SF.net SVN: gar:[25789] csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk
janholzh at users.sourceforge.net
janholzh at users.sourceforge.net
Mon Jun 27 09:58:32 CEST 2016
Revision: 25789
http://sourceforge.net/p/gar/code/25789
Author: janholzh
Date: 2016-06-27 07:58:30 +0000 (Mon, 27 Jun 2016)
Log Message:
-----------
openssl1/trunk: update to 1.0.2h
Modified Paths:
--------------
csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/Makefile
csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/checksums
csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/files/map.openssl.libcrypto
csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/files/update-pkcs11-patch.sh
Added Paths:
-----------
csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/files/openssl-1.0.2h-pkcs11-engine.patch
Removed Paths:
-------------
csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/files/openssl-1.0.2e-pkcs11-engine.patch
Modified: csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/Makefile
===================================================================
--- csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/Makefile 2016-06-25 08:32:51 UTC (rev 25788)
+++ csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/Makefile 2016-06-27 07:58:30 UTC (rev 25789)
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
###### Package information #######
NAME = openssl
-VERSION = 1.0.2e
+VERSION = 1.0.2h
GARTYPE = v2
# Since version 1.0.0, soname is fixed and does not follow the minor releases
SONAME=1.0.0
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@
# Let's always block some compromised CA, whatever the CA configured
# (patchs taken from Debian Package)
-PATCHFILES += block_bad_certificates.patch
+#PATCHFILES += block_bad_certificates.patch
# Add old-style certificates hash generation to maintain compatibilies
# with gnutls and programs linked with openssl 0.9.8
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
# Bug opened upstream: http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=3153
PATCHFILES += make_issetugid_support_configurable.patch
-PATCHFILES += openssl-1.0.2e-pkcs11-engine.patch
+PATCHFILES += openssl-1.0.2h-pkcs11-engine.patch
ENGINES += pk11
# Patches taken form oracle
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@
PATCHFILES += 040-uninitialized_ctx.patch
PATCHFILES += 043-x86_wrong_platform.patch
PATCHFILES += 044-suppress_v8plus_abi_warnings.patch
+#PATCHFILES += 046-weak-ciphers.patch
LICENSE = LICENSE
Modified: csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/checksums
===================================================================
--- csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/checksums 2016-06-25 08:32:51 UTC (rev 25788)
+++ csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/checksums 2016-06-27 07:58:30 UTC (rev 25789)
@@ -1 +1 @@
-5262bfa25b60ed9de9f28d5d52d77fc5 openssl-1.0.2e.tar.gz
+9392e65072ce4b614c1392eefc1f23d0 openssl-1.0.2h.tar.gz
Modified: csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/files/map.openssl.libcrypto
===================================================================
--- csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/files/map.openssl.libcrypto 2016-06-25 08:32:51 UTC (rev 25788)
+++ csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/files/map.openssl.libcrypto 2016-06-27 07:58:30 UTC (rev 25789)
@@ -3738,6 +3738,12 @@
CRYPTO_memcmp = DIRECT;
} OPENSSL_1.0.1;
+OPENSSL_1.0.1s {
+ global:
+ SRP_user_pwd_free = DIRECT;
+ SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user = DIRECT;
+} OPENSSL_1.0.1d;
+
OPENSSL_1.0.2 {
global:
ASN1_TIME_diff = DIRECT;
@@ -3829,5 +3835,5 @@
i2d_DHxparams = DIRECT;
i2d_re_X509_tbs = DIRECT;
sk_deep_copy = DIRECT;
-} OPENSSL_1.0.1d;
+} OPENSSL_1.0.1s;
Deleted: csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/files/openssl-1.0.2e-pkcs11-engine.patch
===================================================================
--- csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/files/openssl-1.0.2e-pkcs11-engine.patch 2016-06-25 08:32:51 UTC (rev 25788)
+++ csw/mgar/pkg/openssl1/trunk/files/openssl-1.0.2e-pkcs11-engine.patch 2016-06-27 07:58:30 UTC (rev 25789)
@@ -1,9037 +0,0 @@
-#
-# This patch file adds the Solaris's pkcs11 engine.
-# This is Solaris-specific (developed in house): not suitable for upstream.
-#
---- /tmp/Configure Fri Feb 11 14:40:39 2011
-+++ openssl-1.0.0d/Configure Fri Feb 11 14:41:36 2011
-@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
-
- # see INSTALL for instructions.
-
--my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
-+my $usage="Usage: Configure --pk11-libname=PK11_LIB_LOCATION [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
-
- # Options:
- #
-@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@
- # --prefix prefix for the OpenSSL include, lib and bin directories
- # (Default: the OPENSSLDIR directory)
- #
-+# --pk11-libname PKCS#11 library name.
-+# (Default: none)
-+#
- # --install_prefix Additional prefix for package builders (empty by
- # default). This needn't be set in advance, you can
- # just as well use "make INSTALL_PREFIX=/whatever install".
-@@ -716,6 +719,9 @@
- my $idx_arflags = $idx++;
- my $idx_multilib = $idx++;
-
-+# PKCS#11 engine patch
-+my $pk11_libname="";
-+
- my $prefix="";
- my $libdir="";
- my $openssldir="";
-@@ -938,6 +944,10 @@
- {
- $prefix=$1;
- }
-+ elsif (/^--pk11-libname=(.*)$/)
-+ {
-+ $pk11_libname=$1;
-+ }
- elsif (/^--libdir=(.*)$/)
- {
- $libdir=$1;
-@@ -1105,6 +11115,13 @@
- exit 0;
- }
-
-+if (! $pk11_libname)
-+ {
-+ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.\n";
-+ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n";
-+ exit 1;
-+ }
-+
- if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) {
- $target = "Cygwin".$1;
- }
-@@ -1279,6 +1296,8 @@
- if ($flags ne "") { $cflags="$flags$cflags"; }
- else { $no_user_cflags=1; }
-
-+$cflags="-DPK11_LIB_LOCATION=\"$pk11_libname\" $cflags";
-+
- # Kerberos settings. The flavor must be provided from outside, either through
- # the script "config" or manually.
