind_ack_ctx.syntax = pkt->u.bind.ctx_list[0].transfer_syntaxes[0];
++ alter_ack_ctx.result = 0;
++ alter_ack_ctx.reason = 0;
++ alter_ack_ctx.syntax = pkt->u.alter.ctx_list[0].transfer_syntaxes[0];
+ } else {
+ /* Rejection reason: abstract syntax not supported */
+- bind_ack_ctx.result = DCERPC_BIND_PROVIDER_REJECT;
+- bind_ack_ctx.reason = DCERPC_BIND_REASON_ASYNTAX;
+- bind_ack_ctx.syntax = null_ndr_syntax_id;
++ alter_ack_ctx.result = DCERPC_BIND_PROVIDER_REJECT;
++ alter_ack_ctx.reason = DCERPC_BIND_REASON_ASYNTAX;
++ alter_ack_ctx.syntax = null_ndr_syntax_id;
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -1417,7 +1417,7 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ }
+
+ status = dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer(pkt, pkt,
+- &pkt->u.bind.auth_info,
++ &pkt->u.alter.auth_info,
+ &auth_info, NULL, true);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Unable to unmarshall dcerpc_auth.\n"));
+@@ -1503,7 +1503,7 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ u.alter_resp.secondary_address_size = 1;
+
+ u.alter_resp.num_results = 1;
+- u.alter_resp.ctx_list = &bind_ack_ctx;
++ u.alter_resp.ctx_list = &alter_ack_ctx;
+
+ /* NOTE: We leave the auth_info empty so we can calculate the padding
+ * later and then append the auth_info --simo */
+@@ -1523,7 +1523,7 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ &u,
+ &p->out_data.frag);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+- DEBUG(0, ("Failed to marshall bind_ack packet. (%s)\n",
++ DEBUG(0, ("Failed to marshall alter_resp packet. (%s)\n",
+ nt_errstr(status)));
+ goto err_exit;
+ }
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From bf96df45abbd32c90a561b8f444e510d4a34da0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 16:06:59 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 24/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: verify presentation
+ context arrays
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 1e6b4abac14840e4cee1afc5d4811b0f0277eade)
+---
+ source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+index 382d94a..335af2a 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+@@ -934,7 +934,12 @@ static bool api_pipe_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ p->allow_bind = false;
+
+ if (pkt->u.bind.num_contexts == 0) {
+- DEBUG(0, ("api_pipe_bind_req: no rpc contexts around\n"));
++ DEBUG(1, ("api_pipe_bind_req: no rpc contexts around\n"));
++ goto err_exit;
++ }
++
++ if (pkt->u.bind.ctx_list[0].num_transfer_syntaxes == 0) {
++ DEBUG(1, ("api_pipe_bind_req: no transfer syntaxes around\n"));
+ goto err_exit;
+ }
+
+@@ -1374,6 +1379,16 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ goto err_exit;
+ }
+
++ if (pkt->u.alter.num_contexts == 0) {
++ DEBUG(1, ("api_pipe_alter_context: no rpc contexts around\n"));
++ goto err_exit;
++ }
++
++ if (pkt->u.alter.ctx_list[0].num_transfer_syntaxes == 0) {
++ DEBUG(1, ("api_pipe_alter_context: no transfer syntaxes around\n"));
++ goto err_exit;
++ }
++
+ if (pkt->u.alter.assoc_group_id != 0) {
+ assoc_gid = pkt->u.alter.assoc_group_id;
+ } else {
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From 5d564f46ae2621f99c4450d21a198b432ca0cd30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 16:06:59 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 25/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: make use of
+ dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header() to verify incoming pdus
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit e39fdceb25fc75b6f8c77c097bf8dbd2f4286618)
+---
+ source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 81 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 81 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+index 335af2a..2f404b4 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
+ #include "auth.h"
+ #include "ntdomain.h"
+ #include "rpc_server/srv_pipe.h"
++#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_dcerpc.h"
+ #include "../librpc/ndr/ndr_dcerpc.h"
+ #include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_samr.h"
+ #include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_lsa.h"
+@@ -933,6 +934,25 @@ static bool api_pipe_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ }
+ p->allow_bind = false;
+
++ status = dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header(pkt,
++ DCERPC_PKT_BIND,
++ pkt->u.bind.auth_info.length,
++ 0, /* required flags */
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_SUPPORT_HEADER_SIGN |
++ 0x08 | /* this is not defined, but should be ignored */
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_CONC_MPX |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_DID_NOT_EXECUTE |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_MAYBE |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_OBJECT_UUID);
++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
++ DEBUG(1, ("api_pipe_bind_req: invalid pdu: %s\n",
++ nt_errstr(status)));
++ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
++ goto err_exit;
++ }
++
+ if (pkt->u.bind.num_contexts == 0) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("api_pipe_bind_req: no rpc contexts around\n"));
+ goto err_exit;
+@@ -1248,6 +1268,25 @@ bool api_pipe_bind_auth3(struct pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
++ status = dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header(pkt,
++ DCERPC_PKT_AUTH3,
++ pkt->u.auth3.auth_info.length,
++ 0, /* required flags */
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_SUPPORT_HEADER_SIGN |
++ 0x08 | /* this is not defined, but should be ignored */
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_CONC_MPX |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_DID_NOT_EXECUTE |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_MAYBE |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_OBJECT_UUID);
++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
++ DEBUG(1, ("api_pipe_bind_auth3: invalid pdu: %s\n",
++ nt_errstr(status)));
++ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
+ /* We can only finish if the pipe is unbound for now */
+ if (p->pipe_bound) {
+ DEBUG(0, (__location__ ": Pipe already bound, "
+@@ -1379,6 +1418,25 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ goto err_exit;
+ }
+
++ status = dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header(pkt,
++ DCERPC_PKT_ALTER,
++ pkt->u.alter.auth_info.length,
++ 0, /* required flags */
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_SUPPORT_HEADER_SIGN |
++ 0x08 | /* this is not defined, but should be ignored */
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_CONC_MPX |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_DID_NOT_EXECUTE |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_MAYBE |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_OBJECT_UUID);
++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
++ DEBUG(1, ("api_pipe_alter_context: invalid pdu: %s\n",
++ nt_errstr(status)));
++ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
++ goto err_exit;
++ }
++
+ if (pkt->u.alter.num_contexts == 0) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("api_pipe_alter_context: no rpc contexts around\n"));
+ goto err_exit;
+@@ -1923,6 +1981,29 @@ static bool process_request_pdu(struct pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt
+ return False;
+ }
+
++ /*
++ * We don't ignore DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_PENDING_CANCEL.
++ * TODO: we can reject it with DCERPC_FAULT_NO_CALL_ACTIVE later.
++ */
++ status = dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header(pkt,
++ DCERPC_PKT_REQUEST,
++ pkt->u.request.stub_and_verifier.length,
++ 0, /* required_flags */
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_FIRST |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_LAST |
++ 0x08 | /* this is not defined, but should be ignored */
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_CONC_MPX |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_DID_NOT_EXECUTE |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_MAYBE |
++ DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_OBJECT_UUID);
++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
++ DEBUG(1, ("process_request_pdu: invalid pdu: %s\n",
++ nt_errstr(status)));
++ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(ncacn_packet, pkt);
++ set_incoming_fault(p);
++ return false;
++ }
++
+ /* Store the opnum */
+ p->opnum = pkt->u.request.opnum;
+
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From 5a53b46092399686d5c1ade79e15eb093b9d1842 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2015 12:40:58 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 26/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: disconnect the connection
+ after a fatal FAULT pdu
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 664d7ace0e68b42d2de99583757e0a985647eb4b)
+---
+ source3/rpc_server/rpc_server.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/rpc_server.c b/source3/rpc_server/rpc_server.c
+index 376d26a..3ba83e0 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/rpc_server.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_server/rpc_server.c
+@@ -664,6 +664,12 @@ static void named_pipe_packet_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
++ if (npc->p->fault_state != 0) {
++ DEBUG(2, ("Disconnect after fault\n"));
++ sys_errno = EINVAL;
++ goto fail;
++ }
++
+ /* clear out any data that may have been left around */
+ npc->count = 0;
+ TALLOC_FREE(npc->iov);
+@@ -1392,6 +1398,12 @@ static void dcerpc_ncacn_packet_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
++ if (ncacn_conn->p->fault_state != 0) {
++ DEBUG(2, ("Disconnect after fault\n"));
++ sys_errno = EINVAL;
++ goto fail;
++ }
++
+ /* clear out any data that may have been left around */
+ ncacn_conn->count = 0;
+ TALLOC_FREE(ncacn_conn->iov);