- if (!$no_krb5)
-@@ -1687,6 +1706,7 @@
- s/^VERSION=.*/VERSION=$version/;
- s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/;
- s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/;
-+ s/^PK11_LIB_LOCATION=.*/PK11_LIB_LOCATION=$pk11_libname/;
- s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/;
- s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/;
- s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/;
---- /tmp/Makefile.org Fri Feb 11 14:41:54 2011
-+++ openssl-1.0.0d/Makefile.org Fri Feb 11 14:38:01 2011
-@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@
- INSTALL_PREFIX=
- INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl
-
-+# You must set this through --pk11-libname configure option.
-+PK11_LIB_LOCATION=
-+
- # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this!
- OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl
-
---- /tmp/Makefile Mon Feb 14 14:59:22 2011
-+++ openssl-1.0.0d/engines/Makefile Mon Feb 14 15:00:35 2011
-@@ -26,7 +26,8 @@
- APPS=
-
- LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a
--LIBNAMES= 4758cca aep atalla cswift gmp chil nuron sureware ubsec padlock capi
-+LIBNAMES= 4758cca aep atalla cswift gmp chil nuron sureware ubsec padlock capi \
-+ pk11
-
- LIBSRC= e_4758cca.c \
- e_aep.c \
-@@ -38,7 +39,8 @@
- e_sureware.c \
- e_ubsec.c \
- e_padlock.c \
-- e_capi.c
-+ e_capi.c \
-+ e_pk11.c
- LIBOBJ= e_4758cca.o \
- e_aep.o \
- e_atalla.o \
-@@ -49,7 +51,8 @@
- e_sureware.o \
- e_ubsec.o \
- e_padlock.o \
-- e_capi.o
-+ e_capi.o \
-+ e_pk11.o
-
- SRC= $(LIBSRC)
-
-@@ -63,7 +66,8 @@
- e_nuron_err.c e_nuron_err.h \
- e_sureware_err.c e_sureware_err.h \
- e_ubsec_err.c e_ubsec_err.h \
-- e_capi_err.c e_capi_err.h
-+ e_capi_err.c e_capi_err.h \
-+ e_pk11.h e_pk11_uri.h e_pk11_err.h e_pk11_pub.c e_pk11_uri.c e_pk11_err.c
-
- ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER)
-
-@@ -78,7 +82,7 @@
- for l in $(LIBNAMES); do \
- $(MAKE) -f ../Makefile.shared -e \
- LIBNAME=$$l LIBEXTRAS=e_$$l.o \
-- LIBDEPS='-L.. -lcrypto $(EX_LIBS)' \
-+ LIBDEPS='-L.. -lcrypto -lcryptoutil $(EX_LIBS)' \
- link_o.$(SHLIB_TARGET); \
- done; \
- else \
---- crypto/engine/eng_all.c Thu Sep 5 12:59:50 2013
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/engine/eng_all.c Thu Sep 5 12:59:50 2013
-@@ -60,6 +60,16 @@
- #include "cryptlib.h"
- #include "eng_int.h"
-
-+/*
-+ * pkcs11 engine no longer is a built-in engine, and ENGINE_load_pk11() needs to be
-+ * defined in libcrypto.so for ssh. Instead of load pkcs11 engine, it load dynamic
-+ * engines.
-+ */
-+void ENGINE_load_pk11(void)
-+ {
-+ ENGINE_load_dynamic();
-+ }
-+
- void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void)
- {
- /* Some ENGINEs need this */
---- crypto/dso/dso_lib.c Thu Sep 5 12:59:50 2013
-+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c Thu Sep 5 12:59:50 2013
-@@ -396,6 +396,24 @@
- DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_CONVERT_FILENAME, DSO_R_NO_FILENAME);
- return (NULL);
- }
-+ /*
-+ * For pkcs11 engine, use libpk11.so (instead of libpkcs11.so) to
-+ * avoid the name collision with PKCS#11 library.
-+ */
-+ if (strcmp(filename, "pkcs11") == 0) {
-+#ifdef _LP64
-+ char *fullpath = "/opt/csw/lib/64/openssl-1.0.0/engines/libpk11.so";
-+#else
-+ char *fullpath = "/opt/csw/lib/openssl-1.0.0/engines/libpk11.so";
-+#endif
-+ result = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(fullpath) + 1);
-+ if(result == NULL) {
-+ DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_CONVERT_FILENAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return(NULL);
-+ }
-+ BUF_strlcpy(result, fullpath, strlen(fullpath) + 1);
-+ return (result);
-+ }
- if ((dso->flags & DSO_FLAG_NO_NAME_TRANSLATION) == 0) {
- if (dso->name_converter != NULL)
- result = dso->name_converter(dso, filename);
---- /tmp/engine.h Fri Feb 11 14:46:24 2011
-+++ openssl-1.0.0d/crypto/engine/engine.h Fri Feb 11 14:47:32 2011
-@@ -413,6 +413,7 @@
- # endif
- # endif
- void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void);
-+void ENGINE_load_pk11(void);
- void ENGINE_load_rdrand(void);
- void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void);
-
-Index: crypto//e_pk11.c
-===================================================================
-diff -uNr openssl-1.0.2e/engines/e_pk11.c openssl-1.0.2e/engines/e_pk11.c
---- openssl-1.0.2e/engines/e_pk11.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.2e/engines/e_pk11.c 2015-12-21 12:56:23.%N +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,3720 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2015, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
-+ */
-+
-+/* crypto/engine/e_pk11.c */
-+/*
-+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
-+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
-+ *
-+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
-+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
-+ */
-+/*
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ * distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ * licensing at OpenSSL.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ * acknowledgment:
-+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#include <strings.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <openssl/engine.h>
-+#include <openssl/dso.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+#include <openssl/md5.h>
-+#include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+#include <openssl/dh.h>
-+#endif
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/objects.h>
-+#include <openssl/x509.h>
-+#include <openssl/aes.h>
-+#include <dlfcn.h>
-+#include <pthread.h>
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
-+
-+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */
-+#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG"
-+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */
-+#undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+/*
-+ * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more
-+ * information.
-+ */
-+#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun)
-+#define SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+#include <sys/auxv.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
-+#define DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(...) fprintf(stderr, __VA_ARGS__)
-+#else
-+#define DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(...)
-+#endif
-+
-+#include <security/cryptoki.h>
-+#include <security/pkcs11.h>
-+#include "e_pk11.h"
-+#include "e_pk11_uri.h"
-+
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_true = CK_TRUE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_false = CK_FALSE;
-+#define PK11_ENGINE_LIB_NAME "PKCS#11 engine"
-+#include "e_pk11_err.c"
-+#include "e_pk11_uri.c"
-+#include "e_pk11_pub.c"
-+
-+/*
-+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(),
-+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the
-+ * RSA keys by reference feature.
-+ */
-+pthread_mutex_t *uri_lock = NULL;
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+/*
-+ * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel
-+ * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information.
-+ */
-+int *hw_cnids;
-+int *hw_dnids;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */
-+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX];
-+
-+/*
-+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when
-+ * logging into the token.
-+ */
-+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
-+
-+/*
-+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for
-+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given
-+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be
-+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already
-+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each
-+ * PK11_SESSION object.
-+ *
-+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the
-+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also
-+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another
-+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in
-+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation.
-+ *
-+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores.
-+ * They are also used for active list protection.
-+ */
-+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
-+
-+/*
-+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one
-+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session
-+ * list) for given algorithm type
-+ */
-+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available
-+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed
-+ * without losing the secret key objects.
-+ */
-+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+/* Index for the supported ciphers */
-+enum pk11_cipher_id
-+ {
-+ PK11_DES_CBC,
-+ PK11_DES3_CBC,
-+ PK11_DES_ECB,
-+ PK11_DES3_ECB,
-+ PK11_RC4,
-+ PK11_AES_128_CBC,
-+ PK11_AES_192_CBC,
-+ PK11_AES_256_CBC,
-+ PK11_AES_128_ECB,
-+ PK11_AES_192_ECB,
-+ PK11_AES_256_ECB,
-+ PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC,
-+ PK11_AES_128_CTR,
-+ PK11_AES_192_CTR,
-+ PK11_AES_256_CTR,
-+ PK11_CIPHER_MAX
-+ };
-+
-+/* Index for the supported digests */
-+enum pk11_digest_id
-+ {
-+ PK11_MD5,
-+ PK11_SHA1,
-+ PK11_SHA224,
-+ PK11_SHA256,
-+ PK11_SHA384,
-+ PK11_SHA512,
-+ PK11_DIGEST_MAX
-+ };
-+
-+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st
-+ {
-+ enum pk11_cipher_id id;
-+ int nid;
-+ int iv_len;
-+ int min_key_len;
-+ int max_key_len;
-+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type;
-+ } PK11_CIPHER;
-+
-+typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st
-+ {
-+ enum pk11_digest_id id;
-+ int nid;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type;
-+ } PK11_DIGEST;
-+
-+/* ENGINE level stuff */
-+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e);
-+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)());
-+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e);
-+
-+/* RAND stuff */
-+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
-+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
-+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void);
-+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
-+static int pk11_rand_status(void);
-+
-+/* These functions are also used in other files */
-+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+
-+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */
-+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type);
-+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type);
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock);
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Local helper functions */
-+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void);
-+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
-+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
-+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE handle, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
-+ CK_BBOOL persistent);
-+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
-+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
-+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name);
-+
-+/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */
-+static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
-+static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids);
-+static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids);
-+static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
-+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
-+static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp);
-+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
-+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
-+static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
-+static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
-+ const int **nids, int nid);
-+static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
-+ const int **nids, int nid);
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp);
-+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
-+ int key_len);
-+static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
-+static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-+static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
-+ size_t count);
-+static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
-+static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from);
-+static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-+
-+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found);
-+static void pk11_choose_rand_slot(CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot);
-+static void pk11_choose_pubkey_slot(CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info,
-+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info, CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, CK_RV rv,
-+ int best_number_of_mechs, CK_SLOT_ID best_pubkey_slot_sofar);
-+static void pk11_choose_cipher_digest(int *local_cipher_nids,
-+ int *local_digest_nids, CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot);
-+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
-+ int *local_cipher_nids);
-+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest,
-+ int *local_digest_nids);
-+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id,
-+ int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids,
-+ PK11_CIPHER *cipher);
-+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
-+ int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
-+ PK11_DIGEST *digest);
-+
-+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void);
-+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void);
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void);
-+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table);
-+static int hw_aes_instruction_set_present(void);
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type) \
-+ { \
-+ if (uselock) \
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \
-+ { \
-+ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \
-+ sp->persistent); \
-+ } \
-+ if (uselock) \
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \
-+ }
-+
-+static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
-+static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
-+static int cipher_count = 0;
-+static int digest_count = 0;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE;
-+
-+/*
-+ * Static list of ciphers.
-+ * Note, that ciphers array is indexed by member PK11_CIPHER.id,
-+ * thus ciphers[i].id == i
-+ * Rows must be kept in sync with enum pk11_cipher_id.
-+ */
-+static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] =
-+ {
-+ { PK11_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8, 8,
-+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_DES3_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_DES_ECB, NID_des_ecb, 0, 8, 8,
-+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_DES3_ECB, NID_des_ede3_ecb, 0, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_RC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16, 256,
-+ CKK_RC4, CKM_RC4, },
-+ { PK11_AES_128_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, 16,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_AES_192_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_AES_256_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, 32,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_AES_128_ECB, NID_aes_128_ecb, 0, 16, 16,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_AES_192_ECB, NID_aes_192_ecb, 0, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_AES_256_ECB, NID_aes_256_ecb, 0, 32, 32,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, },
-+ { PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16, 16,
-+ CKK_BLOWFISH, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, },
-+ { PK11_AES_128_CTR, NID_aes_128_ctr, 16, 16, 16,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
-+ { PK11_AES_192_CTR, NID_aes_192_ctr, 16, 24, 24,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
-+ { PK11_AES_256_CTR, NID_aes_256_ctr, 16, 32, 32,
-+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, },
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Static list of digests.