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From a895ca55f14cbdb28b7327d3a1fdbf2b5397ad96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2015 12:38:55 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 27/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: let a failing BIND mark
+ the connection as broken
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 8d97085efd8782e48d0f1162e3f56756acb99472)
+---
+ source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+index 2f404b4..6275190 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+@@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ static bool setup_bind_nak(struct pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
+ p->out_data.data_sent_length = 0;
+ p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0;
+
++ set_incoming_fault(p);
+ TALLOC_FREE(p->auth.auth_ctx);
+ p->auth.auth_level = DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE;
+ p->auth.auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From 1633842f3667442c3a5bdf683fc0dbb905755b11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2015 12:38:55 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 28/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: use
+ DCERPC_NCA_S_PROTO_ERROR FAULTs for protocol errors
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit d30363f08efb81b22055d4445977c96df3737adf)
+---
+ source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+index 6275190..3fb8855 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+@@ -1933,7 +1933,7 @@ void set_incoming_fault(struct pipes_struct *p)
+ data_blob_free(&p->in_data.data);
+ p->in_data.pdu_needed_len = 0;
+ p->in_data.pdu.length = 0;
+- p->fault_state = DCERPC_FAULT_CANT_PERFORM;
++ p->fault_state = DCERPC_NCA_S_PROTO_ERROR;
+
+ p->allow_alter = false;
+ p->allow_auth3 = false;
+@@ -2254,7 +2254,7 @@ done:
+ "pipe %s\n", get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(),
+ &p->syntax)));
+ set_incoming_fault(p);
+- setup_fault_pdu(p, NT_STATUS(DCERPC_FAULT_OP_RNG_ERROR));
++ setup_fault_pdu(p, NT_STATUS(DCERPC_NCA_S_PROTO_ERROR));
+ TALLOC_FREE(pkt);
+ } else {
+ /*
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From 62e058a6874f9ae3f1856cd9c3c52516ce350f95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2015 10:58:07 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 29/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:librpc/rpc: remove unused
+ dcerpc_pull_dcerpc_auth()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 02aef978ff8f16009a52c2d981d414d019bc8dd9)
+---
+ source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h | 4 ----
+ source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c | 41 -------------------------------------
+ 2 files changed, 45 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h
+index e7cca9e..9452e85 100644
+--- a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h
++++ b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h
+@@ -71,10 +71,6 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_push_dcerpc_auth(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ uint32_t auth_context_id,
+ const DATA_BLOB *credentials,
+ DATA_BLOB *blob);
+-NTSTATUS dcerpc_pull_dcerpc_auth(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+- const DATA_BLOB *blob,
+- struct dcerpc_auth *r,
+- bool bigendian);
+ NTSTATUS dcerpc_guess_sizes(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
+ size_t header_len, size_t data_left,
+ size_t max_xmit_frag, size_t pad_alignment,
+diff --git a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
+index c07835f..e4d0e3a 100644
+--- a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
++++ b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
+@@ -210,47 +210,6 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_push_dcerpc_auth(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ }
+
+ /**
+-* @brief Decodes a dcerpc_auth blob
+-*
+-* @param mem_ctx The memory context on which to allocate the packet
+-* elements
+-* @param blob The blob of data to decode
+-* @param r An empty dcerpc_auth structure, must not be NULL
+-*
+-* @return a NTSTATUS error code
+-*/
+-NTSTATUS dcerpc_pull_dcerpc_auth(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+- const DATA_BLOB *blob,
+- struct dcerpc_auth *r,
+- bool bigendian)
+-{
+- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
+- struct ndr_pull *ndr;
+-
+- ndr = ndr_pull_init_blob(blob, mem_ctx);
+- if (!ndr) {
+- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+- }
+- if (bigendian) {
+- ndr->flags |= LIBNDR_FLAG_BIGENDIAN;
+- }
+-
+- ndr_err = ndr_pull_dcerpc_auth(ndr, NDR_SCALARS|NDR_BUFFERS, r);
+-
+- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+- talloc_free(ndr);
+- return ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
+- }
+- talloc_free(ndr);
+-
+- if (DEBUGLEVEL >= 10) {
+- NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(dcerpc_auth, r);
+- }
+-
+- return NT_STATUS_OK;
+-}
+-
+-/**
+ * @brief Calculate how much data we can in a packet, including calculating
+ * auth token and pad lengths.