-+ * Note, that digests array is indexed by member PK11_DIGEST.id,
-+ * thus digests[i].id == i
-+ * Rows must be kept in sync with enum pk11_digest_id.
-+ */
-+static PK11_DIGEST digests[] =
-+ {
-+ {PK11_MD5, NID_md5, CKM_MD5, },
-+ {PK11_SHA1, NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, },
-+ {PK11_SHA224, NID_sha224, CKM_SHA224, },
-+ {PK11_SHA256, NID_sha256, CKM_SHA256, },
-+ {PK11_SHA384, NID_sha384, CKM_SHA384, },
-+ {PK11_SHA512, NID_sha512, CKM_SHA512, },
-+ {0, NID_undef, 0xFFFF, },
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in
-+ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11
-+ * session in multiple cipher_update calls
-+ */
-+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ } PK11_CIPHER_STATE;
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets
-+ * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID.
-+ *
-+ * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here.
-+ */
-+
-+/* DES CBC EVP */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_des_cbc,
-+ 8, 8, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+/* 3DES CBC EVP */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_des_ede3_cbc,
-+ 8, 24, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
-+ * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL.
-+ */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_des_ecb,
-+ 8, 8, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_des_ede3_ecb,
-+ 8, 24, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_128_cbc,
-+ 16, 16, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_192_cbc,
-+ 16, 24, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_256_cbc,
-+ 16, 32, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
-+ * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL.
-+ */
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_128_ecb,
-+ 16, 16, 0,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_192_ecb,
-+ 16, 24, 0,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_256_ecb,
-+ 16, 32, 0,
-+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_128_ctr,
-+ 16, 16, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_192_ctr,
-+ 16, 24, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr =
-+ {
-+ NID_aes_256_ctr,
-+ 16, 32, 16,
-+ EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc =
-+ {
-+ NID_bf_cbc,
-+ 8, 16, 8,
-+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
-+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 =
-+ {
-+ NID_rc4,
-+ 1, 16, 0,
-+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
-+ pk11_cipher_init,
-+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
-+ pk11_cipher_cleanup,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL,
-+ NULL
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 =
-+ {
-+ NID_md5,
-+ NID_md5WithRSAEncryption,
-+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ 0,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ MD5_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha1,
-+ NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ SHA_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha224,
-+ NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ /* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */
-+ SHA256_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha256,
-+ NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ SHA256_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha384,
-+ NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ /* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */
-+ SHA512_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 =
-+ {
-+ NID_sha512,
-+ NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption,
-+ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
-+ pk11_digest_init,
-+ pk11_digest_update,
-+ pk11_digest_final,
-+ pk11_digest_copy,
-+ pk11_digest_cleanup,
-+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
-+ SHA512_CBLOCK,
-+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
-+ };
-+
-+/*
-+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
-+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine
-+ */
-+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE
-+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] =
-+ {
-+ {
-+ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH,
-+ "SO_PATH",
-+ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library",
-+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
-+ },
-+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
-+ };
-+
-+
-+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random =
-+ {
-+ pk11_rand_seed,
-+ pk11_rand_bytes,
-+ pk11_rand_cleanup,
-+ pk11_rand_add,
-+ pk11_rand_bytes,
-+ pk11_rand_status
-+ };
-+
-+
-+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
-+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11";
-+static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support";
-+
-+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL;
-+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList";
-+
-+/*
-+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function
-+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether
-+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build.
-+ */
-+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION;
-+
-+/* Needed in e_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */
-+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE;
-+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = CK_FALSE;
-+static int pk11_pid = 0;
-+static ENGINE* pk11_engine = NULL;
-+
-+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL;
-+
-+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */
-+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void)
-+ {
-+ int type;
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], NULL);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+
-+ if ((uri_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(uri_lock, NULL);
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], NULL);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], NULL);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ session_cache[type].lock =
-+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
-+ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL)
-+ goto malloc_err;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+malloc_err:
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void)
-+ {
-+ int type;
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
-+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
-+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
-+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
-+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]);
-+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]);
-+ find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock);
-+ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock);
-+ session_cache[type].lock = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ /* Free uri_lock */
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(uri_lock);
-+ OPENSSL_free(uri_lock);
-+ uri_lock = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support.
-+ */
-+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL;
-+ RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA();
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(e))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_pkey_meths(e, pk11_engine_pkey_methods))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey))
-+ return (0);
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG);
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA()))
-+ return (0);
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG);
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH()))
-+ return (0);
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG);
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+ if (pk11_have_random)
-+ {
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random))
-+ return (0);
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG);
-+ }
-+ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) ||
-+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+/*
-+ * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup
-+ * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp
-+ * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation.
-+ * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern.
-+ */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
-+ pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp;
-+ pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+
-+ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */
-+ ERR_load_pk11_strings();
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
-+ {
-+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (!bind_pk11(e))
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
-+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
-+
-+/*
-+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and
-+ * the function symbol names to bind to.
-+ */
-+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
-+
-+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
-+ {
-+ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
-+ return (PK11_LIBNAME);
-+
-+ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME);
-+ }
-+
-+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
-+ {
-+ if (PK11_LIBNAME)
-+ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME);
-+
-+ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name)
-+ {
-+ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
-+
-+ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */
-+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(uri_lock);
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+/* release all engine specific mutexes */
-+static void pk11_fork_parent(void)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock);
-+ }
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them
-+ * accessible to all threads.
-+ */
-+static void pk11_fork_child(void)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (!pk11_library_initialized)
-+ return;
-+
-+ /* invalidate the global session */
-+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+
-+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock);
-+ }
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
-+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(uri_lock);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */
-+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ return (pk11_library_init(e));
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Helper function that unsets reference to current engine (pk11_engine = NULL).