+ *
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From 34cbf85617810fb81ad27250ef6bab0efd13a5e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 13:05:01 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 30/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: check the transfer syntax
+ in check_bind_req() first
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 9464684010461947fa98d8ee084069e9cf362625)
+---
+ source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+index 3fb8855..0e6b073 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+@@ -351,16 +351,24 @@ static bool check_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ DEBUG(3,("check_bind_req for %s\n",
+ get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), abstract)));
+
++ ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(transfer, &ndr_transfer_syntax);
++ if (!ok) {
++ DEBUG(1,("check_bind_req unknown transfer syntax for "
++ "%s context_id=%u\n",
++ get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), abstract),
++ (unsigned)context_id));
++ return false;
++ }
++
+ /* we have to check all now since win2k introduced a new UUID on the lsaprpc pipe */
+- if (rpc_srv_pipe_exists_by_id(abstract) &&
+- ndr_syntax_id_equal(transfer, &ndr_transfer_syntax)) {
+- DEBUG(3, ("check_bind_req: \\PIPE\\%s -> \\PIPE\\%s\n",
+- rpc_srv_get_pipe_cli_name(abstract),
+- rpc_srv_get_pipe_srv_name(abstract)));
+- } else {
++ if (!rpc_srv_pipe_exists_by_id(abstract)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
++ DEBUG(3, ("check_bind_req: %s -> %s rpc service\n",
++ rpc_srv_get_pipe_cli_name(abstract),
++ rpc_srv_get_pipe_srv_name(abstract)));
++
+ context_fns = SMB_MALLOC_P(struct pipe_rpc_fns);
+ if (context_fns == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(0,("check_bind_req: malloc() failed!\n"));
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From 511a212ad0bde4c84c6fb30625537cfc5052ac43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 13:05:01 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 31/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: don't allow an existing
+ context to be changed in check_bind_req()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+An alter context can't change the syntax of an existing context,
+a new context_id will be used for that.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit a995740d4e7fbd8fbb5c8c6280b73eaceae53574)
+---
+ source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+index 0e6b073..4263a91 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+@@ -360,6 +360,28 @@ static bool check_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ return false;
+ }
+
++ for (context_fns = p->contexts;
++ context_fns != NULL;
++ context_fns = context_fns->next)
++ {
++ if (context_fns->context_id != context_id) {
++ continue;
++ }
++
++ ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(&context_fns->syntax,
++ abstract);
++ if (ok) {
++ return true;
++ }
++
++ DEBUG(1,("check_bind_req: changing abstract syntax for "
++ "%s context_id=%u into %s not supported\n",
++ get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), &context_fns->syntax),
++ (unsigned)context_id,
++ get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), abstract)));
++ return false;
++ }
++
+ /* we have to check all now since win2k introduced a new UUID on the lsaprpc pipe */
+ if (!rpc_srv_pipe_exists_by_id(abstract)) {
+ return false;
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From 6d8d1b5524548c7d2a5f4ba5d2f6263b3ed57590 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 00:01:37 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 32/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: pass struct
+ pipe_auth_data to create_rpc_{bind_auth3,alter_context}()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit f556d9245c13d018d4e772f06d013ebe558703d9)
+---
+ source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c | 26 ++++++++++----------------
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+index 1c4ff01..3af3d8f 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+@@ -1816,9 +1816,8 @@ static bool check_bind_response(const struct dcerpc_bind_ack *r,
+
+ static NTSTATUS create_rpc_bind_auth3(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct rpc_pipe_client *cli,
+- uint32 rpc_call_id,
+- enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type,
+- enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level,
++ struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
++ uint32_t rpc_call_id,
+ DATA_BLOB *pauth_blob,
+ DATA_BLOB *rpc_out)
+ {
+@@ -1828,8 +1827,8 @@ static NTSTATUS create_rpc_bind_auth3(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ u.auth3._pad = 0;
+
+ status = dcerpc_push_dcerpc_auth(mem_ctx,
+- auth_type,
+- auth_level,
++ auth->auth_type,
++ auth->auth_level,
+ 0, /* auth_pad_length */
+ 1, /* auth_context_id */
+ pauth_blob,
+@@ -1861,9 +1860,8 @@ static NTSTATUS create_rpc_bind_auth3(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ ********************************************************************/
+
+ static NTSTATUS create_rpc_alter_context(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+- enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type,
+- enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level,
+- uint32 rpc_call_id,
++ struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
++ uint32_t rpc_call_id,
+ const struct ndr_syntax_id *abstract,
+ const struct ndr_syntax_id *transfer,
+ const DATA_BLOB *pauth_blob, /* spnego auth blob already created. */
+@@ -1873,8 +1871,8 @@ static NTSTATUS create_rpc_alter_context(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ NTSTATUS status;
+
+ status = dcerpc_push_dcerpc_auth(mem_ctx,
+- auth_type,
+- auth_level,
++ auth->auth_type,
++ auth->auth_level,
+ 0, /* auth_pad_length */
+ 1, /* auth_context_id */
+ pauth_blob,
+@@ -2300,9 +2298,7 @@ static NTSTATUS rpc_bind_next_send(struct tevent_req *req,
+ /* Now prepare the alter context pdu. */
+ data_blob_free(&state->rpc_out);
+
+- status = create_rpc_alter_context(state,
+- auth->auth_type,
+- auth->auth_level,
++ status = create_rpc_alter_context(state, auth,
+ state->rpc_call_id,
+ &state->cli->abstract_syntax,
+ &state->cli->transfer_syntax,
+@@ -2335,10 +2331,8 @@ static NTSTATUS rpc_bind_finish_send(struct tevent_req *req,
+ /* Now prepare the auth3 context pdu. */
+ data_blob_free(&state->rpc_out);
+
+- status = create_rpc_bind_auth3(state, state->cli,
++ status = create_rpc_bind_auth3(state, state->cli, auth,
+ state->rpc_call_id,
+- auth->auth_type,
+- auth->auth_level,
+ auth_token,
+ &state->rpc_out);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From 62166b207bd465b5c10e07dd23de4b9b2d44bfa4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 00:01:37 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 33/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:librpc/rpc: add auth_context_id to
+ struct pipe_auth_data
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit cbf20b43d7b40e3b6ccf044f6f51a5adff1f5e6d)
+---
+ source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h
+index 9452e85..c25b0f5 100644
+--- a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h
++++ b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h
+@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ struct pipe_auth_data {
+ bool verified_bitmask1;
+
+ void *auth_ctx;
++ uint32_t auth_context_id;
+
+ /* Only the client code uses these 3 for now */
+ char *domain;
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From dbfd333649e66f03c13e266e5e2007cd70acdc44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 00:01:37 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 34/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: make use of
+ pipe_auth_data->auth_context_id
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This is better than using hardcoded values.