-+ *
-+ * Use of local variable only seems clumsy, it needs to be this way!
-+ * This is to prevent double free in the unlucky scenario:
-+ * ENGINE_free calls pk11_destroy calls pk11_finish calls ENGINE_free
-+ * Setting pk11_engine to NULL prior to ENGINE_free() avoids this.
-+ */
-+static void pk11_engine_free()
-+ {
-+ ENGINE* old_engine = pk11_engine;
-+
-+ if (old_engine)
-+ {
-+ pk11_engine = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
-+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also
-+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and
-+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function
-+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
-+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
-+ CK_INFO info;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
-+ int any_slot_found;
-+ int i;
-+
-+ if (e != pk11_engine)
-+ {
-+ pk11_engine_free();
-+ pk11_engine = e;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which is called
-+ * from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still at least one
-+ * existing functional reference to the engine (see engine(3) for more
-+ * information), pk11_finish() is skipped. For example, this can happen
-+ * if an application forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a
-+ * fork() when the application is finishing the engine so that it can be
-+ * reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional reference causes
-+ * pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In that case we need the PID
-+ * check so that we properly initialize the engine again.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_library_initialized)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_pid == getpid())
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ /*
-+ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case
-+ * the application calls fork() without finishing the
-+ * engine first.
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks()
-+ * will do the cleanup.
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_init_all_locks())
-+ goto err;
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ session_cache[i].head = NULL;
-+ /*
-+ * Initialize active lists. We only use active lists
-+ * for asymmetric ciphers.
-+ */
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ active_list[i] = NULL;
-+
-+ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library. */
-+ if (!pk11_dso)
-+ {
-+ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */
-+ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso,
-+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST);
-+ if (!p)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */
-+ rv = p(&pFuncList);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any
-+ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an
-+ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11
-+ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just
-+ * because no slot was present.
-+ */
-+ if (any_slot_found == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT,
-+ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since
-+ * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function
-+ */
-+ if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len)
-+ == CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
-+ {
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, "
-+ "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG);
-+ digest_count = 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_library_initialized = CK_TRUE;
-+ pk11_pid = getpid();
-+
-+ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized)
-+ {
-+ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent,
-+ pk11_fork_child) != 0)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ pk11_atfork_initialized = CK_TRUE;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ int rtn = 1;
-+
-+ free_PK11_LIBNAME();
-+ ERR_unload_pk11_strings();
-+ if (pk11_library_initialized == CK_TRUE)
-+ rtn = pk11_finish(e);
-+
-+ return (rtn);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11
-+ * library.
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Make sure, right engine instance is being destroyed.
-+ * Engine e may be the wrong instance if
-+ * 1) either someone calls ENGINE_load_pk11 twice
-+ * 2) or last ref. to an already finished engine is being destroyed
-+ */
-+ if (e != pk11_engine)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ if (pk11_dso == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL);
-+
-+ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* free all active lists */
-+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
-+ pk11_free_active_list(i);
-+
-+ /* Global session is not present when there are no slots. */
-+ if (global_session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session);
-+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
-+ * may have side-effects.
-+ */
-+#if 0
-+ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL);
-+#endif
-+ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso))
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ pk11_dso = NULL;
-+ pFuncList = NULL;
-+ pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE;
-+ pk11_pid = 0;
-+ pk11_engine_free();
-+ /*
-+ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than
-+ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason
-+ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out
-+ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes
-+ * the engine before calling fork().
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_all_locks();
-+
-+ return (1);
-+
-+err:
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)())
-+ {
-+ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
-+
-+ switch (cmd)
-+ {
-+ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH:
-+ if (p == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (initialized)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p));
-+ default:
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
-+
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
-+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void)
-+ {
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
-+ return;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since
-+ * the calling functions do not care anyway
-+ */
-+ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
-+ {
-+ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0);
-+ }
-+
-+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
-+static int pk11_rand_status(void)
-+ {
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */
-+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ break;
-+#endif
-+ default:
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have
-+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here
-+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist.
-+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist.
-+ */
-+PK11_SESSION *
-+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist;
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
-+ static pid_t pid = 0;
-+ pid_t new_pid;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (NULL);
-+ }
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in
-+ * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session
-+ * here, with no PID information.
-+ */
-+ if (pid == 0)
-+ pid = getpid();
-+
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ sp = freelist;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If the free list is empty, allocate new uninitialized (filled
-+ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first
-+ * structure from the freelist.
-+ */
-+ if (sp == NULL)
-+ {
-+ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION));
-+
-+ /*
-+ * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the
-+ * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so
-+ * mark them as unused.
-+ */
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+ else
-+ freelist = sp->next;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all
-+ * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones.
-+ */
-+ if (pid != (new_pid = getpid()))
-+ {
-+ pid = new_pid;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited
-+ * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which
-+ * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the
-+ * head of the list).
-+ */
-+ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ freelist = sp1->next;
-+ /*
-+ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions()
-+ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11
-+ * sessions and destroy all objects.
-+ */
-+ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp1);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* we have to free the active list as well. */
-+ pk11_free_active_list(optype);
-+
-+ /* Initialize the process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize(NULL_PTR);
-+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE,
-+ rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this
-+ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one
-+ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found.
-+ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more
-+ * information.
-+ */
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION,
-+ rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs
-+ * re-initialization.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We will keep the session in the cache list and let
-+ * the caller cope with the situation.
-+ */
-+ freelist = sp;
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (sp->pid == 0)
-+ {
-+ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */
-+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
-+ {
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ sp = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */
-+ session_cache[optype].head = freelist;
-+
-+err:
-+ if (sp != NULL)
-+ sp->next = NULL;
-+
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
-+
-+ return (sp);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+void
-+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
-+ PK11_SESSION *freelist;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and
-+ * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the
-+ * next time we will ask for a new session.
-+ */
-+ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid())
-+ return;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ sp->next = freelist;
-+ session_cache[optype].head = sp;
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */
-+static int pk11_free_all_sessions()
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ int type;
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL);
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will
-+ * return 0 on exit.