+We need to use auth_context_id = 1 for authenticated
+connections, as old Samba server (before this patchset)
+will use a hardcoded value of 1.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit ae68d3f325c3880144b80385779c9445897646e6)
+---
+ source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c | 13 ++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+index 3af3d8f..755d676 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+@@ -1314,7 +1314,7 @@ static NTSTATUS create_rpc_bind_req(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ auth->auth_type,
+ auth->auth_level,
+ 0, /* auth_pad_length */
+- 1, /* auth_context_id */
++ auth->auth_context_id,
+ &auth_token,
+ &auth_info);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
+@@ -1830,7 +1830,7 @@ static NTSTATUS create_rpc_bind_auth3(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ auth->auth_type,
+ auth->auth_level,
+ 0, /* auth_pad_length */
+- 1, /* auth_context_id */
++ auth->auth_context_id,
+ pauth_blob,
+ &u.auth3.auth_info);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+@@ -1874,7 +1874,7 @@ static NTSTATUS create_rpc_alter_context(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ auth->auth_type,
+ auth->auth_level,
+ 0, /* auth_pad_length */
+- 1, /* auth_context_id */
++ auth->auth_context_id,
+ pauth_blob,
+ &auth_info);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+@@ -2704,6 +2704,7 @@ NTSTATUS rpccli_ncalrpc_bind_data(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+
+ result->auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NCALRPC_AS_SYSTEM;
+ result->auth_level = DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT;
++ result->auth_context_id = 1;
+
+ result->user_name = talloc_strdup(result, "");
+ result->domain = talloc_strdup(result, "");
+@@ -2728,6 +2729,7 @@ NTSTATUS rpccli_anon_bind_data(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+
+ result->auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
+ result->auth_level = DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE;
++ result->auth_context_id = 0;
+
+ result->user_name = talloc_strdup(result, "");
+ result->domain = talloc_strdup(result, "");
+@@ -2765,6 +2767,7 @@ static NTSTATUS rpccli_ntlmssp_bind_data(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+
+ result->auth_type = auth_type;
+ result->auth_level = auth_level;
++ result->auth_context_id = 1;
+
+ result->user_name = talloc_strdup(result, username);
+ result->domain = talloc_strdup(result, domain);
+@@ -2836,6 +2839,7 @@ NTSTATUS rpccli_schannel_bind_data(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const char *domain,
+
+ result->auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL;
+ result->auth_level = auth_level;
++ result->auth_context_id = 1;
+
+ result->user_name = talloc_strdup(result, "");
+ result->domain = talloc_strdup(result, domain);
+@@ -3500,6 +3504,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_rpc_pipe_open_krb5(struct cli_state *cli,
+ }
+ auth->auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_KRB5;
+ auth->auth_level = auth_level;
++ auth->auth_context_id = 1;
+
+ if (!username) {
+ username = "";
+@@ -3570,6 +3575,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_rpc_pipe_open_spnego_krb5(struct cli_state *cli,
+ }
+ auth->auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO;
+ auth->auth_level = auth_level;
++ auth->auth_context_id = 1;
+
+ if (!username) {
+ username = "";
+@@ -3644,6 +3650,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_rpc_pipe_open_spnego_ntlmssp(struct cli_state *cli,
+ }
+ auth->auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO;
+ auth->auth_level = auth_level;
++ auth->auth_context_id = 1;
+
+ if (!username) {
+ username = "";
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From 2d58dfb478eccb3f93e1d56f1d2bbff1577d3c02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 00:01:37 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 35/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: make use of
+ pipe_auth_data->auth_context_id
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This is better than using hardcoded values.
+We need to use the value the client used in the BIND request.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 2bc617293a5d8652e484af69660b3646f3d48690)
+---
+ source3/rpc_server/rpc_ncacn_np.c | 1 +
+ source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 11 +++++++----
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/rpc_ncacn_np.c b/source3/rpc_server/rpc_ncacn_np.c
+index f2e9d10..c0f24a6 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/rpc_ncacn_np.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_server/rpc_ncacn_np.c
+@@ -781,6 +781,7 @@ static NTSTATUS rpc_pipe_open_external(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ }
+ result->auth->auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
+ result->auth->auth_level = DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE;