-+ */
-+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
-+ {
-+ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0)
-+ ret = 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many
-+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we
-+ * return an error on return.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL;
-+ pid_t mypid = getpid();
-+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
-+ int ret = 1;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock);
-+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
-+ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
-+ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
-+ ret = 0;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ freelist = sp->next;
-+ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype);
-+ OPENSSL_free(sp);
-+ }
-+
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock);
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID myslot;
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ case OP_RAND:
-+ myslot = rand_SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ case OP_DIGEST:
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+ myslot = SLOTID;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION,
-+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We are probably a child process so force the
-+ * reinitialize of the session
-+ */
-+ pk11_library_initialized = CK_FALSE;
-+ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL))
-+ return (0);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ }
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ sp->pid = getpid();
-+
-+ switch (optype)
-+ {
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ case OP_RSA:
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ break;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ case OP_DSA:
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
-+ break;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ case OP_DH:
-+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
-+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
-+ break;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+ case OP_CIPHER:
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_encrypt = -1;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent
-+ * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so.
-+ */
-+ sp->persistent = CK_FALSE;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+/*
-+ * Destroy all non-NULL RSA parameters. For the RSA keys by reference code,
-+ * public components 'n'/'e' are the key components we use to check for the
-+ * cache hit even for the private keys. So, no matter whether we are destroying
-+ * a public or a private key, we always free what we can.
-+ */
-+static void
-+destroy_all_rsa_params(PK11_SESSION *sp)
-+ {
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
-+ destroy_all_rsa_params(sp);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA);
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
-+ destroy_all_rsa_params(sp);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
-+ * objects in the free list.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+ CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock);
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head;
-+ uselock = CK_FALSE;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
-+ */
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+ * destroy operations fails.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock);
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
-+ * objects in the free list.
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+ CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock);
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head;
-+ uselock = CK_FALSE;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
-+ */
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+ * destroy operations fails.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock);
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+/* Destroy DH key from single session. */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key,
-+ ret, uselock, OP_DH);
-+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
-+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
-+ {
-+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
-+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Destroy DH key object wrapper.
-+ *
-+ * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure
-+ * if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list
-+ */
-+int
-+pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 1;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+ CK_BBOOL uselock = CK_TRUE;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock);
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head;
-+ uselock = CK_FALSE;
-+ }
-+
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
-+ * destroy operations fails.
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0)
-+ {
-+ ret = 0;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock);
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
-+ CK_BBOOL persistent)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects
-+ * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so
-+ * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here.
-+ */
-+ if (persistent == CK_TRUE)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,
-+ rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */
-+
-+static int
-+cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++)
-+ if (ciphers[i].nid == nid)
-+ return (ciphers[i].id);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids)
-+ {
-+ if (cipher_count > 0)
-+ *nids = cipher_nids;
-+ else
-+ *nids = NULL;
-+ return (cipher_count);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids)
-+ {
-+ if (digest_count > 0)
-+ *nids = digest_nids;
-+ else
-+ *nids = NULL;
-+ return (digest_count);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key.
-+ */
-+static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher,
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and
-+ * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before
-+ * pk11_init_symmetric() is called.
-+ */
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != NULL);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0);
-+
-+ if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr ||
-+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr ||
-+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
-+ {
-+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params);
-+ pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params);
-+ /*
-+ * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter,
-+ * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344
-+ * needs. For more information on internal structure of the
-+ * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can
-+ * add code so that the counter length can be set via
-+ * ENGINE_ctrl() function.
-+ */
-+ ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
-+ OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+ (void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ if (pcipher->iv_len > 0)
-+ {
-+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv;
-+ pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */
-+ if (ctx->encrypt)
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key);
-+ else
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ?
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
-+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
-+ {
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech;
-+ int index;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row;
-+
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+
-+ index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid);
-+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index];
-+ /*
-+ * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the
-+ * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our
-+ * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From
-+ * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a
-+ * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key
-+ * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this
-+ * code serves as a sanity check.
-+ *
-+ * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be
-+ * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs
-+ * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES
-+ * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV.
-+ */
-+ if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len ||
-+ ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len ||
-+ ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ /* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */
-+ mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type;
-+ mech.pParameter = NULL;
-+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
-+
-+ /* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */
-+ (void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then
-+ * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the
-+ * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup().
-+ */
-+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE &&
-+ sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt)
-+ {
-+ state->sp = sp;
-+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object
-+ * needs to be created.
-+ */
-+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key(
-+ ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to
-+ * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here.
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp))
-+ {
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* now initialize the context with a new key */
-+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt;
-+ state->sp = sp;
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a
-+ * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session
-+ * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so
-+ * that it needs not be recreated.
-+ *
-+ * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this
-+ * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return
-+ * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good
-+ * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix
-+ * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient
-+ * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
-+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
-+ {
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ unsigned long outl = inl;
-+
-+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp;
-+
-+ if (!inl)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ /* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */
-+ if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (ctx->encrypt)
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session,
-+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
-+ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always
-+ * the same size of input.
-+ * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with
-+ * correctly aligned buffers.
-+ */
-+ if (inl != outl)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal()
-+ * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's
-+ * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but
-+ * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't
-+ * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with
-+ * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness,
-+ * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used
-+ * context is initialized without finalizing it first.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH;
-+ CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data;
-+
-+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get
-+ * rid of the context.
-+ */
-+ if (ctx->encrypt)
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal(
-+ state->sp->session, buf, &len);
-+ else
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal(
-+ state->sp->session, buf, &len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ?