++ result->auth->auth_context_id = 0;
+
+ status = rpccli_anon_bind_data(result, &auth);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+index 4263a91..d6c4118 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+@@ -534,6 +534,7 @@ static bool pipe_spnego_auth_bind(struct pipes_struct *p,
+
+ p->auth.auth_ctx = spnego_ctx;
+ p->auth.auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO;
++ p->auth.auth_context_id = auth_info->auth_context_id;
+
+ DEBUG(10, ("SPNEGO auth started\n"));
+
+@@ -644,6 +645,7 @@ static bool pipe_schannel_auth_bind(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ /* We're finished with this bind - no more packets. */
+ p->auth.auth_ctx = schannel_auth;
+ p->auth.auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL;
++ p->auth.auth_context_id = auth_info->auth_context_id;
+
+ p->pipe_bound = True;
+
+@@ -688,6 +690,7 @@ static bool pipe_ntlmssp_auth_bind(struct pipes_struct *p,
+
+ p->auth.auth_ctx = ntlmssp_state;
+ p->auth.auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NTLMSSP;
++ p->auth.auth_context_id = auth_info->auth_context_id;
+
+ DEBUG(10, (__location__ ": NTLMSSP auth started\n"));
+
+@@ -1173,6 +1176,7 @@ static bool api_pipe_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ p->pipe_bound = True;
+ /* The session key was initialized from the SMB
+ * session in make_internal_rpc_pipe_p */
++ p->auth.auth_context_id = 0;
+ }
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(u.bind_ack);
+@@ -1218,12 +1222,11 @@ static bool api_pipe_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ }
+
+ if (auth_resp.length) {
+-
+ status = dcerpc_push_dcerpc_auth(pkt,
+ auth_type,
+ auth_info.auth_level,
+- 0,
+- 1, /* auth_context_id */
++ 0, /* pad_len */
++ p->auth.auth_context_id,
+ &auth_resp,
+ &auth_blob);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+@@ -1646,7 +1649,7 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ auth_info.auth_type,
+ auth_info.auth_level,
+ pad_len,
+- 1, /* auth_context_id */
++ p->auth.auth_context_id,
+ &auth_resp,
+ &auth_blob);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From 43a77c90f877df714e71274143ab01eef27271cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 00:01:37 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 36/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:librpc/rpc: make use of
+ auth->auth_context_id in dcerpc_add_auth_footer()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 61faaa63e7e610308c72ae4c41a5c7b5b7312685)
+---
+ source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
+index e4d0e3a..977a372 100644
+--- a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
++++ b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
+@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_add_auth_footer(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
+ auth->auth_type,
+ auth->auth_level,
+ pad_len,
+- 1 /* context id. */,
++ auth->auth_context_id,
+ &auth_blob,
+ &auth_info);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From fd2a01c93e86f1f7d23700c25cde5c84743bc289 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 00:01:37 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 37/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:librpc/rpc: verify auth_context_id in
+ dcerpc_check_auth()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 0cf3151c843e2c779b534743b455e630d89e2ba9)
+---
+ source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
+index 977a372..b00cf1bf 100644
+--- a/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
++++ b/source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c
+@@ -881,6 +881,10 @@ NTSTATUS dcerpc_check_auth(struct pipe_auth_data *auth,
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
++ if (auth_info.auth_context_id != auth->auth_context_id) {
++ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
++ }
++
+ pkt_trailer->length -= auth_length;
+ data = data_blob_const(raw_pkt->data + header_size,
+ pkt_trailer->length);
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From b2f0b95a0cdeeaad2ca9b993940fbbb5687a3509 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 22:51:18 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 38/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: verify auth_context_id in
+ rpc_pipe_bind_step_one_done()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 93a0f92b8ebecb38f92d3b2c9a946b486ee91d3c)
+---
+ source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+index 755d676..ee33e80 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+@@ -2052,6 +2052,14 @@ static void rpc_pipe_bind_step_one_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+ return;
+ }
+
++ if (auth.auth_context_id != pauth->auth_context_id) {
++ DEBUG(0, (__location__ " Auth context id %u mismatch expected %u.\n",
++ (unsigned)auth.auth_context_id,
++ (unsigned)pauth->auth_context_id));
++ tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
++ return;
++ }
++
+ break;
+ }
+