-+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with
-+ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the
-+ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with
-+ */
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int
-+pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
-+ const int **nids, int nid)
-+ {
-+ if (!cipher)
-+ return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids));
-+
-+ switch (nid)
-+ {
-+ case NID_des_ede3_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_des_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_des_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_des_ede3_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_des_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_des_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_128_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_192_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_256_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_128_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_192_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_256_ecb:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_128_ctr:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_192_ctr:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_aes_256_ctr:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_bf_cbc:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_rc4:
-+ *cipher = &pk11_rc4;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ *cipher = NULL;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ return (*cipher != NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+/* ARGSUSED */
-+static int
-+pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
-+ const int **nids, int nid)
-+ {
-+ if (!digest)
-+ return (pk11_usable_digests(nids));
-+
-+ switch (nid)
-+ {
-+ case NID_md5:
-+ *digest = &pk11_md5;
-+ break;
-+ /*
-+ * A special case. For "openssl dgst -dss1 -engine pkcs11 ...",
-+ * OpenSSL calls EVP_get_digestbyname() on "dss1" which ends up
-+ * calling pk11_engine_digests() for NID_dsa. Internally, if an
-+ * engine is not used, OpenSSL uses SHA1_Init() as expected for
-+ * DSA. So, we must return pk11_sha1() for NID_dsa as well. Note
-+ * that this must have changed between 0.9.8 and 1.0.0 since we
-+ * did not have the problem with the 0.9.8 version.
-+ */
-+ case NID_sha1:
-+ case NID_dsa:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha1;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha224:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha224;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha256:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha256;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha384:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha384;
-+ break;
-+ case NID_sha512:
-+ *digest = &pk11_sha512;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ *digest = NULL;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ return (*digest != NULL);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */
-+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6;
-+
-+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] =
-+ {
-+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
-+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
-+ {CKA_TOKEN, &pk11_false, sizeof (pk11_false)},
-+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
-+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &pk11_true, sizeof (pk11_true)},
-+ {CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0},
-+ };
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions
-+ * can use the key handles. Here is why:
-+ * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key.
-+ * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key.
-+ * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with
-+ * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES
-+ * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and
-+ * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session
-+ * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key
-+ * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to
-+ * terminate the active operation.
-+ */
-+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session;
-+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key;
-+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
-+ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key;
-+ a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
-+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Save the key information used in this session.
-+ * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX.
-+ */
-+ sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX ?
-+ PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX : ctx->key_len;
-+ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len);
-+err:
-+
-+ return (h_key);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+md_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++)
-+ if (digests[i].nid == nid)
-+ return (digests[i].id);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_MECHANISM mech;
-+ int index;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp;
-+ PK11_DIGEST *pdp;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
-+
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+
-+ index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type);
-+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ pdp = &digests[index];
-+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ /* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */
-+ mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type;
-+ mech.pParameter = NULL;
-+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ state->sp = sp;
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
-+
-+ /* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */
-+ if (count == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data,
-+ count);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ unsigned long len;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
-+ len = ctx->digest->md_size;
-+
-+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv);
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (ctx->digest->md_size != len)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session
-+ * to the pool
-+ */
-+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
-+ state->sp = NULL;
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
-+ {
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ int ret = 0;
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to;
-+ CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL;
-+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
-+
-+ if (from->md_data == NULL || to->digest->ctx_size == 0)
-+ return (1);
-+
-+ /* The copy-from state */
-+ state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data;
-+ if (state->sp == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* Initialize the copy-to state */
-+ if (!pk11_digest_init(to))
-+ goto err;
-+ state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data;
-+
-+ /* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL,
-+ &ul_state_len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (ul_state_len == 0)
-+ {
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len);
-+ if (pstate == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate,
-+ &ul_state_len);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
-+ rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate,
-+ ul_state_len, 0, 0);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY,
-+ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv);
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ ret = 1;
-+err:
-+ if (pstate != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(pstate);
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Return any pending session state to the pool */
-+static int
-+pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-+ {
-+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data;
-+ unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-+
-+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not
-+ * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory
-+ * that might have been allocated in the token when
-+ * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final()
-+ * will return the session to the cache.
-+ */
-+ if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf))
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key
-+ * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key
-+ * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for
-+ * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first
-+ * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same
-+ * prefix.
-+ */
-+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
-+ int key_len)
-+ {
-+ if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len ||
-+ memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0)
-+ {
-+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */
-+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
-+ {
-+ int ret = 0;
-+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
-+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
-+
-+ if (session != NULL)
-+ local_free_session = session;
-+ else
-+ {
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock);
-+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head;
-+ }
-+
-+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
-+ {
-+ local_free_session = sp->next;
-+
-+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * The secret key object is created in the
-+ * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key().
-+ */
-+ if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session,
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ ret = 1;
-+err:
-+
-+ if (session == NULL)
-+ (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock);
-+
-+ return (ret);
-+ }
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported
-+ *
-+ * CKM_RSA_X_509
-+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS
-+ * CKM_DSA
-+ *
-+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a
-+ * public key slot.
-+ *
-+ * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported
-+ *
-+ * CKM_DES3_CBC
-+ * CKM_DES_CBC
-+ * CKM_AES_CBC
-+ * CKM_DES3_ECB
-+ * CKM_DES_ECB
-+ * CKM_AES_ECB
-+ * CKM_AES_CTR
-+ * CKM_RC4
-+ * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC
-+ *
-+ * Digests optionally supported
-+ *
-+ * CKM_MD5
-+ * CKM_SHA_1
-+ * CKM_SHA224
-+ * CKM_SHA256
-+ * CKM_SHA384
-+ * CKM_SHA512
-+ *
-+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which
-+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of
-+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global
-+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key
-+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests.
-+ */
-+static int
-+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found)
-+ {
-+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
-+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
-+ int i;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID best_pubkey_slot_sofar;
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0;
-+ int best_number_of_mechs = 0;
-+ int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
-+ int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
-+
-+ /* let's initialize the output parameter */
-+ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
-+ *any_slot_found = 0;
-+
-+ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */
-+ if (ulSlotCount == 0)
-+ {
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG);
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
-+
-+ if (pSlotList == NULL)
-+ {
-+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Get the slot list for processing */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME);
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
-+
-+ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
-+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
-+ {
-+ current_slot = pSlotList[i];
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: == checking slot: %d ==\n", PK11_DBG,
-+ current_slot);
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ continue;
-+
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG,
-+ token_info.label);
-+
-+ pk11_choose_rand_slot(token_info, current_slot);
-+
-+ pk11_choose_pubkey_slot(mech_info, token_info, current_slot,
-+ rv, best_number_of_mechs, best_pubkey_slot_sofar);
-+
-+ (void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
-+ (void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids));
-+ pk11_choose_cipher_digest(local_cipher_nids,
-+ local_digest_nids, pFuncList, current_slot);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (best_number_of_mechs == 0)
-+ {
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ pubkey_SLOTID = best_pubkey_slot_sofar;
-+ }
-+
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID);
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID);
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID);
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa);
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa);
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh);
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random);
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count);
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count);
-+
-+ if (pSlotList != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids);
-+ OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids);
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+
-+ if (any_slot_found != NULL)
-+ *any_slot_found = 1;
-+ return (1);
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_choose_rand_slot(CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot)
-+ {
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking rand slots\n", PK11_DBG);
-+ if (((token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) != 0) && !pk11_have_random)
-+ {
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG);
-+ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE;
-+ rand_SLOTID = current_slot;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_choose_pubkey_slot(CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info,
-+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info, CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, CK_RV rv,
-+ int best_number_of_mechs, CK_SLOT_ID best_pubkey_slot_sofar)
-+ {
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE;
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE;
-+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE;
-+ int current_number_of_mechs = 0;
-+
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking pubkey slots\n", PK11_DBG);
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
-+ * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
-+ &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
-+ {
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of encryption,
-+ * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
-+ CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)))
-+ {
-+ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE;
-+ current_number_of_mechs++;
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
-+ * verifying with CKM_DSA.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA,
-+ &mech_info);
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
-+ {
-+ slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE;
-+ current_number_of_mechs++;
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-+ /*
-+ * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and
-+ * derivation.
-+ */
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
-+ CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR))
-+ {
-+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
-+ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info);
-+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE))
-+ {
-+ slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE;
-+ current_number_of_mechs++;
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-+
-+ if (current_number_of_mechs > best_number_of_mechs)
-+ {
-+ best_pubkey_slot_sofar = current_slot;
-+ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa;
-+ pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa;
-+ pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh;
-+ best_number_of_mechs = current_number_of_mechs;
-+ /*
-+ * Cache the flags for later use. We might need those if
-+ * RSA keys by reference feature is used.
-+ */
-+ pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags;
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: pubkey flags changed to "
-+ "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_choose_cipher_digest(int *local_cipher_nids,
-+ int *local_digest_nids, CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot)
-+ {
-+ int current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
-+ int current_slot_n_digest = 0;
-+
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking cipher/digest\n", PK11_DBG);
-+
-+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot,
-+ ¤t_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids);
-+
-+ pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot,
-+ ¤t_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids);
-+
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+ current_slot_n_cipher);
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG,
-+ current_slot_n_digest);
-+ /*
-+ * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than
-+ * the previous best one we change the current best to this one,
-+ * otherwise leave it where it is.
-+ */
-+ if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) >
-+ (cipher_count + digest_count))
-+ {
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: changing best slot to %d\n",
-+ PK11_DBG, current_slot);
-+ SLOTID = current_slot;
-+ cipher_count = current_slot_n_cipher;
-+ digest_count = current_slot_n_digest;
-+ OPENSSL_assert(cipher_count <= PK11_CIPHER_MAX);
-+ OPENSSL_assert(digest_count <= PK11_DIGEST_MAX);
-+ (void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids,
-+ sizeof (int) * cipher_count);
-+ (void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids,
-+ sizeof (int) * digest_count);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ int slot_id, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids,
-+ PK11_CIPHER *cipher)
-+ {
-+ static CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+ static CK_RV rv;
-+ static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE last_checked_mech = (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)-1;
-+
-+ OPENSSL_assert(cipher->mech_type != (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)-1);
-+
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, cipher->mech_type);
-+ if (cipher->mech_type != last_checked_mech)
-+ {
-+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, cipher->mech_type,
-+ &mech_info);
-+ }
-+
-+ last_checked_mech = cipher->mech_type;
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" not found\n");
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
-+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))
-+ {
-+ if (mech_info.ulMinKeySize > cipher->min_key_len ||
-+ mech_info.ulMaxKeySize < cipher->max_key_len)
-+ {
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" engine key size range <%i-%i> does not"
-+ " match mech range <%lu-%lu>\n",
-+ cipher->min_key_len, cipher->max_key_len,
-+ mech_info.ulMinKeySize, mech_info.ulMaxKeySize);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ if (nid_in_table(cipher->nid, hw_cnids))
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ {
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" usable\n");
-+ local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] =
-+ cipher->nid;
-+ }
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ else
-+ {
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
-+ " rejected, software implementation only\n");
-+ }
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" unusable\n");
-+ }
-+
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
-+ int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, PK11_DIGEST *digest)
-+ {
-+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
-+ CK_RV rv;
-+
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL("%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, digest->mech_type);
-+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, digest->mech_type, &mech_info);
-+
-+ if (rv != CKR_OK)
-+ {
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" not found\n");
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST)
-+ {
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ if (nid_in_table(digest->nid, hw_dnids))
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ {
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" usable\n");
-+ local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] =
-+ digest->nid;
-+ }
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+ else
-+ {
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(
-+ " rejected, software implementation only\n");
-+ }
-+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
-+ }
-+ else
-+ {
-+ DEBUG_SLOT_SEL(" unusable\n");
-+ }
-+
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */
-+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i)
-+ {
-+ pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot,
-+ current_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids, &ciphers[i]);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */
-+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
-+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids)
-+ {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i)
-+ {
-+ pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, current_slot_n_digest,
-+ local_digest_nids, &digests[i]);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
-+/*
-+ * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library
-+ * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation
-+ * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code
-+ * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the
-+ * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some
-+ * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a
-+ * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code,
-+ * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the
-+ * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte
-+ * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products
-+ * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression
-+ * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the
-+ * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea.
-+ *
-+ * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for
-+ * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same
-+ * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11
-+ * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without
-+ * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use
-+ * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since
@@ Diff output truncated at 100000 characters. @@
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