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From 6e814c0173c4e74469d6f884f6eef3fc117e7117 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 00:01:37 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 39/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: verify auth_context_id in
+ api_pipe_{bind_auth3,alter_context}
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 3ef461d8304ee36184cd7a3963676eedff4ef1eb)
+---
+ source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+index d6c4118..26c4ee0 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
+@@ -1364,6 +1364,14 @@ bool api_pipe_bind_auth3(struct pipes_struct *p, struct ncacn_packet *pkt)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
++ if (auth_info.auth_context_id != p->auth.auth_context_id) {
++ DEBUG(0, ("Auth context id mismatch! Client sent %u, "
++ "but auth was started as level %u!\n",
++ (unsigned)auth_info.auth_context_id,
++ (unsigned)p->auth.auth_context_id));
++ goto err;
++ }
++
+ switch (auth_info.auth_type) {
+ case DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NTLMSSP:
+ ntlmssp_ctx = talloc_get_type_abort(p->auth.auth_ctx,
+@@ -1545,6 +1553,14 @@ static bool api_pipe_alter_context(struct pipes_struct *p,
+ goto err_exit;
+ }
+
++ if (auth_info.auth_context_id != p->auth.auth_context_id) {
++ DEBUG(0, ("Auth context id mismatch! Client sent %u, "
++ "but auth was started as level %u!\n",
++ (unsigned)auth_info.auth_context_id,
++ (unsigned)p->auth.auth_context_id));
++ goto err_exit;
++ }
++
+ switch (auth_info.auth_type) {
+ case DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SPNEGO:
+ spnego_ctx = talloc_get_type_abort(p->auth.auth_ctx,
+--
+2.8.1
+
+
+From dca4488d6ce0477cac4bf4ab878444d64a83ebfb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Date: Tue, 22 Dec 2015 21:23:14 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 40/40] CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: disconnect connection on
+ protocol errors
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd at samba.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 024d3b263a2879cee4fb7794d70f253c948cc043)
+---
+ source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 64 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+index ee33e80..a3810f0 100644
+--- a/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
++++ b/source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c
+@@ -953,6 +953,12 @@ static void rpc_api_pipe_got_pdu(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+
+ state->pkt = talloc(state, struct ncacn_packet);
+ if (!state->pkt) {
++ /*
++ * TODO: do a real async disconnect ...
++ *
++ * For now do it sync...
++ */
++ TALLOC_FREE(state->cli->transport);
+ tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY);
+ return;
+ }
+@@ -962,6 +968,12 @@ static void rpc_api_pipe_got_pdu(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+ state->pkt,
+ !state->endianess);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
++ /*
++ * TODO: do a real async disconnect ...
++ *
++ * For now do it sync...
++ */
++ TALLOC_FREE(state->cli->transport);
+ tevent_req_nterror(req, status);
+ return;
+ }
+@@ -979,6 +991,28 @@ static void rpc_api_pipe_got_pdu(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+ (unsigned)state->reply_pdu_offset,
+ nt_errstr(status)));
+
++ if (state->pkt->ptype != DCERPC_PKT_FAULT && !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
++ /*
++ * TODO: do a real async disconnect ...
++ *
++ * For now do it sync...
++ */
++ TALLOC_FREE(state->cli->transport);
++ } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) {
++ /*
++ * TODO: do a real async disconnect ...
++ *
++ * For now do it sync...
++ */
++ TALLOC_FREE(state->cli->transport);
++ } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_RPC_SEC_PKG_ERROR)) {
++ /*
++ * TODO: do a real async disconnect ...
++ *
++ * For now do it sync...
++ */
++ TALLOC_FREE(state->cli->transport);
++ }
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ tevent_req_nterror(req, status);
+ return;
+@@ -1003,12 +1037,24 @@ static void rpc_api_pipe_got_pdu(struct tevent_req *subreq)
+ "%s\n",
+ state->endianess?"little":"big",
+ state->pkt->drep[0]?"little":"big"));
+- tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
++ /*
++ * TODO: do a real async disconnect ...
++ *
++ * For now do it sync...
++ */
++ TALLOC_FREE(state->cli->transport);
++ tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (state->reply_pdu_offset + rdata.length > MAX_RPC_DATA_SIZE) {
+- tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
++ /*
++ * TODO: do a real async disconnect ...
++ *
++ * For now do it sync...
++ */
++ TALLOC_FREE(state->cli->transport);
++ tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_RPC_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
+ return;
+ }
+
+@@ -1016,6 +1062,12 @@ static void rpc_api_pipe_got_pdu(struct tevent_req *subreq)
@@ Diff output truncated at 100000 characters. @@
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